Re: dangers of TCPA/palladium

2002-08-14 Thread Jeff Cours
Brian A. LaMacchia wrote: > Seth David Schoen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >>R. Hirschfeld writes: >>> >>>This may be a silly question, but how do you know that the source >>>code provided really describes the binary? >>> >>>It seems too much to hope for that if you compile the source code >>>then t

Re: dangers of TCPA/palladium

2002-08-14 Thread Adam Shostack
On Tue, Aug 13, 2002 at 11:55:24PM -0700, Brian A. LaMacchia wrote: | Adam Shostack <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: | > On Mon, Aug 12, 2002 at 12:38:42AM -0700, Brian A. LaMacchia wrote: | >> There are two parts to answering the first question: | >> | >> 1) People (many people, the more the merrier) n

Re: dangers of TCPA/palladium

2002-08-14 Thread Brian A. LaMacchia
Adam Shostack <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Mon, Aug 12, 2002 at 12:38:42AM -0700, Brian A. LaMacchia wrote: >> There are two parts to answering the first question: >> >> 1) People (many people, the more the merrier) need to understand the >> code and what it does, and thus be in a position to b

Re: dangers of TCPA/palladium

2002-08-13 Thread Adam Shostack
On Mon, Aug 12, 2002 at 12:38:42AM -0700, Brian A. LaMacchia wrote: | | > I don't know for sure whether Microsoft is going to do this, or is | > even capable of doing this. It would be a cool idea. It also isn't | > sufficient to address all questions about deliberate malfeasance. | > Back in t

Re: dangers of TCPA/palladium

2002-08-12 Thread Brian A. LaMacchia
Seth David Schoen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > R. Hirschfeld writes: > >>> From: "Peter N. Biddle" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >>> Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2002 16:35:46 -0700 >> >>> You can know this to be true because the >>> TOR will be made available for review and thus you can read the >>> source and decide

Re: dangers of TCPA/palladium

2002-08-11 Thread Ben Laurie
AARG!Anonymous wrote: > Adam Back writes: > > >>- Palladium is a proposed OS feature-set based on the TCPA hardware >>(Microsoft) > > > Actually there seem to be some hardware differences between TCPA and > Palladium. TCPA relies on a TPM, while Palladium uses some kind of > new CPU mode. Pa

TCPA/Palladium -- likely future implications (Re: dangers of TCPA/palladium)

2002-08-09 Thread Adam Back
On Thu, Aug 08, 2002 at 09:15:33PM -0700, Seth David Schoen wrote: > Back in the Clipper days [...] "how do we know that this > tamper-resistant chip produced by Mykotronix even implements the > Clipper spec correctly?". The picture is related but has some extra wrinkles with the TCPA/Palladium a

Re: dangers of TCPA/palladium

2002-08-09 Thread AARG!Anonymous
Seth Schoen writes: > There is > a much larger conversation about trusted computing in general, which > we ought to be having: > > What would make you want to enter sensitive information into a > complicated device, built by people you don't know, which you can't > take apart under a microscope?

Re: dangers of TCPA/palladium

2002-08-09 Thread Seth David Schoen
R. Hirschfeld writes: > > From: "Peter N. Biddle" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2002 16:35:46 -0700 > > > You can know this to be true because the > > TOR will be made available for review and thus you can read the source and > > decide for yourself if it behaves this way. > > This m

Re: dangers of TCPA/palladium

2002-08-08 Thread R. Hirschfeld
> From: "Peter N. Biddle" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Date: Mon, 5 Aug 2002 16:35:46 -0700 > You can know this to be true because the > TOR will be made available for review and thus you can read the source and > decide for yourself if it behaves this way. This may be a silly question, but how do you