On Thu, Jan 31, 2008 at 11:12:45PM -0500, Victor Duchovni wrote:
On Fri, Feb 01, 2008 at 01:15:09PM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
If anyone's interested, I did an analysis of this sort of thing in an
unpublished draft Performance Characteristics of Application-level Security
Protocols,
I'd scrawled..
Other than for b perhaps wanting to verify the correctness of { p, q, g,
j } (group parameter validation), is there any reason to send q ?
[EMAIL PROTECTED] replied:
I would actually recommend sending all the public data. This does not take
significant additional space and
Anne Lynn Wheeler [EMAIL PROTECTED] write:
one of my favorite exchanges from the mid-90s was somebody claiming
that adding digital certificates to the electronic payment
transaction infrastructure would bring it into the modern age. my
response was that it actually would regress the
--
Ivan Krstic' wrote:
The wider point of Peter's writeup -- and of the
therapy -- is that developers working on security
tools should _know_ they're working in a notoriously,
infamously hard field where the odds are
_overwhelmingly_ against them if they choose to
engineer new
At 09:34 PM 2/1/2008 +0100, Ian G wrote:
* Browser vendors don't employ security people as we know them on this
mailgroup, they employ cryptoplumbers. Completely different layer. These
people are mostly good (and often very good) at fixing security bugs. We
thank them for that! But they
StealthMonger wrote:
They can't be as anonymous as cash if the party being dealt with can
be identified. And the party can be identified if the transaction is
online, real-time. Even if other clues are erased, there's still
traffic analysis in this case.
What the offline paradigm has going
At Sun, 03 Feb 2008 12:51:25 +1000,
James A. Donald wrote:
--
Ivan Krstic' wrote:
The wider point of Peter's writeup -- and of the
therapy -- is that developers working on security
tools should _know_ they're working in a notoriously,
infamously hard field where the odds are
