Re: authentication protocols

2002-03-30 Thread David Jablon

John,

Do your parties have any shared secret information?

If they share a cryptographic key, they can use a
simple hash-based challenge/response protocol.

If the have shared passwords or any other small
secrets, they can use EKE or SPEKE.

There are lots of neat tricks that might be applicable,
but you should first describe your needs in more detail.

-- David

At 06:14 PM 3/25/02 -0500, John Saylor wrote:
Hi

I'd like to find an authentication protocol that fits my needs:
1. 2 [automated] parties
2. no trusted 3rd party intemediary ['Trent' in _Applied_Crypto_]

Most of the stuff in _Applied_Crypto_ requires that third party. It may
be an impossible task, nothing seems obvious to me. Pointers,
suggestions, or aphorisms all welcome.

-- 
\js innovate scalable infomediaries



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Re: DMCA Still Faces Its First Criminal Test

2002-03-30 Thread Seth David Schoen

R. A. Hettinga writes:

 
http://www.law.com/cgi-bin/gx.cgi/AppLogic+FTContentServer?pagename=law/Viewc=Articlecid=ZZZU66KQBZClive=truecst=1pc=0pa=0s=NewsExpIgnore=trueshowsummary=0
 
 
 
 March 28, 2002
 
 
  DMCA Still Faces Its First Criminal Test
 
 Criminal case will test Digital Copyright Act

The article by Elinor Mills Abreu at

http://biz.yahoo.com/rf/020328/crime_bootleg_2.html

claims that _two_ people have already been convicted of, or pleaded
guilty to, criminal DMCA violations -- one unnamed person in Nebraska
and one person just recently in California.  My colleague Robin Gross
is quoted as saying that the Mohsin Mynaf case is the first time the
DMCA has been used to go after someone who is actually infringing
copyright.  Mynaf was apparently prosecuted for using a Macrovision
corrector in the course of infringing the copyright on movies
(presumably an act-of-circumvention case rather than a tools case).

The first _civil_ case brought under the DMCA's anticircumvention
provisions is probably the little-known _RealNetworks v. Streambox_,
in Federal court in Washington state, which came to an unhappy end in
2000.

The Elcomsoft case might have the distinction of being the first
criminal case involving a _challenge_ to the anticircumvention
provisions, but it isn't the first criminal case in which they've been
used.

Another colleague of mine is compiling a list of all court cases in
which anticircumvention claims were brought under the DMCA.  If you
know of any -- other than the ones EFF has been involved in -- please
let me know.

-- 
Seth Schoen
Staff Technologist[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Electronic Frontier Foundationhttp://www.eff.org/
454 Shotwell Street, San Francisco, CA  94110 1 415 436 9333 x107

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Re: ciphersaber-2 human memorable test vectors

2002-03-30 Thread Jeff Cours

On Fri, 29 Mar 2002, Adam Back wrote:

 Any takers on ciphersaber-2 test vectors which are also topical
 and amusing english phrases?

Is there a faster way to search the test vector space than brute
force? Only certain output values from the PRNG will transform
alphanumeric characters into other alphanumerics, so that's one way to
constrain the search, but are there other, more effective ones?

- Jeff



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Re: ciphersaber-2 human memorable test vectors

2002-03-30 Thread Adam Back

On Sat, Mar 30, 2002 at 08:27:02AM -0800, Jeff Cours wrote:
 On Fri, 29 Mar 2002, Adam Back wrote:
 
  Any takers on ciphersaber-2 test vectors which are also topical
  and amusing english phrases?
 
 Is there a faster way to search the test vector space than brute
 force? Only certain output values from the PRNG will transform
 alphanumeric characters into other alphanumerics, so that's one way to
 constrain the search, but are there other, more effective ones?

The code on the web page makes that optimization.

http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/csvec/

Here's what it does: 

- from the word sets you feed it equal length word pairs are first
XORed and stored for fast lookup with the lookup key being the xor of
the word pair, and the value stored being a list of word pairs (you
get quite often multiple word pairs that xor to the same value)

- brute force by human readable key and iv meeting constraints given
by user

- first test if key output is 7 bit clean (xor of two 7 bit clean
values is 7 bit clean).

- if so lookup successive word lengths from the set of word lengths
the user requested in the pre-computed word-pair database

I use Dan Bernstein's amazingly fast and compact CDB (Constant
DataBase) to store the xor pairs in -- if you have enough RAM, or a
small word set the lookups will anyway be cached, but the CPU to
lookup ratio is such that it's fast enough.  (I don't try to keep the
CPU busy while waiting for disk, the disk isn't exactly buzzing even
with fairly short plaintext / ciphertext words -- if you cared about
that small improvement you could start a few clients in parallel or
fix the code).

Those seemed like the obvious speedups, perhaps there are others.  But
the current approach may be fast enough, the frequency with which it
finds words goes down as you request longer plaintext - ciphertext
words due to the rate of English, but I presume will become more CPU
bound as a higher proportion of RC4 PRNG outputs will not be 7-bit
clean and so will be rejeced without before getting to the database
lookup for.

Adam
--
http://www.cypherspace.org/adam/

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