More detailed descriptions of these Office Of The Secretary Of
Defense (OSD), Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)
solicitations are further down the page. Directly clicking on
the links yields some login prompt.
http://www.acq.osd.mil/sadbu/sbir/solicitations/sbir031/osd031.htm
Stefan,
Overview:
http://munitions.vipul.net/dolphin.cgi?action=3Drendercategory=3D08
My browser displays an empty page on that link.
You might want to try http://www.pki-page.info/#TOOLS which
lists many CA toolkits, many of which are not open source, though.
Cheers,
I can see a number of problems with using mobile phones as a second
channel for authentication:
1. It begs the question of tamper resistant hardware. Unless the
phone contains a tamper resistant serial number or key, it is
relatively easy to clone. And cell phones are merging with PDAs. If
Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
I can see a number of problems with using mobile phones as a second
channel for authentication:
Great questions. Without aspiring to exhaust the answers, let me comment.
1. It begs the question of tamper resistant hardware. Unless the
phone contains a tamper
On Wed, 9 Oct 2002, Joseph Ashwood wrote:
Unfortunately, SecurID hasn't been that way for a while. RSA has offered
executables for various operating systems for some time now. I agree it
destroys what there was of the security, and reduces it to basically the
level of username/password, albeit
i made a small gui wrapper around openssl.
http://users.skynet.be/ballet/joris/SimpleCA/
nothing fancy, just the basics.
joris.
Stefan Mink wrote:
if you find others, please post...
tschuess
Stefan
--
Joris Ballet
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
[slightly (but only slightly, I hope) off-topic]
We've just about finished the draft manuscript for the second
edition of Firewalls and Internet Security (this time by Bill
Cheswick, Steve Bellovin, and Avi Rubin). Given the tremendous
change in the market (including both the prevalence of
At 8:40 AM -0700 10/11/02, Ed Gerck wrote:
Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
I can see a number of problems with using mobile phones as a second
channel for authentication:
Great questions. Without aspiring to exhaust the answers, let me comment.
1. It begs the question of tamper resistant
--- begin forwarded text
Status: RO
User-Agent: Microsoft-Entourage/10.1.0.2006
Date: Mon, 14 Oct 2002 15:16:44 +0800
Subject: Digital Identity Forum programme
From: David G.W. Birch [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Bob Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Digital Bearer Settlement List [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Hi
[I'm reducing the reply level to 2, for context please see former msg]
Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
At 8:40 AM -0700 10/11/02, Ed Gerck wrote:
Cloning the cell phone has no effect unless you also have the credentials
to initiate the transaction. The cell phone cannot initiate the authentication
[ quoted from the qmail mailing list. -russ ]
For those of you wondering when qmail is going to start protecting mail
messages against eavesdropping and forgery: I'll be in San Francisco
Friday morning in front of Judge Patel arguing that the remaining crypto
regulations are unconstitutional.
The content on AES is of some interest, as are a couple of other
portions.
.pm
---BeginMessage---
CRYPTO-GRAM
October 15, 2002
by Bruce Schneier
Founder and CTO
Counterpane Internet Security, Inc.
[EMAIL
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