Re: septillion operations per second

2001-06-21 Thread Mike Brodhead
If they ever build such a computer (or 1.000.000 of them) what would that mean for today's key lengths ? I am curious how long a computer capable of a septillion operations per second would take to crack one 128 bit or 256 bit key. Or a RSA 1024 or 2048 bit key for that matter ... take a

Re: Computer Security Division Activities

2001-10-13 Thread Mike Brodhead
I will not participate in activities that require me to identify myself to the government, or to be pre-vetted for attendance. Just about all of the private-sector conferences I have attended require registration. The same goes for any decent hotel. Does this bother me? Sure it does, but

Re: Cringely Gives KnowNow Some Unbelievable Free Press... (fwd)

2002-02-27 Thread Mike Brodhead
Isn't Elliptic-Curve patent-encumbered? I think we went through this a few weeks ago. Nope. Fortunately, ECC per-se is not patent encumbered. Scott Vanstone makes much of that in his ECC dog and pony show. Of course, free ECC does not mean some nice optimizations aren't patented.

Re: crypto question

2002-03-20 Thread Mike Brodhead
The usual good solution is to make a human type in a secret. Of course, the downside is that the appropriate human must be present for the system to come up properly. In some situations, the system must be able to boot into a working state. That way, even if somebody accidentally trips the

Re: crypto question

2002-03-23 Thread Mike Brodhead
The problem is doing it in a way that is affordable and doesn't require an army. [snip] I'm not sure what changes in your argument if you delete the word physical. Perhaps we should all just give up with this security nonsense. :) Agreed. It's not about perfect security, it's about

Re: crypto/web impementation tradeoffs

2002-07-04 Thread Mike Brodhead
I'm passing some data through a web client [applet-like] and am planning on using some crypto to help ensure the data's integrity when the applet sends it back to me after it has been processed. Help us to understand your threat model. Do you trust the user and his/her machine, but are