On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 5:25 PM, Marsh Ray ma...@extendedsubset.com wrote:
Everyone here knows about the inherent security-functionality tradeoff. I
think it's such a law of nature that any control must present at least some
cost to the legitimate user in order to provide any effective
On 2011-07-23 7:29 AM, Marsh Ray wrote:
What does the user see when they *are* under attack and the
server authentication step fails?
Then his task fails.
How do the security properties change when the user clicks
on a link in a phishing email?
A phishing email is normally phishing for
On 2011-07-23 7:29 AM, Marsh Ray wrote:
How do the security properties change when the user clicks
on a link in a phishing email?
On 2011-07-23 2:06 PM, James A. Donald wrote:
when someone contacts me on skype, they can never
successfully pretend to be one of my existing contacts. Why
On 13/07/11 9:25 AM, Marsh Ray wrote:
On 07/12/2011 04:24 PM, Zooko O'Whielacronx wrote:
On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 11:10 AM, Hill, Bradbh...@paypal-inc.com
wrote:
I have found that when H3 meets deployment and use, the reality
too often becomes: Something's gotta give. We haven't yet found
a
On 13/07/11 3:10 AM, Hill, Brad wrote:
Re: H3, There is one mode and it is secure
I have found that when H3 meets deployment and use, the reality too often becomes:
Something's gotta give. We haven't yet found a way to hide enough of the
complexity of security to make it free, and this
I know it sounds good, but has it ever worked? Has any vendor ever been
successfully attacked through a
weak demo system, and then rolled out a new one *which happened to be
prepared in time for this eventuality* ?
Not a shining example of secure protocol design, but here's one example:
On 07/13/2011 01:01 AM, Ian G wrote:
On 13/07/11 9:25 AM, Marsh Ray wrote:
But the entire purpose of securing a system is to deny access to
the protected resource.
And that's why it doesn't work; we end up denying access to the
protected resource.
Denying to the attacker - good.
Denying
Ralph Holz h...@net.in.tum.de writes:
The question, after all, is how often do you really read the SSH warnings?
How often do you just type on or retry or press accept? What if you're the
admin who encounters this maybe 2-3 times day?
The August (I think) issue of ;login, the Usenix magazine (
Andy Steingruebl a...@steingruebl.com writes:
The way it for for everyone I knew that went through it was:
1. Sniffing was sort of a problem, but most people didn't care
2. Telnet was quite a bit of a pain, especially when using NAT, and wanting
to do X11 forwarding
3. Typing in your password
On 2011-07-13 8:43 PM, d...@geer.org wrote:
I'll certainly agree that security cannot be made free,
on the obvious grounds that security's costs are decision
making under uncertainty plus enforcement of those decisions.
Skype is an excellent example of free security.
Skype has not one click
Andy Steingruebl a...@steingruebl.com writes:
Hmm, do you know that many sysadmins outside high-security conscious areas
that really cared about typing the root password over telnet, especially back
in 1997? I don't. Academia and banks cared, and often deployed things like
securid or OPIE/SKEY
On Wed, Jul 13, 2011 at 8:40 PM, Peter Gutmann
pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote:
Maybe we travel in different circles, but both in sysadmin circles and in
instances where it's come up in the past on security lists as an example of a
successful security protocol, it reason for success has always
On Wed, Jul 13, 2011 at 11:39 AM, Andy Steingruebl a...@steingruebl.com wrote:
On Wed, Jul 13, 2011 at 7:11 AM, Peter Gutmann
pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote:
Andy Steingruebl a...@steingruebl.com writes:
The way it for for everyone I knew that went through it was:
1. Sniffing was sort of a
Re: H3, There is one mode and it is secure
I have found that when H3 meets deployment and use, the reality too often
becomes: Something's gotta give. We haven't yet found a way to hide enough
of the complexity of security to make it free, and this inevitably causes
conflicts with goals like
On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 12:10 PM, Hill, Brad bh...@paypal-inc.com wrote:
Re: H3, There is one mode and it is secure
I have found that when H3 meets deployment and use, the reality too often
becomes: Something's gotta give. We haven't yet found a way to hide enough
of the complexity of
On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 2:24 PM, Zooko O'Whielacronx zo...@zooko.com wrote:
When systems come with good usability properties in the key management
(SSH, and I modestly suggest ZRTP and Tahoe-LAFS) then we don't see
this pattern. People are willing to use secure tools that have a good
usable
On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 5:36 PM, Andy Steingruebl a...@steingruebl.com wrote:
I reject the SSH key management example though. Especially if you've
ever maintained a large number/variety of unix servers running SSH,
where hardware failures, machine upgrades, etc. lead to frequent SSH
key
On 13/07/11 8:36 AM, Andy Steingruebl wrote:
On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 2:24 PM, Zooko O'Whielacronxzo...@zooko.com wrote:
When systems come with good usability properties in the key management
(SSH, and I modestly suggest ZRTP and Tahoe-LAFS) then we don't see
this pattern. People are willing
On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 3:56 PM, Ian G i...@iang.org wrote:
The SSH-vs-telnet example was back in the mid-90s where there were two
alternatives: secure telnet and this new-fangled thing called SSH.
