Re: [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks

2013-08-27 Thread radix42
Iang wrote: Why do we need the 1980s assumption of being able to send freely to everyone, anyway? tech.supp...@i.bought.your.busted.thing.com is one that comes to mind. i...@sale.me.your.thing.com is another. I think the types of prior whitelist only secure systems being discussed on-list

Re: [Cryptography] Email and IM are ideal candidates for mix networks

2013-08-27 Thread radix42
Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote: One hypothesis that I would like to throw out is that there is no point in accepting encrypted email from someone who does not have a key to encrypt the response. I'd agree, as I was in just this position in the last week or so: I got a gpg encryped email from

[Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions

2013-09-03 Thread radix42
Ok, skip this one if you aren't an active crypto library maintainer. I'm updating a hash library from FIPS 180-2 to 180-4 compliance and this list is the place I know where somebody might know the answers to all the following questions without my spending days tracking down the answers. Please

Re: [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions

2013-09-03 Thread radix42
--Alexander Kilmov wrote: --David Mercer wrote: 2) Is anyone aware of ITAR changes for SHA hashes in recent years that require more than the requisite notification email to NSA for download URL and authorship information? Figuring this one out last time around took ltttss of

Re: [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions

2013-09-03 Thread radix42
Fare wrote: Or once again, maybe a general problem solver given the specification of some cryptographic function satisfying some properties could automatically find a robust enough algorithm, and then it's impossible to either restrict its export or patent. Now, if each time your solver is itself

Re: [Cryptography] FIPS, NIST and ITAR questions

2013-09-03 Thread radix42
Ok, I dug around my email archives to see what the heck to google, and answered my own question regarding ITAR and NIST defined Suite B implementing software. Here it goes From http://www.nsa.gov/ia/programs/suiteb_cryptography/ ...Says, effectively, that products that 'are configure to USE

Re: [Cryptography] Three kinds of hash: Two are still under ITAR.

2013-09-03 Thread radix42
+radix42=gmail@metzdowd.com Date: Tue, 03 Sep 2013 12:29:38 To: cryptography@metzdowd.com Subject: [Cryptography] Three kinds of hash: Two are still under ITAR. On 09/03/2013 09:54 AM, radi...@gmail.com wrote: --Alexander Kilmov wrote: --David Mercer wrote: 2) Is anyone aware of ITAR changes

Re: [Cryptography] Sha3

2013-10-05 Thread radix42
Jerry Leichter wrote: Currently we have SHA-128 and SHA-256, but exactly why one should choose one or the other has never been clear - SHA-256 is somewhat more expensive, but I can't think of any examples where SHA-128 would be practical but SHA-256 would not. In practice, when CPU is thought