Re: Did you *really* zeroize that key?

2002-11-07 Thread Rich Salz
Probably moving out of the domain of the crypto list. volatile char *foo; volatile, like const, is a storage-class modifier. As written, it means a pointer to memory that is volatile; this means, in particular, that you can't optimize away dereferences. If you wrote char *

Re: New Protection for 802.11

2002-11-07 Thread Donald Eastlake 3rd
Well, you see some of the people working on improving 802.11 security, in particular some members of 802.11 Task Group i noted that IEEE procedures have no interoperability demonstration requirements. So they formed a little group that took a subset of the then current 802.11i draft and tried to

Re: New Protection for 802.11

2002-11-07 Thread thomas lakofski
David Wagner said: It's not clear to me if WPA products come with encryption turned on by default. This is probably the #1 biggest source of vulnerabilities in practice, far bigger than the weaknesses of WEP. Maybe this is the case in the USA but from my own informal surveys in Helsinki and

Re: New Protection for 802.11

2002-11-07 Thread Nelson Minar
Reading the Wifi report, it seems their customers stampeded them and demanded that the security hole be fixed, fixed a damned lot sooner than they intended to fix it. Which is sort of a shame, in a way. 802.11b has no pretense of media layer security. I've been thinking of that as an opportunity

DOS attack on WPA 802.11?

2002-11-07 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
The new Wi-Fi Protected Access scheme (WPA), designed to replace the discredited WEP encryption for 802.11b wireless networks, is a major and welcome improvement. However it seems to have a significant vulnerability to denial of service attacks. This vulnerability results from the proposed

Re: Windows 2000 declared secure

2002-11-07 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 6:38 AM -0500 11/4/02, Jonathan S. Shapiro wrote: Requirements, on the other hand, is a tough problem. David Chizmadia and I started pulling together a draft higher-assurance OS protection profile for a class we taught at Hopkins. It was drafted in tremendous haste, and we focused selectively

Re: New Protection for 802.11

2002-11-07 Thread James A. Donald
-- Reading the Wifi report, http://www.weca.net/OpenSection/pdf/Wi- Fi_Protected_Access_Overview.pdf it seems their customers stampeded them and demanded that the security hole be fixed, fixed a damned lot sooner than they intended to fix it. I am struck the contrast between the seemingly

Re: Did you *really* zeroize that key?

2002-11-07 Thread Steven M. Bellovin
In message [EMAIL PROTECTED], Peter Gutmann writes : [Moderator's note: FYI: no pragma is needed. This is what C's volatile keyword is for. No it isn't. This was done to death on vuln-dev, see the list archives for the discussion. [Moderator's note: I'd be curious to hear a summary -- it

RE: New Protection for 802.11

2002-11-07 Thread Trei, Peter
James A. Donald[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] wrote: Reading the Wifi report, http://www.weca.net/OpenSection/pdf/Wi- Fi_Protected_Access_Overview.pdf it seems their customers stampeded them and demanded that the security hole be fixed, fixed a damned lot sooner than they intended to fix it.

Re: Did you *really* zeroize that key?

2002-11-07 Thread David Honig
At 03:55 PM 11/7/02 +0100, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: Regardless of whether one uses volatile or a pragma, the basic point remains: cryptographic application writers have to be aware of what a clever compiler can do, so that they know to take countermeasures. Wouldn't a crypto coder be using

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2002-11-07 Thread Astromerkez
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Re: DOS attack on WPA 802.11?

2002-11-07 Thread Donald Eastlake 3rd
On Thu, 7 Nov 2002, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote: Date: Thu, 7 Nov 2002 16:17:48 -0500 From: Arnold G. Reinhold [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: DOS attack on WPA 802.11? The new Wi-Fi Protected Access scheme (WPA), designed to replace the discredited WEP encryption for

Re: Did you *really* zeroize that key?

2002-11-07 Thread Don Davis
At 3:07 PM +1300 11/7/02, Peter Gutmann wrote: [Moderator's note: FYI: no pragma is needed. This is what C's volatile keyword is for. No it isn't. This was done to death on vuln-dev, see the list archives for the discussion. [Moderator's note: I'd be curious to hear a summary -- it

the volatile keyword

2002-11-07 Thread Perry E. Metzger
Don Davis writes: * the c99 standard and its predecessors don't at all intend volatile to mean what we naively think it means. specifically, in the hands of a high-end compiler developer, the spec's statement: any expression referring to [a volatile] object

Re: Did you *really* zeroize that key?

2002-11-07 Thread Patrick Chkoreff
From: Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED] [Moderator's note: FYI: no pragma is needed. This is what C's volatile keyword is for. Unfortunately, not everyone writing in C knows the language. --Perry] Thanks for the reminder about volatile. It is an ancient and valuable feature of C and I suppose

Re: Did you *really* zeroize that key?

2002-11-07 Thread Patrick Chkoreff
From: Trei, Peter [EMAIL PROTECTED] [Moderator's note: FYI: no pragma is needed. This is what C's volatile keyword is for. Unfortunately, not everyone writing in C knows the language. --Perry] Thanks for the reminder about volatile. It is an ancient and valuable feature of C and I suppose

Re: Did you *really* zeroize that key?

2002-11-07 Thread Peter Gutmann
David Honig [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Wouldn't a crypto coder be using paranoid-programming skills, like *checking* that the memory is actually zeroed? (Ie, read it back..) I suppose that caching could still deceive you though? You can't, in general, assume the compiler won't optimise this away

Re: patent free(?) anonymous credential system pre-print - asimpleattack and other problems

2002-11-07 Thread Stefan Brands
Hello Jason: Page 193 and 210 do talk about having an identifying value encoded in the credentials which the holder can prove is or isn't the same as in other credentials. However, the discussion on page 193 is with respect to building digital pseudonyms No, not at all. The paragraph on page