Re: Columbia crypto box
On Sun, Feb 09, 2003 at 11:34:01PM -0500, Steven M. Bellovin wrote: First, there was no key management. This means that loss of a single unit -- a stolen laptop or a disgruntled (ex-)employee would do -- compromises the entire network, since it's impossible to rekey everything at once in an organization of any size. For most real-world deployments, this is the most serious weakness. Furthermore, if there were real key management, the next two problems couldn't have happened. This was clearly avoidable. Practically, what's the right way to do this? You could do it with a centralized server key that has the ability to broadcast a new shared key to all clients, but then if the server gets compromised you lose control of the entire network (possibly true anyway, for different reasons). From my personal (limited) experience, key management is really hard. I'm curious about potential solutions to this. -- - Adam - Adam Fields, Managing Partner, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Surgam, Inc. is a technology consulting firm with strong background in delivering scalable and robust enterprise web and IT applications. http://www.adamfields.com - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Columbia crypto box
On Sat, Feb 08, 2003 at 01:24:14PM -0500, Tim Dierks wrote: There may be more valid reasons for treating the device as secret; some categories that come to mind include protecting non-cryptographic information, such as the capabilities of the communication channel. Also, many systems on the shuttle are obsolete by modern standards, and it's possible that the communications security is similarly aged. Isn't it also possible that the device contains a physical key of some kind? -- - Adam - Adam Fields, Managing Partner, [EMAIL PROTECTED] Surgam, Inc. is a technology consulting firm with strong background in delivering scalable and robust enterprise web and IT applications. http://www.adamfields.com - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Linux-style kernel PRNGs and the FIPS140-2 test
Thor Lancelot Simon says: Many operating systems use Linux-style (environmental noise stirred with a hash function) generators to provide random and pseudorandom data on /dev/random and /dev/urandom respectively. A few modify the general Linux design by adding an output buffer which is not stirred so that bits which have already been output are not stirred into the pool of new random data (IMO, not doing this is insane, but that's a different subject). [...] Does the above description also apply to truerand, or is that subtly different? - Adam - Surgam, Inc. is a technology consulting firm with strong background in delivering robust and scalable enterprise web and IT applications. http://www.surgam.net - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Linux-style kernel PRNGs and the FIPS140-2 test
Arnold G. Reinhold says: This result would seem to raise questions about SHA1 and MD5 as much as about the quality of /dev/random and /dev/urandom. Naively, it should be difficult to create input to these hash functions that cause their output to fail any statistical test. I would think that this would only be relevant if there was a correlation between inputs and outputs. Lack of entropic skew across the bits of the output shouldn't give any clues to the specific input, unless the outputs are clumping across the output space. Theoretically, the hash functions ought to be able to output every bit string in the output space, so you'd realistically expect a fair number of runs. You're right - it should be difficult to create inputs to the hash functions that cause their output to fail a distribution test, but doing so casts doubt on the randomness of the inputs, not the distribution space of the hash. At least I think that's right - it's been a while since I've thought about this. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
What does it take to be a security professional?
I make my living as a technical consultant, doing architecture and programming for mid-to-large-scale enterprise information processing systems (mostly content management infrastructures lately). I have a formal CS education, and I consider myself about as knowledgable an amateur as possible on the subjects of computer security and crypto. So, I ask the following question - what does it take to be a security professional?. What should I learn in order to be able to confidently offer security services to my clients? I'm looking for journals, readings, certifications, broad topics... the works. - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Hijackers' e-mails were unencrypted
[EMAIL PROTECTED] says: I can just see it coming -- their email was in the clear and we still coudln't find them; imagine how much harder it will be when everybody uses cryptography. I don't think we can win either way. Of course, when everybody uses state-sanctioned security, the protocol will automatically forward a suspicion digest index to the appropriate authorities, allowing for easy sifting and sorting by threat level. - Adam - Surgam, Inc. is a technology consulting firm with strong background in delivering enterprise web and IT applications for Global 2000 clients. http://www.surgam.net - The Cryptography Mailing List Unsubscribe by sending unsubscribe cryptography to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
