Re: [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC

2013-08-29 Thread Lucky Green
On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 01:47:01PM -0400, Phill wrote: (This is the last week before school goes back which is stopping me getting to the big iron and my coding platform if folk are wondering where the code is). I had a discussion with some IETF types. Should I suggest a BOF in

Re: [Cryptography] Petnames Zooko's triangle -- theory v. practice (was Email and IM are...)

2013-08-29 Thread James A. Donald
On 2013-08-28 7:33 PM, ianG wrote: On 28/08/13 02:44 AM, radi...@gmail.com wrote: Zooko's triangle, pet names...we have cracked the THEORY of secure naming, just not the big obstacle of key exchange. Perhaps in a sense of that, I can confirm that we may have an elegant theory but practice

[Cryptography] Keeping backups (was Re: Separating concerns

2013-08-29 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Wed, 28 Aug 2013 20:04:34 +0200 Faré fah...@gmail.com wrote: One thing that irks me, though, is the problem of the robust, secure terminal: if everything is encrypted, how does one survive the loss/theft/destruction of a computer or harddrive? So, as has been discussed, I envision people

Re: [Cryptography] Why human-readable IDs (was Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks)

2013-08-29 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Thu, 29 Aug 2013 01:18:59 +1000 (EST) Dave Horsfall d...@horsfall.org wrote: On Wed, 28 Aug 2013, Perry E. Metzger wrote: Anyway, I've already started implementing my proposed solution to that part of the problem. There is still a need for a distributed database to handle the lookup

Re: [Cryptography] Why not the DNS? (was Re: Implementations, attacks on DHTs, Mix Nets?)

2013-08-29 Thread Perry E. Metzger
On Wed, 28 Aug 2013 10:43:24 -0400 Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote: On Aug 28, 2013, at 8:34 AM, Perry E. Metzger wrote: On Tue, 27 Aug 2013 23:39:51 -0400 Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote: It's not as if this isn't a design we have that we know works: DNS. Read what I said:

Re: [Cryptography] Separating concerns

2013-08-29 Thread ianG
Hi Phill, On 28/08/13 21:31 PM, Phill wrote: And for a company it is almost certain that 'secure against intercept by any government other than the US' is an acceptable solution. I think that was acceptable in general up until recently. But, I believe the threat scenario has changed, and

Re: [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC

2013-08-29 Thread Moritz
Since forward and reverse DNS will rarely match for IP addresses used by individuals rather than service providers, this change precludes home users of IPv6 from sending email to Gmail acccount. Note that this new restriction imposed by Gmail only applies to IPv6 addresses, not IPv4

Re: [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks

2013-08-29 Thread Jerry Leichter
On Aug 28, 2013, at 11:03 AM, Jonathan Thornburg wrote: On Wed, 28 Aug 2013, Jerry Leichter wrote: On the underlying matter of changing my public key: *Why* would I have to change it? It's not, as today, because I've changed my ISP or employer or some other random bit of routing

Re: [Cryptography] Separating concerns

2013-08-29 Thread Jerry Leichter
On Aug 28, 2013, at 2:04 PM, Faré wrote: My target audience, like Perry's is people who simply can't cope with anything more complex than an email address. For me secure mail has to look feel and smell exactly the same as current mail. The only difference being that sometime the secure

Re: [Cryptography] Separating concerns

2013-08-29 Thread Phillip Hallam-Baker
On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 7:15 AM, Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote: On Aug 28, 2013, at 2:04 PM, Faré wrote: My target audience, like Perry's is people who simply can't cope with anything more complex than an email address. For me secure mail has to look feel and smell exactly the same

Re: [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC

2013-08-29 Thread Taral
On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 12:08 PM, Lucky Green shamr...@cypherpunks.to wrote: Additional guidelines for IPv6 The sending IP must have a PTR record (i.e., a reverse DNS of the sending IP) and it should match the IP obtained via the forward DNS resolution of the hostname specified in the PTR

Re: [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks

2013-08-29 Thread Callme Whatiwant
Hello, I'm new here, so I apologize if I'm repeating past arguments or asking old questions. On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 8:52 PM, Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote: On Aug 27, 2013, at 9:48 PM, Perry E. Metzger wrote: On Tue, 27 Aug 2013 22:04:22 +0100 Wendy M. Grossman

