Re: [cryptography] OpenPGP in Python: Security evaluations?

2015-06-12 Thread Werner Koch
On Fri, 12 Jun 2015 12:39, li...@infosecurity.ch said: Regarding GPGME, is it really exec()uting the gpg binary or is it calling directly the gpg as a library? Sure it does fork/exec. However, gpgsm is run as a co-process and thus there is only one fork/exec for a bunch of operations

Re: [cryptography] OpenPGP in Python: Security evaluations?

2015-04-23 Thread Werner Koch
On Thu, 23 Apr 2015 08:25, li...@infosecurity.ch said: Unluckily PyMe is unmaintained and there's no major software using GPGMe interface. On my Debian box I see ~50 direct dependencies including several MUAs and Jabber clients. KDE uses the C++ wrapper in several packages. libgmime is used

Re: [cryptography] PGP word list

2015-02-23 Thread Werner Koch
Foxtrott Two Alfa Delta Eight Five Alfa Charlie One Echo Four Two Bravo Three Six Seven uid [ unknown] Werner Koch w...@gnupg.org Salam-Shalom, Werner -- Die Gedanken sind frei. Ausnahmen regelt ein Bundesgesetz

Re: [cryptography] PGP word list

2015-02-19 Thread Werner Koch
On Thu, 19 Feb 2015 11:04, i...@iang.org said: I just realised one barrier -- language. It uses the English language, and PGP might be stronger in Europe than in the anglo world. Right. I recall that this has been discussed in the OpenPGP WG years ago. IIRC, the conclusion was that the

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] Email encryption for the wider public

2014-09-19 Thread Werner Koch
On Fri, 19 Sep 2014 06:57, g...@toad.com said: She can send you email at de...@ihtfp.com once, and when your replies all come from: From: Derek Atkins lkjasdflksdlkjp2338tnlsdfh848492-hds8f...@ihtfp.com then when she replies to you, she'll be sending encrypted emails. But The same can

Re: [cryptography] [Cryptography] Email encryption for the wider public

2014-09-19 Thread Werner Koch
On Fri, 19 Sep 2014 12:37, givo...@gmx.com said: for a key in a key server (keystore). but, automatically sending a separate header sounds, er...automatic, transparent to the user. and lets the system do the work. long, more than 10 digits, Actually such a header and an I-D exists for close

Re: [cryptography] technical question about gpg on debian/sid

2013-10-15 Thread Werner Koch
On Tue, 15 Oct 2013 18:10, fu...@yuggoth.org said: Also, to bring this further onto topic, any critiques of the above linked articles are of interest to me. I'm currently in the process of drafting some similar recommendations for another large free There is a simple rule for best practices:

Re: [cryptography] blinding is in libgcrypt but NOT in gnupg?

2013-08-23 Thread Werner Koch
On Fri, 23 Aug 2013 05:56, j...@spaz.org said: I found it in libgcrypt. I don't understand why it's not in gnupg. Becuase in GnuPG 2.x all crypto operations are done by Libgcrypt. It looks to my untrained eye that gnupg and libgcrypt had a common ancestor, but i'm not sure when that was.

Re: [cryptography] LeastAuthority.com announces PRISM-proof storage service

2013-08-16 Thread Werner Koch
On Thu, 15 Aug 2013 13:11, wasabe...@gmail.com said: To: and From: headers leak the emails/identity of communicating parties, but it's not the only place that happens. I've never used PGP but I've used OpenPGP allows sending messages without information on the used keys (e.g. gpg

Re: [cryptography] ElGamal Encryption and Signature: Key Generation Requirements?

2012-12-20 Thread Werner Koch
On Wed, 19 Dec 2012 10:00, a...@cypherspace.org said: probably is heading towards the computional in feasibility, so the only real chance is if people would communicate the p_i values (or the seed for re-generating them, perhaps.) Actually GnuPG tracked those values up to version 1.4.1 in the

Re: [cryptography] Duplicate primes in lots of RSA moduli

2012-02-16 Thread Werner Koch
]: [224 bits] pkey[2]: [2046 bits] pkey[3]: [2048 bits] :user ID packet: Werner Koch w...@g10code.com :signature packet: algo 17, keyid F2AD85AC1E42B367 version 4, created 1199118881, md5len 0, sigclass 0x13 digest algo 11, begin of digest 2a 29

Re: [cryptography] Duplicate primes in lots of RSA moduli

2012-02-16 Thread Werner Koch
On Thu, 16 Feb 2012 13:03, bmoel...@acm.org said: Oh, in this case it's a self-signature. Werner, the problem (aka feature) is that expiry according to self-signatures isn't carried forward into third-party certification signatures -- so if an attacker gets hold of the That depends on how the

Re: [cryptography] Duplicate primes in lots of RSA moduli

2012-02-16 Thread Werner Koch
On Thu, 16 Feb 2012 12:30, bmoel...@acm.org said: I call it a protocol failure, you call it stupid, but Jon calls it a feature (http://article.gmane.org/gmane.ietf.openpgp/4557/). It is a feature in the same sense as putting your thumb between the nail head and the hammer to silently peg up a

Re: [cryptography] -currently available- crypto cards with onboard key storage

2011-10-28 Thread Werner Koch
On Fri, 28 Oct 2011 14:03, t...@panix.com said: So this appears to be basically a smartcard and USB smartcard reader built into the same frob. I can probably find a way to put it within Right. Unfortunately, it also appears to be unbuyable. I tried all three sources listed on the

Re: [cryptography] -currently available- crypto cards with onboard key storage

2011-10-28 Thread Werner Koch
On Fri, 28 Oct 2011 11:10, mar...@martinpaljak.net said: PKCS#11 but also open source drivers (also free, in the sense of free software vs open source software) is as good excuse to reject PKCS#11 In 99% percent of all cases Open Source and Free Software describe software distributed under the

Re: [cryptography] -currently available- crypto cards with onboard key storage

2011-10-27 Thread Werner Koch
On Thu, 27 Oct 2011 11:15, mar...@martinpaljak.net said: I don't know about PGP(.com), but GnuPG is picky about hardware key containers. Things like PKCS#11. For the records: That is simply not true. We only demand an open API specification for the HSM because we don't want to support binary