The way it for for everyone I knew that went through it was:
1. Sniffing was sort of a
On 07/12/2011 04:24 PM, Zooko O'Whielacronx wrote:
On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 11:10 AM, Hill, Bradbh...@paypal-inc.com
wrote:
I have found that when H3 meets deployment and use, the reality
too often becomes: Something's gotta give. We haven't yet found
a way to hide enough of the complexity of
On 2011-07-13 7:24 AM, Zooko O'Whielacronx wrote:
On Tue, Jul 12, 2011 at 11:10 AM, Hill, Bradbh...@paypal-inc.com wrote:
I have found that when H3 meets deployment and use, the reality too often becomes:
Something's gotta give. We haven't yet found a way to hide enough of the
complexity
On 2011-07-13 3:10 AM, Hill, Brad wrote:
Recognize in advance that users will demand an insecure mode and give it to
them.
I don't see any demand for an insecure mode for tor hidden services, and
though SSH provides an insecure mode, no one uses it.
If users demand an insecure mode,
On 2011-07-13 8:36 AM, Andy Steingruebl wrote:
I reject the SSH key management example though. Especially if you've
ever maintained a large number/variety of unix servers running SSH,
where hardware failures, machine upgrades, etc. lead to frequent SSH
key churn. In those cases the only
If users demand an insecure mode, it is because your secure mode has bad user
interface.
I'm actually thinking about things like web services where the user isn't
someone sitting in front of a UI, but a programmer, or a team of programmers,
testers, and operational personnel.It's easy to
Zooko O'Whielacronx zo...@zooko.com writes:
Hm, digging around in my keepsakes cabinet, I unfortunately do not find the
original state transition diagram that I mentioned above, but I do find an
artifact that I wrote a few months later=E2=80=94a sketch of a protocol that
I called ZRTP lite which
Sampo Syreeni de...@iki.fi writes:
To my mind the difference seemed to be about shallow versus deep parsing. You
can't really deep parse anything in BER with implicit tagging,
You can deep-parse, you just need to apply some basic heuristics (e.g. if
it's an octet string and the first byte is
Nico Williams n...@cryptonector.com writes:
On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 12:06 AM, Peter Gutmann
pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote:
(The ASN.1 filter I mentioned earlier is a stripped-down version of dumpasn1.
Remember that dataset of 400K broken certs that NISCC generated a few years
ago and that
I wrote:
BER and DER are actually the safest encodings of the major security protocols
I work with.
Based on the following, which just appeared on another list:
In contrast to RFC 5280, X.509 does not require DER encoding. It only
requires that the signature is generated across a DER
On Wed, Jul 6, 2011 at 7:07 AM, Peter Gutmann pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote:
I wrote:
BER and DER are actually the safest encodings of the major security protocols
I work with.
