Re: ?splints for broken hash functions

2004-09-06 Thread bear
On Wed, 1 Sep 2004, David Wagner wrote: Hal Finney writes: [John Denker proposes:] the Bi are the input blocks: (IV) - B1 - B2 - B3 - ... Bk - H1 (IV) - B2 - B3 - ... Bk - B1 - H2 then we combine H1 and H2 nonlinearly. This does not add any strength against Joux's attack. One can find

Re: ?splints for broken hash functions

2004-09-06 Thread Bill Stewart
how about this simpler construction? (IV1) - B1 - B2 - B3 - ... Bk - H1 (IV2) - B1 - B2 - B3 - ... Bk - H2 This approach and the cache Block 1 until the end approach are both special-case versions of maintain more state attacks. This special case maintains 2*(size of hash output) bits of

Re: Compression theory reference?

2004-09-06 Thread Bill Stewart
It's a sad situation when you have to get a non-technical judge to resolve academic conflicts like this, but it's your head that you're banging against the wall, not mine. If you want to appeal to authority, there's the FAQ, which of course requires explaining the Usenet FAQ traditions; perhaps

Re: Compression theory reference?

2004-09-06 Thread John Denker
Matt Crawford wrote: Plus a string of log(N) bits telling you how many times to apply the decompression function! Uh-oh, now goes over the judge's head ... Hadmut Danisch wrote: The problem is that if you ask for a string of log(N) bits, then someone else could take this as a proof that this

[wearables] CFP: Workshop on Pervasive Computing and Communication Security (fwd from [EMAIL PROTECTED])

2004-09-06 Thread Eugen Leitl
From: Bob Mayo [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: [wearables] CFP: Workshop on Pervasive Computing and Communication Security To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thu, 2 Sep 2004 16:36:15 -0700 (PDT) Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] CALL FOR PAPERS PerSec

Re: Approximate hashes

2004-09-06 Thread Len Sassaman
On Wed, 1 Sep 2004, Marcel Popescu wrote: Hence my question: is there some approximate hash function (which I could use instead of SHA-1) which can verify that a text hashes very close to a value? So that if I change, say, tabs into spaces, I won't get exactly the same value, but I would get

Re: Implementation choices in light of recent attacks?

2004-09-06 Thread John Kelsey
From: bear [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Sep 1, 2004 2:43 PM To: Jim McCoy [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Implementation choices in light of recent attacks? On Wed, 1 Sep 2004, Jim McCoy wrote: After digesting the various bits of information and speculation on the recent breaks

PGP Identity Management: Secure Authentication and Authorization over the Internet

2004-09-06 Thread R. A. Hettinga
http://www.pgp.com/resources/ctocorner/identitymgmt.html Click for illustrations, etc... Cheers, RAH PGP Corporation - Resources - CTO Corner United States | International? Resources CTO Corner Guest Contributors PGP Identity Management Welcome CTO Corner Data Sheets

Re: Kerberos Design

2004-09-06 Thread Joseph Ashwood
I'm currently looking into implementing a single sign-on solution for distributed services. Be brave, there's more convolutions and trappings there than almost anywhere else. Since I'm already using OpenSSL for various SSL/x.509 related things, I'm most astonished by the almost total absence of

Which book for a newbie to cryptography?

2004-09-06 Thread Foo-O-Matic
Hi, first im new to this list and to cryptography. :) I've read the first lesson from this 24 crypto lessons: http://www.und.nodak.edu/org/crypto/crypto/lanaki.crypt.class/lessons/ and found it really interesting. I want to start learning cryptography from a book, and I have access to these 3

Re: Kerberos Design

2004-09-06 Thread Rich Salz
I've been trying to study Kerberos' design history in the recent past and have failed to come up with a good resource that explains why things are built the way they are. http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/www/dialogue.html /r$

Spam Spotlight on Reputation

2004-09-06 Thread R. A. Hettinga
http://www.eweek.com/print_article/0,1761,a=134748,00.asp EWeek Spam Spotlight on Reputation Spam Spotlight on Reputation September 6, 2004 By Dennis Callaghan As enterprises continue to register Sender Protection Framework records, hoping to thwart spam and phishing attacks, spammers