On Thu, Mar 06, 2003 at 10:35:22PM -0500, Barney Wolff wrote:
| On Thu, Mar 06, 2003 at 08:38:42PM -0500, Dan Riley wrote:
|
| But this whole discussion is terribly last century--still pictures are
| passe. What's the defense of any of these systems against cell phones
| that transmit live
At 12:25 PM 3/6/03 -0800, Ed Gerck wrote:
Trei, Peter wrote:
Ballot boxes are also subject to many forms of fraud. But a dual
system (electronic backed up by paper) is more resistant to
attack then either alone.
The dual, and multiple, system can be done without paper ballot.
There is nothing
At 10:35 PM 3/6/03 -0500, Barney Wolff wrote:
On Thu, Mar 06, 2003 at 08:38:42PM -0500, Dan Riley wrote:
But this whole discussion is terribly last century--still pictures are
passe. What's the defense of any of these systems against cell phones
that transmit live video?
A Faraday cage.
On Thu, Mar 06, 2003 at 10:35:22PM -0500, Barney Wolff wrote:
We certainly don't want an electronic system that is more
vulnerable than existing systems, but sticking with known-to-be-terrible
systems is not a sensible choice either.
Paper ballots, folded, and dropped into a large
I'll hop in here, and see if I can give this a swing. IANAC (I am not
a cryptographer), but I do have access to one at work, and I did make
use of him in gaining an understanding of this area.
Some of these points are minutia, but are important, both because they
are common errors, and because
On Fri, Mar 07, 2003 at 12:50:44AM -0600, (Mr) Lyn R. Kennedy wrote:
Paper ballots, folded, and dropped into a large transparent box, is not a
broken system. It's voting machines, punch cards, etc that are broken.
I don't recall seeing news pictures of an election in any other western
At 9:21 PM -0800 3/6/03, Ben Laurie wrote:
Bill Frantz wrote:
At 3:47 AM -0800 3/6/03, Ben Laurie wrote:
I'm looking for a list or lists of sensibly sized proven primes - all
the lists I can find are more interested in records, which are _way_ too
big for cryptographic purposes.
By sensibly
On Thursday 06 March 2003 02:34 pm, John Ioannidis wrote:
Both JFK and SFO have stopped gate searches. Searches at security are
still decided by the TSA personnel there (they don't get to see your
boarding pass).
FWIW, MSP initial security screening wants to see your boarding pass. I
- Original Message -
From: Ed Gerck [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[...]
For example, using the proposed system a voter can easily, by using a
small concealed camera or a cell phone with a camera, obtain a copy of
that receipt and use it to get money for the vote, or keep the job. And
no one
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/07/books/07BOOK.html?th=pagewanted=printposition=top
March 7, 2003
Harnessing Atoms to Create Superfast Computers
By IAN FOSTER
A SHORTCUT THROUGH TIME
The Path to the Quantum Computer
By George Johnson.
Illustrated. 204 pages. Knopf. $24.
George
Francois Grieu [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Then there is the problem that the printed receipt must not be usable
to determine who voted for who, even knowing in which order the
voters went to the machine. Therefore the printed receipts must be
shuffled. Which brings us straight back to papers in
At 2:04 AM -0800 3/7/03, Ben Laurie wrote:
BTW, a terminology nit - a Sophie Germain prime is one such that p and
2p+1 are prime - I'll be that what you've given me is one such that p
and (p-1)/2 are prime, right?
Yes. And I do know that the Sophie Germain prime is the smaller of the two
related
At 10:04 AM 3/7/2003 +, Ben Laurie wrote:
Indeed. The commonly used one is ECPP which uses elliptic curves cunningly
to not only prove primality, but to produce a certificate which can be
quickly verified.
Probabilistic prime tests are just that - probable. ECPP actually proves it.
Does
On Fri, Mar 07, 2003 at 02:22:23AM -0500, Barney Wolff wrote:
On Fri, Mar 07, 2003 at 12:50:44AM -0600, (Mr) Lyn R. Kennedy wrote:
Paper ballots, folded, and dropped into a large transparent box, is not a
broken system. It's voting machines, punch cards, etc that are broken.
I don't
Roy M. Silvernail [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
On Thursday 06 March 2003 02:34 pm, John Ioannidis wrote:
Both JFK and SFO have stopped gate searches. Searches at security are
still decided by the TSA personnel there (they don't get to see your
boarding pass).
FWIW, MSP initial security
Bill Frantz wrote:
I guess I'm dumb, but how to you verify a proof of Sophie Germain primeness
with less effort than to run the tests yourself?
There are ways to prove that p is prime so that the receiver
can verify the proof more easily than it would be to construct
a proof. The verification
I thought that finding them was the hard part, and verifying one once
found
was relatively easy. I used the probable prime test in the Java
BigInteger
package. It sounds like, from some of the list traffic, that there are
better tests.
Chapter 4 of the HAC gives a good introduction to all
Actually, there's the textbook Introduction to Cryptography by Delfs and
Knebl that covers provably secure encryption and digital signatures as well.
Published by Springer.
Jaap-Henk
On Fri, 7 Mar 2003 15:14:04 -0300 Mads Rasmussen [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Has anyone read Nigel Smart's book
On Fri, Mar 07, 2003 at 12:45:41PM -0600, (Mr) Lyn R. Kennedy wrote:
Paper ballots ...
Surely you jest - where else did the term ballot-stuffing come from?
Perhaps you can elaborate on how ballot-stuffing is done without the
co-operation of most of the people overseeing a polling place.
John Gilmore writes:
And, besides identifying what cities they're doing this in, we should
also start examining a collection of these boarding passes, looking
for the encrypted let me through without searching me information.
Or the Don't let me fly information. Then we can evaluate how
On Thu, Mar 06, 2003 at 09:38:25AM -0800, Ed Gerck wrote:
Tal Garfinkel wrote:
The value of these type of controls that they help users you basically
trust who might be careless, stupid, lazy or confused to do the right
thing (however the right thing is defined, according to your
John Ioannidis writes:
(they [TSA] still picked up random people without the search
string on their boarding passess).
HHH! If this list was to have a subtitle it would be
Practical uses of randomness. Surely they're rolling dice, or
cutting a well-shuffled deck, or
(Mr) Lyn R. Kennedy wrote:
On Thu, Mar 06, 2003 at 10:35:22PM -0500, Barney Wolff wrote:
We certainly don't want an electronic system that is more
vulnerable than existing systems, but sticking with known-to-be-terrible
systems is not a sensible choice either.
Paper ballots, folded,
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