Revised Call for Papers
Financial Cryptography '02
NOTE EXTENDED DEADLINE
March 11-14, 2002
Sonesta Beach Resort
Southhampton,
I have being trying to read about formally proving security protocols. I
have seen the work of Needham, Paulson et. al., Meadows among others.
I was wondering if anyone here has seen a comparison between these
approaches to evaluate things like ease of use and effectiveness. I mean
something
On Wed, 31 Oct 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
In closed systems, yes. However, even in those environments there is a
substantial risk, because there really are no trusted, or otherwise
authoritative third parties, short of a full blown background check.
Approximately 80% of all attacks are
In a message dated 11/1/01 11:09:21 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
It appears that a lot
of work has to be done and a lot of money spent before even a small amount of
trust in an individual's proof of identity (on a world- or Internet-wide
scale) can be established.
Not really. The problem
there are several soures to investigate. a nice survey
varieties of secure distributed computing by matt franklin
and moti yung introduces lots of protocos with proofs of
security for most. the survey is available on the net, and
includes a huge bibliography list form where you can carry on.
I have been trying to read about formally proving security
protocols. ... I was wondering if anyone here has seen a
comparison between these approaches to evaluate things like
ease of use and effectiveness.
5 years ago, i saw meadows give an interesting talk,
comparing the various
Might try,
Modelling and Analysis of Security Protocols
P. Ryan, S. Schneider
ISBN 0-201-67471-8
Can't say it has exactly what you're looking for though.
On Thu, 1 Nov 2001, Roop Mukherjee wrote:
I have being trying to read about formally proving security protocols. I
have seen the work of
