The basic idea of using zero-knowledge proofs to create an
unlikable anonymous credentials system ...
[sic] !
-
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Nomen Nescio wrote:
It looks like Camenisch Lysyanskaya are patenting their credential
system. This is from the online patent applications database:
http://appft1.uspto.gov/netacgi/nph-Parser?Sect1=PTO2Sect2=HITOFFp=1u=/ne
At 9:00 PM -0700 8/30/02, Nomen Nescio wrote:
Bill Frantz writes, regarding the possibility that the Palladium
architecture could be designed to resist the use of encrypted
code:
All general purpose computers require a way to move data space to code
space to support compilation.
Well, this is
From: Ng Pheng Siong [EMAIL PROTECTED]
A URL concocted by my app looks like this:
https://whatever/object?action=somethingexpiry=timevalcap=XXYYZZ
The cap at the end is supposed to be a capability. ;-)
cap = hmac-sha1(key, /object?action=somethingexpiry=timeval)
1. Is the construction
At 10:53 PM 9/3/2002 Tuesday, Ng Pheng Siong wrote:
(Pardon the crossposting.)
Hi,
I'm building a web app which, rather typically of web apps, constructs
URLs on the fly.
A URL concocted by my app looks like this:
https://whatever/object?action=somethingexpiry=timevalcap=XXYYZZ
The cap at
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Status: RO
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Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2002 19:09:03 +0200 (CEST)
From: Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Announcement: Cypherpunks meeting/party/BBQ, Tim May's house (fwd)
--
-- Eugen* Leitl a
At 1:53 PM +0800 9/4/02, Ng Pheng Siong wrote:
I'm building a web app which... constructs URLs on the fly.
...
I'm creating the capability thusly:
cap = hmac-sha1(key, /object?action=somethingexpiry=timeval)
My questions:
...
2. The key is created from /dev/random. How long should it
does anyone know of an on-line copy of this paper?
- don davis, boston
http://www.ece.wpi.edu/research/crypt/seminar/
A New Class of Side-Channel Attacks on DES,
Prof. Christof Paar, Chair for Communication Security,
Ruhr-University Bochum, Germany
Thursday,