Hi,
I'm looking for a court decision about a case where
FBI agents fooled russian hackers in order to gain
their passwords and to intrude their computers.
Unfortunately (or better: fortunately) I'm unexperienced
with the american court system. Can anyone give me
a hint where/how I can get a
A couple of places have reported on this:
http://www.nature.com/nsu/020916/020916-15.html
An idea from some folks at MIT apparently where a physical token
consisting of a bunch of spheres embedded in epoxy is used as an
access device by shining a laser through it.
On the surface, this seems
On Thu, Sep 19, 2002 at 10:18:46PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
According to this:
http://www.sun.com/smi/Press/sunflash/2002-09/sunflash.20020919.8.html
Sun is donating some elliptic curve code to the OpenSSL project. Does
anyone know details that they would care to share on the
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
But if you can't simulate the system, that implies that the challenger
has to have stored the challenge-response pairs because he can't just
generate them, right? That means that only finitely many are likely to
be stored. Or was this thought of too?
According to
I see several applications where these tokens could be really
useful where biometric methods are completely useless. Main advantage
seems to be that these tokens are extremely cheap. There are heaps
of applications where these tokens seem to be just perfect.
For a bit of perspective, this work
On Fri, Sep 20, 2002 at 02:17:11PM -0400, Trei, Peter wrote:
It appears to have replay resistance *between* readers - ie, the data
from reader A would be useless to spoof reader B, since the two readers
will illuminate the device at different locations and angles.
Not really. Illuminating
Hello,
I am looking for analysis or implementations of Dr. C.N. Chang's
patent 5583939 Secure, Swift Cryptographic Key Exchange or the
newer #5987130 Simplified Secure Swift... and hoping listfolk
can point me in the right direction.
The only references I have found so far are towards a
Perry E. Metzger wrote:
But if you can't simulate the system, that implies that the challenger
has to have stored the challenge-response pairs because he can't just
generate them, right? That means that only finitely many are likely to
be stored. Or was this thought of too?
I believe the idea is
On Sat, Sep 21, 2002 at 12:11:17AM +, David Wagner wrote:
I find the physical token a poor replacement for cryptography, when the
goal is challenge-response authentication over a network. In practice,
you never really want just challenge-response authentication; you
want to set up a
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Some of the OpenSSL developers are on this list. In case they are too busy to
reply, below are some of the comments from the package:
Could someone with legal know-how translate whatever it is this is saying into
English?
Peter.
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