Based on the following, which just appeared on another list:
In contrast to RFC 5280, X.509 does not require
On 2011-07-04, Jon Callas wrote:
Let me be blunt here. The state of software security is so immature
that worrying about crypto security or protocol security is like
debating the options between hardened steel and titanium, when the
thing holding the chain of links to the actual user
On Jul 4, 2011, at 10:10 PM, coderman wrote:
H3 should be Gospel: There is Only One Mode and it is Secure
anything else is a failure waiting to happen…
Yeah, sure. I agree completely. How could any sane person not agree? We could
rephrase this as, The Nineties Called, and They Want Their
coderman coder...@gmail.com writes:
H3 should be Gospel: There is Only One Mode and it is Secure
Also known as Grigg's Law. The corollary, for protocols where there *are*
options, is There is one one cipher suite and that is Suite #1.
Peter.
___
On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 11:31 PM, Peter Gutmann
pgut...@cs.auckland.ac.nz wrote:
... The corollary, for protocols where there *are*
options, is There is one one cipher suite and that is Suite #1.
hey, removing all other options can be an option.
uh oh, i just contradicted myself...
On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 11:11 PM, Jon Callas j...@callas.org wrote:
...
Yeah, sure. I agree completely.
no you don't ;)
How can I use this principle as a touchstone to let me know the right thing
to do. I suppose we could consider it a rule of thumb instead, but that flies
in the face of
On Jul 4, 2011, at 11:35 PM, coderman wrote:
On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 11:11 PM, Jon Callas j...@callas.org wrote:
...
Yeah, sure. I agree completely.
no you don't ;)
Actually I do. I also believe in truth and justice and beauty, too. And
simplicity. I just value actionable, as well.
Nico Williams n...@cryptonector.com writes:
Why even have a tag?? The ASN.1 Packed Encoding Rules (think ONC XDR with 1-
byte alignment instead of 4-byte alignment) doesn't use tags at all.
Which makes them impossible to statically check, and leads to hellishly
complex decoders.
In
there may be a pragmatic need for options dealing with existing
systems or business requirements, however i have yet to hear a
convincing argument for why options are necessary in any new system
where you're able to apply lessons learned from past mistakes.
You said it yourself: different
On 07/05/2011 09:09 AM, Steven Bellovin wrote:
More importantly (and to pick a less extreme scenario), security isn't
an absolute, it's a matter of economics. If the resource you're
protecting isn't worth much, why should you spend a lot?
And, one does not need to guess at how much a lot is;
On 5/07/11 3:59 PM, Jon Callas wrote:
There are plenty of people who agree with you that options are bad. I'm not one
of them. Yeah, yeah, sure, it's always easy to make too many options. But just
because you can have too many options that doesn't mean that zero is the right
answer. That's
Nico Williams n...@cryptonector.com writes:
In other words, in ASN.1 as it's used you have to know the schema and message
type in order to do a good job of parsing the message,
No you don't. I give as a counterexample dumpasn1, which knows nothing about
message types or schemas, but parses
(I'm not sure whether I should write anything anytime soon, because of
Len Sassaman's untimely demise. He was an idol of sorts to me, as a guy
who Got Things Done, while being of comparable age to me. But perhaps
it's equally valid to carry on the ideas, as a sort of a nerd eulogy?)
On Jul 4, 2011, at 7:28 10PM, Sampo Syreeni wrote:
(I'm not sure whether I should write anything anytime soon, because of Len
Sassaman's untimely demise. He was an idol of sorts to me, as a guy who Got
Things Done, while being of comparable age to me. But perhaps it's equally
valid to
On Mon, Jul 4, 2011 at 6:28 PM, Sampo Syreeni de...@iki.fi wrote:
Personally I've slowly come to believe that options within crypto protocols
are a *very* bad idea. Overall. I mean, it seems that pretty much all of the
effective, real-life security breaches over the past decade have come from
On Jul 4, 2011, at 4:28 PM, Sampo Syreeni wrote:
(I'm not sure whether I should write anything anytime soon, because of Len
Sassaman's untimely demise. He was an idol of sorts to me, as a guy who Got
Things Done, while being of comparable age to me. But perhaps it's equally
valid to carry
44 matches
Mail list logo
