Re: Active Countermeasures Against Tempest Attacks

2003-03-11 Thread Bill Stewart
At 09:14 AM 03/10/2003 -0500, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote: On the other hand, remember that the earliest Tempest systems were built using vacuum tubes. An attacker today can carry vast amounts of signal processing power in a briefcase. And while some of the signal processing jobs need to scale with

Re: Active Countermeasures Against Tempest Attacks

2003-03-11 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 11:43 PM -0800 3/10/03, Bill Stewart wrote: At 09:14 AM 03/10/2003 -0500, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote: On the other hand, remember that the earliest Tempest systems were built using vacuum tubes. An attacker today can carry vast amounts of signal processing power in a briefcase. And while some of

Re: Active Countermeasures Against Tempest Attacks

2003-03-11 Thread Gregory Hicks
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2003 23:43:28 -0800 From: Bill Stewart [EMAIL PROTECTED] At 09:14 AM 03/10/2003 -0500, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote: On the other hand, remember that the earliest Tempest systems were built using vacuum tubes. An attacker today can carry vast amounts [...snip...]

Re: Active Countermeasures Against Tempest Attacks

2003-03-10 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 9:35 PM -0500 3/8/03, Dave Emery wrote: On Fri, Mar 07, 2003 at 10:46:06PM -0800, Bill Frantz wrote: The next more complex version sends the same random screen over and over in sync with the monitor. Even more complex versions change the random screen every-so-often to try to frustrate

Re: Active Countermeasures Against Tempest Attacks

2003-03-09 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 10:46 PM -0800 3/7/03, Bill Frantz wrote: It has occurred to me that the cheapest form of protection from tempest attacks might be an active transmitter that swamps the signal from the computer. Such a transmitter would still be legal if its power output is kept within the FCC part 15 rules.

Active Countermeasures Against Tempest Attacks

2003-03-08 Thread Bill Frantz
It has occurred to me that the cheapest form of protection from tempest attacks might be an active transmitter that swamps the signal from the computer. Such a transmitter would still be legal if its power output is kept within the FCC part 15 rules. Take, for example, the signal from a CRT

Re: Active Countermeasures Against Tempest Attacks

2003-03-08 Thread Dave Emery
On Fri, Mar 07, 2003 at 10:46:06PM -0800, Bill Frantz wrote: The next more complex version sends the same random screen over and over in sync with the monitor. Even more complex versions change the random screen every-so-often to try to frustrate recovering the differences between screens