It depends what sort of side channel attacks you are worried about and what
sort of crypt algorithms you are using.
My knowledge area is cache based side channel attacks.
1. ARM chips use trustzone which claims it prevents cache based side
channel attacks when running in secure mode but probably
Since he's writing an Android client side app, TrustZone is probably not
available to him.
Also, the latest ARM chips are still ARMv7. We wont see any ARMv8 chips
until at least next year. So the AES acceleration instructions are not
available to him.
Many SoC's have hardware crypto accelerators
On Fri, Mar 08, 2013 at 07:45:55AM -0500, Ethan Heilman wrote:
It depends what sort of side channel attacks you are worried about and what
sort of crypt algorithms you are using.
My knowledge area is cache based side channel attacks.
1. ARM chips use trustzone which claims it prevents
On 08/03/2013 14:11, Rob Kendrick wrote:
3. Timers on ARM chips don't have the same resolution as timers on x86 so
cache based attacks are very possible but harder.
The ARM has no timers as such; it's up to the SoC vendor to integrate
them. And some of them are very high resolution.
At
On Fri, Mar 8, 2013 at 2:57 AM, ianG i...@iang.org wrote:
Has anyone done any side channel analysis on phones?
I'm working on an android crypto app at the moment, and an unanswered
question from the threat model is how to limit the possibilities of
attacking the keys from another app. I can
I'm happy to announce the first public release of RbNaCl, a Ruby binding to
the Networking and Cryptography library by Daniel J. Bernstein:
https://github.com/cryptosphere/rbnacl
RbNaCl is actually a Ruby FFI binding to the shared library provided by
Sodium, a more portable repackaging of NaCl
