On Fri, 5 Jul 2002, AARG!Anonymous wrote:
... /
Right, and you can boot untrusted OS's as well. Recently there was
discussion here of HP making a trusted form of Linux that would work with
the TCPA hardware. So you will have options in both the closed source and
open source worlds to
On Fri, Jul 05, 2002 at 09:14:27AM +0100, Matthew Byng-Maddick wrote:
On Thu, Jul 04, 2002 at 10:54:11PM +0200, Hadmut Danisch wrote:
[backdoored network cards]
I don't think so. As far as I understood, the
bus system (PCI,...) will be encrypted as well. You'll have
to use a NIC which is
today. I want things to get better. I can't read e-books on my pocket computer, for
example, which is sad since I actually would be able to enjoy e-books if I only could
load them onto my small computer that follows my everywhere. Yes, of course I could
probably bypass the protection and make
On Mon, 24 Jun 2002, Anonymous wrote:
The important thing to note is this: you are no worse off than today!
You are already in the second state today: you run untrusted, and none
of the content companies will let you download their data. But boolegs
are widely available.
The problem is that
Yes, this is a debate I've had with the medical privacy7 guys, some of
whom like the idea of using Palladium to protect medical records.
This is a subject on which I've a lot of experience (see my web page),
and I don't think that Palladium will help. Privacy abuses almost always
involve abuse
Interesting QA paper and list comments. Three
additional comments:
1. DRM and privacy look like apple and speedboats.
Privacy includes the option of not telling, which DRM
does not have.
2. Palladium looks like just another vaporware from
Microsoft, to preempt a market like when MS promised
Adam Back wrote:
I don't mean that you would necessarily have to correlate
your viewing habits with your TrueName for DRM systems.
Though that is mostly
(exclusively?) the case for current deployed (or at least
implemented with a view of attempting commercial deployment) copy-mark
David wrote:
It's not clear that enabling anti-competitive behavior is
good for society. After all, there's a reason we have
anti-trust law. Ross Anderson's point -- and it seems to me
it's one worth considering
-- is that, if there are potentially harmful effects that
come with the
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
As a side note, it seems that a corporation would actually have to
demonstrate that I had seen and agreed to the thing and clicked
acceptance. Prior to that point, I could reverse engineer, since
there is no statement that I cannot reverse engineer agreed to. So
On Wed, 26 Jun 2002, Scott Guthery wrote:
Privacy abuse is first and foremost the failure
of a digital rights management system. A broken
safe is not evidence that banks shouldn't use
safes. It is only an argument that they shouldn't
use the safe than was broken.
I'm hard pressed to imagine
I'm slightly confused about this. My understanding of contract law is
that five things are required to form a valid contract: offer and
acceptance, mutual intent, consideration, capacity, and lawful
intent. It seems to me that a click-through agreement is likely to
fail on at least one, and
On Wed, Jun 26, 2002 at 10:01:00AM -0700, bear wrote:
As I see it, we can get either privacy or DRM,
but there is no way on Earth to get both.
[...]
Hear, hear! First post on this long thread that got it right.
Not sure what the rest of the usually clueful posters were thinking!
DRM
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/tcpa-faq.html
Ross
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On Wed, Jun 26, 2002 at 03:57:15PM -0400, C Wegrzyn wrote:
If a DRM system is based on X.509, according to Brand I thought you could
get anonymity in the transaction. Wouldn't this accomplish the same thing?
I don't mean that you would necessarily have to correlate your viewing
habits with
It seems clear at least if DRM is an application than DRM applications would benefit
from the increased trust and architecturally that such trust would be needed to
enforce/ensure some/all of the requirements of the Hollings bill.
hawk
Lucky Green wrote:
other
technical solution that
--- begin forwarded text
Status: U
Date: Sun, 23 Jun 2002 12:53:42 -0700
From: Paul Harrison [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Ross's TCPA paper
To: R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED]
User-Agent: Microsoft-Outlook-Express-Macintosh-Edition/5.02.2022
on 6/23/02 6:50 AM, R. A. Hettinga at [EMAIL
On Mon, Jun 24, 2002 at 08:15:29AM -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
Status: U
Date: Sun, 23 Jun 2002 12:53:42 -0700
From: Paul Harrison [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Ross's TCPA paper
To: R. A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The
important question is not whether trusted platforms are a good
Ross Anderson wrote:
... that means making sure the PC is the hub of the
future home network; and if entertainment's the killer app, and DRM is
the key technology for entertainment, then the PC must do DRM.
Recently there have been a number of articles pointing out how much
money Microsoft
The amazing thing about this discussion is that there are two pieces
of conventional wisdom which people in the cypherpunk/EFF/freedom
communities adhere to, and they are completely contradictory.
The first is that protection of copyright is ultimately impossible.
See the analysis in Schneier
Ross Anderson writes:
During my investigations into TCPA, I learned that HP has started a
development program to produce a TCPA-compliant version of GNU/linux.
I couldn't figure out how they planned to make money out of this. On
Thursday, at the Open Source Software Economics conference, I
Mike wrote quoting Lucky:
trusted here means that the members of the TCPA trust
that the TPM
will make it near impossible for the owner of that motherboard to
access supervisor mode on the CPU without their knowledge,
they trust
that the TPM will enable them to determine remotely
Lucky Green writes regarding Ross Anderson's paper at:
http://www.ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/toulouse.pdf
I must confess that after reading the paper I am quite relieved to
finally have solid confirmation that at least one other person has
realized (outside the authors and proponents of
Anonymous writes:
Lucky Green writes regarding Ross Anderson's paper at:
Ross and Lucky should justify their claims to the community
in general and to the members of the TCPA in particular. If
you're going to make accusations, you are obliged to offer
evidence. Is the TCPA really, as
I recently had a chance to read Ross Anderson's paper on the activities
of the TCPA at
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/.temp/toulouse.pdf
I must confess that after reading the paper I am quite relieved to
finally have solid confirmation that at least one other person has
realized
Ross has shifted his TCPA paper to:
http://www.ftp.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/toulouse.pdf
At 07:03 PM 6/22/2002 -0700, Lucky wrote:
I recently had a chance to read Ross Anderson's paper on the activities
of the TCPA at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/ftp/users/rja14/.temp/toulouse.pdf
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