Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
No, no there's not. In fact, I solicited information here about crypto
accellerators with onboard persistent key memory (secure key storage)
about two years ago and got basically no responses except pointers to
the same old, discontinued or obsolete products I was
Thor Lancelot Simon wrote:
To the extent of my knowledge there are currently _no_ generally
available, general-purpose crypto accellerator chip-level products with
onboard key storage or key wrapping support, with the exception of parts
first sold more than 5 years ago and being shipped now from
Peter Gutmann wrote:
(Does anyone know of any studies that have been done to find out how prevalent
this is for servers? I can see why you'd need to do it for software-only
implementations in order to survive restarts, but what about hardware-assisted
TLS? Is there anything like a study
On Sat, Mar 07, 2009 at 05:40:31AM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Given that, when I looked a couple of years ago, TPM support for
public/private-key stuff was rather hit-and-miss and in some cases seemed to
be entirely absent (so you could use the TPM to wrap and unwrap stored private
keys
But
Thor Lancelot Simon t...@rek.tjls.com writes:
On Sat, Mar 07, 2009 at 05:40:31AM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Given that, when I looked a couple of years ago, TPM support for
public/private-key stuff was rather hit-and-miss and in some cases seemed to
be entirely absent (so you could use the TPM
On Sat, Mar 07, 2009 at 07:36:25AM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
In any case though, how big a deal is private-key theft from web servers?
What examples of real-world attacks are there where an attacker stole a
private key file from a web server, brute-forced the password for it, and then
Thor Lancelot Simon t...@rek.tjls.com writes:
Almost no web servers run with passwords on their private key files. Believe
me. I build server load balancers for a living and I see a _lot_ of customer
web servers -- this is how it is.
Ah, that kinda makes sense, it would parallel the experience
On Sun, Mar 15, 2009 at 12:26:39AM +1300, Peter Gutmann wrote:
I was hoping someone else would leap in about now and question this, but I
guess I'll have to do it... maybe we have a different definition of what's
required here, but AFAIK there's an awful lot of this kind of hardware
floating
Hi Peter,
Apart from the obvious fact that if the TPM is good for DRM then it is also
good for protecting servers and the data on them,
In which way, and for what sorts of protection? And I mean that as a
serious inquiry, not just a Did you spill my pint? question. At the moment
the sole
On Thu, Mar 5, 2009 at 12:13 PM, Kent Yoder shpedoi...@gmail.com wrote:
Hi Peter,
Apart from the obvious fact that if the TPM is good for DRM then it is also
good for protecting servers and the data on them,
In which way, and for what sorts of protection? And I mean that as a
serious
Ben Laurie wrote:
If I have data on my server that I would like to stay on my server and
not get leaked to some third party, then this is exactly the same
situation as DRMed content on an end user's machine, is it not?
No.
You want to keep control of the information on your server. DRM wants
Alexander Klimov wrote:
On Wed, 11 Feb 2009, Ben Laurie wrote:
If I have data on my server that I would like to stay on my server
and not get leaked to some third party, then this is exactly the
same situation as DRMed content on an end user's machine, is it not?
The treat model is
: full-disk subversion standards released
[snip]
It's this variety of different software encryption schemes -- and
compilers to turn them into binary code (which is what the NSA/Intel
backdoor ultimately has to key on) that, I think, makes it so much
harder for a hardware backdoor to work (i.e
On Feb 2, 2009, at 2:29 AM, Peter Gutmann wrote:
Mark Ryan presented a plausible use case that is not DRM:
http://www.cs.bham.ac.uk/~mdr/research/projects/08-tpmFunc/.
This use is like the joke about the dancing bear, the amazing thing
isn't the
quality of the dancing but the fact that the
Peter Gutmann wrote:
Ben Laurie b...@links.org writes:
Apart from the obvious fact that if the TPM is good for DRM then it is also
good for protecting servers and the data on them,
In which way, and for what sorts of protection? And I mean that as a
serious inquiry, not just a Did you
On Wed, 11 Feb 2009, Ben Laurie wrote:
If I have data on my server that I would like to stay on my server
and not get leaked to some third party, then this is exactly the
same situation as DRMed content on an end user's machine, is it not?
The treat model is completely different: for DRM the
I wrote:
| Indeed, the classic question is I've just bought this new computer
| which claims to have full-disk encryption. Is there any practical
| way I can assure myself that there are (likely) no backdoors in/around
| the encryption?
|
| For open-source software encryption (be it swap-space,
Ben Laurie b...@links.org writes:
Apart from the obvious fact that if the TPM is good for DRM then it is also
good for protecting servers and the data on them,
In which way, and for what sorts of protection? And I mean that as a
serious inquiry, not just a Did you spill my pint? question. At
Peter Gutmann wrote:
John Gilmore g...@toad.com writes:
The theory that we should build good and useful tools capable of monopoly
and totalitarianism, but use social mechanisms to prevent them from being
used for that purpose, strikes me as naive.
There's another problem with this theory
Peter Gutmann wrote:
John Gilmore g...@toad.com writes:
The theory that we should build good and useful tools capable of monopoly
and totalitarianism, but use social mechanisms to prevent them from being
used for that purpose, strikes me as naive.
There's another problem with this theory and
Given such solutions, frameworks like what TCG is chartered to build are
in fact good and useful. I don't think it's right to blame the tool (or
the implementation details of a particular instance of a particular kind
of tool) for the idiot carpenter.
Given the charter of TCG, to produce DRM
On Fri, Jan 30, 2009 at 03:37:22PM -0800, Taral wrote:
On Fri, Jan 30, 2009 at 1:41 PM, Jonathan Thornburg
jth...@astro.indiana.edu wrote:
For open-source software encryption (be it swap-space, file-system,
and/or full-disk), the answer is yes: I can assess the developers'
reputations, I
On Fri, Jan 30, 2009 at 04:08:07PM -0800, John Gilmore wrote:
The theory that we should build good and useful tools capable of
monopoly and totalitarianism, but use social mechanisms to prevent
them from being used for that purpose, strikes me as naive.
Okay. In that case, please, explain
John Gilmore g...@toad.com writes:
The theory that we should build good and useful tools capable of monopoly
and totalitarianism, but use social mechanisms to prevent them from being
used for that purpose, strikes me as naive.
There's another problem with this theory and that's the practical
If it comes from the Trusted Computing Group, you can pretty much
assume that it will make your computer *less* trustworthy. Their idea
of a trusted computer is one that random unrelated third parties can
trust to subvert the will of the computer's owner.
John
On Thu, Jan 29, 2009 at 01:22:37PM -0800, John Gilmore wrote:
If it comes from the Trusted Computing Group, you can pretty much
assume that it will make your computer *less* trustworthy. Their idea
of a trusted computer is one that random unrelated third parties can
trust to subvert the will
On Thu, 29 Jan 2009, John Gilmore wrote:
If it comes from the Trusted Computing Group, you can pretty much
assume that it will make your computer *less* trustworthy. Their idea
of a trusted computer is one that random unrelated third parties can
trust to subvert the will of the computer's
On Fri, Jan 30, 2009 at 1:41 PM, Jonathan Thornburg
jth...@astro.indiana.edu wrote:
For open-source software encryption (be it swap-space, file-system,
and/or full-disk), the answer is yes: I can assess the developers'
reputations, I can read the source code, and/or I can take note of
what
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