I arrived at that decision over four years ago ... TCPA possibly didn't
decide on it until two years ago. In the assurance session in the TCPA
track at spring 2001 intel developer's conference I claimed my chip was
much more KISS, more secure, and could reasonably meet the TCPA
requirements at th
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On 15 Aug 2002 at 15:26, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
> Basically I agree with Adam's analysis. At this point I
> think he understands the spec equally as well as I do. He
> has a good point about the Privacy CA key being another
> security weakness that could break the whole system. It
>
I think a number of the apparent conflicts go away if you carefully
track endorsement key pair vs endorsement certificate (signature on
endorsement key by hw manufacturer). For example where it is said
that the endorsement _certificate_ could be inserted after ownership
has been established (not
Basically I agree with Adam's analysis. At this point I think he
understands the spec equally as well as I do. He has a good point
about the Privacy CA key being another security weakness that could
break the whole system. It would be good to consider how exactly that
problem could be eliminate
This is going to be a very long, and very boring message. But it should
highlight why we have differing opinions about so very many capabilities of
the TCPA system. For the sake of attempting to avoid supplying too little
information, I have simply searched for the term and will make comments on
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