Nico Williams n...@cryptonector.com writes:
SSHv2 has a this approach and it has not been a disaster there.
It's still quite a mess. To compare the two, my TLS suite-choosing code is
more or less:
highestSuite = 0;
foreach suite
suite = readInteger();
if priority( suite )
Hi Peter,
On 11 Feb 2013, at 22:45, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Ralph Holz h...@net.in.tum.de writes:
From what I can tell from our data, the most common symmetric ciphers in SSH
are proposed by client/servers to be used in CBC mode. With SSL/TLS and
XMLEnc, this mode has had quite some
Jeff,
There have been attacks on SSH based on the fact that portions of the packets
aren't authenticated, and as soon as the TLS folks stop bikeshedding and
adopt
encrypt-then-MAC I'm going to propose the same thing for SSH, it's such a
no-brainer it should have been adopted years ago
Nico Williams n...@cryptonector.com writes:
If we want a policy of limiting what cipher suites we allocate codepoints to
then we should have an *explicit* policy, and we should not wimp out when it
comes time to enforcing it.
It'll never work, people will clamour for their pet vanity ciphers no
Paterson, Kenny kenny.pater...@rhul.ac.uk writes:
In fact, SSHv2 adopts a Encrypt MAC construction and all fields in SSHv2
are authenticated. But the issue is that this authentication cannot be
checked until the whole message has arrived, and the receiver has to use a
field in the plaintext to
On 12/02/13 03:04 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Nico Williams n...@cryptonector.com writes:
I'd go further: this could be the start of the end of the cipher suite
cartesian product nonsense in TLS. Just negotiate {cipher, mode} and key
exchange separately, or possibly cipher, mode, and key
On 12/02/13 04:49 AM, Kevin W. Wall wrote:
[Full-disclosure: I am not a Bit9 customer; I just get their
spam^H^H^H^H, er, informative product emails, thanks to a colleague
who signed me up for their mailing list.]
Security company, Bit9, has been hacked and have had their private
code-signing
I have seen several services/people using the phrase zero knowledge
recently, e.g.:
https://spideroak.com/
Based on my understanding of zero knowledge proofs and the traditional use
of zero knowledge in cryptography, this usage seems... novel, to put it
politely. In the case of SpiderOak,
On 13/02/13 05:33 AM, Tony Arcieri wrote:
I have seen several services/people using the phrase zero knowledge
recently, e.g.:
https://spideroak.com/
Based on my understanding of zero knowledge proofs and the traditional
use of zero knowledge in cryptography, this usage seems... novel, to
put
