Vin McLellan [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
4. Is this an issue for the client or the server? Normally, this would
only be an issue for the server (i.e., the party that receives the
connection request), since normal SSL clients don't automatically
large numbers of connections.
It's worth noting
Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I'm struck by the similarity of this attack to Matt Blaze's master key
paper. In each case, you're guessing at one position at a time, and
using the response of the security system as an oracle. What's crucial
in both cases is the
If I'm not mistaken, the OpenSSL spec says that you should
MAC the (compressed) message, and then encrypt the message
and the MAC.
This composition is not generically secure, on the other hand you
can prove some nice things about the composition encrypt-then-
MAC assuming certain conditions, see
From Wired News --
http://www.wired.com/news/infostructure/0,1377,57753,00.html?tw=wn_ascii
Hackers Run Wild and Free on AOL
By Christopher Null
Using a combination of trade tricks and clever programming, hackers have
thoroughly compromised security at America Online, potentially exposing
the
The idea is also similar to timing attacks against very, very
badly-implemented password checking schemes; e.g. where a reply by some
verifying server to a correct guess on the first n characters of a
password takes slightly longer than a reply to a correct guess on only
the initial n-1 characters