Re: [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC

2013-08-29 Thread Phillip Hallam-Baker
On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 1:59 PM, Taral tar...@gmail.com wrote: On Wed, Aug 28, 2013 at 12:08 PM, Lucky Green shamr...@cypherpunks.to wrote: Additional guidelines for IPv6 The sending IP must have a PTR record (i.e., a reverse DNS of the sending IP) and it should match the IP obtained via

Re: [Cryptography] Keeping backups (was Re: Separating concerns

2013-08-29 Thread zooko
On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 01:30:35PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: So, as has been discussed, I envision people having small cheap machines at home that act as their cloud, and the system prompting them to pick a friend to share encrypted backups with. The Least-Authority Filesystem is

[Cryptography] The Case for Formal Verification

2013-08-29 Thread Perry E. Metzger
Taking a break from our discussion of new privacy enhancing protocols, I thought I'd share something I've been mumbling about in various private groups for a while. This is almost 100% on the security side of things, and almost 0% on the cryptography side of things. It is long, but I promise that

Re: [Cryptography] Keeping backups (was Re: Separating concerns

2013-08-29 Thread Phillip Hallam-Baker
On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 1:30 PM, Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.comwrote: On Wed, 28 Aug 2013 20:04:34 +0200 Faré fah...@gmail.com wrote: One thing that irks me, though, is the problem of the robust, secure terminal: if everything is encrypted, how does one survive the

Re: [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC

2013-08-29 Thread Phillip Hallam-Baker
On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 4:53 PM, Taral tar...@gmail.com wrote: Oh, wait. I misread the requirement. This is a pretty normal requirement -- your reverse DNS has to be valid. So if you are 3ffe::2, and that reverses to abc.example.com, then abc.example.com better resolve to 3ffe::2. On Thu,

Re: [Cryptography] The Case for Formal Verification

2013-08-29 Thread Phillip Hallam-Baker
On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 4:46 PM, Perry E. Metzger pe...@piermont.comwrote: Taking a break from our discussion of new privacy enhancing protocols, I thought I'd share something I've been mumbling about in various private groups for a while. This is almost 100% on the security side of things,

Re: [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks

2013-08-29 Thread Phillip Hallam-Baker
On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 3:31 PM, Callme Whatiwant nejuc...@gmail.comwrote: Hello, I'm new here, so I apologize if I'm repeating past arguments or asking old questions. On Tue, Aug 27, 2013 at 8:52 PM, Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote: On Aug 27, 2013, at 9:48 PM, Perry E. Metzger

Re: [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC

2013-08-29 Thread Taral
Oh, wait. I misread the requirement. This is a pretty normal requirement -- your reverse DNS has to be valid. So if you are 3ffe::2, and that reverses to abc.example.com, then abc.example.com better resolve to 3ffe::2. On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 1:38 PM, Phillip Hallam-Baker hal...@gmail.com wrote:

[Cryptography] Communicating public keys: A functional specification

2013-08-29 Thread James A. Donald
Communicating public keys: A functional specification A functional specification tells us how the user uses it, what he sees, and what it does for him. It does not tell us how we manage to do it for him. The problem is that you want to tell someone over the phone, or on a napkin, or face

Re: [Cryptography] IPv6 and IPSEC

2013-08-29 Thread Richard Guy Briggs
On Thu, Aug 29, 2013 at 01:53:29PM -0700, Taral wrote: Oh, wait. I misread the requirement. This is a pretty normal requirement -- your reverse DNS has to be valid. So if you are 3ffe::2, and that reverses to abc.example.com, then abc.example.com better resolve to 3ffe::2. Right, so if you

Re: [Cryptography] Why human-readable IDs (was Re: Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks)

2013-08-29 Thread Dave Horsfall
Please stop using that stupid Reply All function; I'm on the list, and will hence see your reply anyway. I don't need my own bloody personal copy of it. -- Dave ___ The cryptography mailing list cryptography@metzdowd.com

Re: [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks

2013-08-29 Thread Jon Callas
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On Aug 29, 2013, at 3:43 AM, Jerry Leichter leich...@lrw.com wrote: - If I need to change because the private key was compromised, there's nothing I can do about past messages; the question is what I do to minimize the number of new messages