On Mon, Sep 30, 2013 at 7:44 PM, arxlight arxli...@arx.li wrote:
Just to close the circle on this:
The Iranians used hundreds of carpet weavers (mostly women) to
reconstruct a good portion of the shredded documents which they
published (and I think continue to publish) eventually reaching
Hi,
Am 2013-09-30 10:16, schrieb ianG:
I'm not really understanding the need for checksums on keys.
Perhaps it is a DLP (Data Leakage Prevention) technology. At least the
same method works great for Creditcard numbers.
Oh, there is a 14 digit number being sent on a unclassified network,
and all
On 9/30/13 at 1:16 AM, i...@iang.org (ianG) wrote:
Any comments from the wider audience?
I talked with a park ranger who had used a high-precision GPS
system which decoded the selective availability encrypted
signal. Access to the device was very tightly controlled and it
had a
GOST was specified with S boxes that could be different for different
applications, and you could choose s boxes to make GOST quite weak. So that's
one example.
--John
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On Sep 30, 2013, at 4:16 AM, ianG i...@iang.org wrote:
I'm not really understanding the need for checksums on keys. I can sort of
see the battlefield requirement that comms equipment that is stolen can't
then be utilized in either a direct sense (listening in) or re-sold to some
other
On 9/30/13 11:07 PM, Jerry Leichter wrote:
On Sep 30, 2013, at 4:16 AM, ianG i...@iang.org wrote:
But it still doesn't quite work. It seems antithetical to NSA's obsession
with security at Suite A levels, if they are worried about the gear being
snatched, they shouldn't have secret
On 9/30/13 at 2:07 PM, leich...@lrw.com (Jerry Leichter) wrote:
People used to wonder why NSA asked that DES keys be
checksummed - the original IBM Lucifer algorithm used a full
64-bit key, while DES required parity bits on each byte. On
the one hand, this decreased the key size from 64 to
