On Fri, Aug 09, 2002 at 08:25:40PM -0700, AARG!Anonymous wrote:
Several people have objected to my point about the anti-TCPA efforts of
Lucky and others causing harm to P2P applications like Gnutella.
The point that a number of people made is that what is said in the
article is not workable:
TCPA and Palladium are content control for the masses. They
are an attempt to encourage the public to confuse the public
interest issues of content control with the private interest
issues of privacy and security.
Seth Johnson
--
[CC] Counter-copyright:
From: AARG! Anonymous [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Think about it: this one innocuous little box holding the TPME key could
ultimately be the root of trust for the entire world. IMO we should
spare no expense in guarding it and making sure it is used properly.
With enough different interest groups
1) What's the name of the technique of salting/padding an small integer
I'm signing with random data?
2) If I'm signing above short (~1 kBit) sequences, can I sign them
directly, or am I supposed to hash them first? (i.e. does a presence
of an essentially fixed field weaken the
At 03:20 PM 8/8/02 -0700, Lucky Green wrote:
I, on the other hand, am able to think of several methods in which
Palladium or operating systems built on top of TCPA can be used to
assist in the enforcement of software licenses and the fight against
software piracy. I therefore, over the
I asked Eric Murray, who knows something about TCPA, what he thought
of some of the more ridiculous claims in Ross Anderson's FAQ (like the
SNRL), and he didn't respond. I believe it is because he is unwilling
to publicly take a position in opposition to such a famous and respected
figure.
Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2002 20:25:40 -0700
From: AARG!Anonymous [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Right, as if my normal style has been so effective. Not one person has
given me the least support in my efforts to explain the truth about TCPA
and Palladium.
Hal, I think you were right on when you wrote:
But
Date: Fri, 9 Aug 2002 19:30:09 -0700
From: AARG!Anonymous [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re the debate over whether compilers reliably produce identical object
(executable) files:
The measurement and hashing in TCPA/Palladium will probably not be done
on the file itself, but on the executable content
Lucky Green wrote:
Ray wrote:
From: James A. Donald [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Tue, 30 Jul 2002 20:51:24 -0700
On 29 Jul 2002 at 15:35, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
both Palladium and TCPA deny that they are designed to restrict
what applications you run. The TPM FAQ at
Wow, this conversation has been fun. Thanks, Anonymous Aarg, for
taking up the unpopular side of the debate. I'll spare any question
about motives.
I think most of us would agree that having a trusted computing
environment makes some interesting things possible. Smartcards,
afterall, are more or
Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
1) What's the name of the technique of salting/padding an small integer
I'm signing with random data?
Blinding? Padding? It depends on what you are trying to accomplish.
2) If I'm signing above short (~1 kBit) sequences, can I sign them
Anonymous wrote:
As far as Freenet and MojoNation, we all know that the latter shut down,
probably in part because the attempted traffic-control mechanisms made
the whole network so unwieldy that it never worked.
Right, so let's solve this problem. Palladium/TCPA solves the problem
in one
Eugen Leitl asked:
1) What's the name of the technique of salting/padding an small integer
I'm signing with random data?
You shouldn't need to salt/pad with random data, fixed data should be
OK.
2) If I'm signing above short (~1 kBit) sequences, can I sign them
directly, or am I
AARG! wrote:
I asked Eric Murray, who knows something about TCPA, what he thought
of some of the more ridiculous claims in Ross Anderson's FAQ (like the
SNRL), and he didn't respond. I believe it is because he is unwilling
to publicly take a position in opposition to such a famous and
Jim Choate writes:
On Mon, 5 Aug 2002, Russell Nelson wrote:
AARG!Anonymous writes:
So don't read too much into the fact that a bunch of anonymous postings
have suddenly started appearing from one particular remailer. For your
information, I have sent over 400 anonymous
Nomen Nescio [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Derek Atkins replied:
It depends on the signature algorithm. With RSA you can sign any
message directly if said message is smaller than the public key size
(N). DSA, however, requires the use of a hash.
Actually, depending on the data being
AARG!Anonymous [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
I don't agree with this distinction. If I use a smart card chip that
has a private key on it that won't come off, is that protecting me from
third parties, or vice versa? If I run a TCPA-enhanced Gnutella that
Who owns the key? If you bought the
On Friday, Aug 9, 2002, at 13:05 US/Eastern, AARG!Anonymous wrote:
If only... Luckily the cypherpunks are doing all they can to make sure
that no such technology ever exists. They will protect us from being
able
to extend trust across the network. They will make sure that any open
Seth Schoen of the EFF has a good blog entry about Palladium and TCPA
at http://vitanuova.loyalty.org/2002-08-09.html. He attended Lucky's
presentation at DEF CON and also sat on the TCPA/Palladium panel at
the USENIX Security Symposium.
Seth has a very balanced perspective on these issues
- Original Message -
From: AARG! Anonymous [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[brief description of Document Revocation List]
Seth's scheme doesn't rely on TCPA/Palladium.
Actually it does, in order to make it valuable. Without a hardware assist,
the attack works like this:
Hack your software (which is
AARG!Anonymous writes:
I'd like the Palladium/TCPA critics to offer an alternative proposal
for achieving the following technical goal:
Allow computers separated on the internet to cooperate and share data
and computations such that no one can get access to the data outside
the
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