(or anyone) goes, I'm sure we'd all appreciate some
notes on what transpired. I understand 17 different bills are
being considered at this hearing, so don't blink or
you may miss it.
Peter Trei
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Derek Atkins
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, for
example. Even use of MACs over exchanged values and pre-shared
conventional keys can prevent many such attacks.
However, not attempting to prevent such attacks -- especially given
that they are very effective -- seems foolish at best.
--
Derek Atkins
Computer and Internet
of frequent business travellers going through there many times.
Ok Ok ok. I'm sorry for trying to do math on only 6 hours sleep
before a flight. I mis-counted 0's. I'm sorry.
-derek
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the number of trials.
-- sidney markowitz
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-derek
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of those lovely unwritten rules that TSA seems to like
imposing).
-derek
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had the mark, you were searched as you tried to board.
If it did not, then you were not searched.
I'm flying United out to the IETF next week, so I'll gladly report my
findings.
-derek
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Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
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about BOS. And I'll find out about ORD
on my return flight. I consider gate checks rather rude, but then
again I consider commercial travel in general rather annoying. If it
weren't going to take me 3 days (rather than 6 hours) I would have
just flown myself out to SF
-derek
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the pin twist be
different at different pin-heights (by putting the drill-hole at a
different twist-angle). I don't think this attack would work quite
as easily on this design.
-derek
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work quite
as easily on this design.
-derek
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?.
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]
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Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/PP-ASEL-IA N1NWH
[EMAIL PROTECTED]PGP key available
| [EMAIL PROTECTED] | http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~eli/
(finished Ph.D., woohoo; looking for good work in the Seattle area)
-derek
PS: My Master's degree is from the Media Lab, so I can vouch for the
fact that reasonable work is done there ... ;)
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viruses.
application/shell anyone? (Yes, some Mail-readers actually
implement this!)
Cheers - Bill
-derek
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million, until more than a month after
reporting results, when it filed a quarterly report with the SEC.
This story ran on page C3 of the Boston Globe on 8/20/2002. ?
Copyright 2002 Globe Newspaper Company.
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the TPM buy _ME_ when running my own machine?
Of course, our task of understanding what TCPA/Pd is trying
to do is made more difficult when proponents lie about what
they are trying to do.
Yep!
-derek
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of a hash.
Note that, in the grand scheme of things, performing the public key
operation is significantly slower than performing the hash, so it
really doesn't hurt you computationally to perform the hash. OTOH,
your signature strength still depends on the strength of your hash.
-derek
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Derek
Nomen Nescio [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Derek Atkins replied:
It depends on the signature algorithm. With RSA you can sign any
message directly if said message is smaller than the public key size
(N). DSA, however, requires the use of a hash.
Actually, depending on the data being
honest to someone else
vs. an application proving to YOU that it is being honest. Again, it
is a question of ownership. There is the DRM side (you proving to
someone else that you are being honest) vs. Virus Protection (an
application proving to _you_ that it is being honest).
-derek
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Derek
but I see it all the time. To me, I think
people just don't know the right term to use so they
just put down something that sounds right to them, regardless
of its correctness.
-derek
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-empty threat model. I would certainly call the latter threat
model paranoid; I would NOT call the former threat model paranoid --
I would call it a normal teenager :)
-derek
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is surprised that Lucky didn't already upgrade to a
key larger than 1024 bits, due to his paranoia.
No offense meant, Lucky...
-derek
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, not the
actual VoIP data. If you read the spec carefully you will notice
that the RTP stream is NOT using IPsec for data protection.
Enzo
-derek
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initiation phase (e.g., through SIP or H.323).
Alternatively, one could rely on IPSEC, but its support on the target
machine cannot (yet?) be taken for granted; the RTP stack, on the opposite,
is usually built into the application rather than the kernel.
Enzo
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chance for any kind of header compression.
-derek
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Templeton has been kicking around some ideas on how to make
zero-UI encryption work (with some small UI available for us experts
who care more about our privacy than the average joe).
http://www.templetons.com/brad/crypt.html
John
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use
the freeware)?
-- Will
Will Price, Director of Engineering
PGP Security, Inc.
a division of Network Associates, Inc.
-derek
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Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
URL: http://web.mit.edu
year
-derek
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[EMAIL PROTECTED]PGP key available
there.
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]
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Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/PP-ASEL-IA N1NWH
[EMAIL PROTECTED]PGP key available
]
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[EMAIL PROTECTED]PGP key available
).
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by some publishers?
I don't know why anyone would care that much about my opinion since I
don't attend Crypto but I think Vancouver is a great location.
Donald
From: Derek Atkins [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Richard Schroeppel [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
References: [EMAIL
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[EMAIL PROTECTED]PGP key
This also looks very similar to my Master's Thesis, where I even use
the term digital ticket! Sheesh.
-derek
Peter Wayner [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I discuss this in both editiions of _Digital Cash_. I wonder if this
is prior art that reads against the patent.
-Peter
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