-Caveat Lector-

http://www.villagevoice.com/issues/0203/trilling.php
Week of January 16 - 22, 2002

America Goes Into the Energy Business With the Former Evil Empire

Bushido—The Way of Oil
by Roger Trilling

For decades, we've heard warnings that the West's overdependence on
Saudi oil could have disastrous effects were anything to go wrong
in the Middle East. But it's been a hard habit to break—the
American public's support for the 1991 Gulf War is proof enough of
that.

That was a war between Saudi Arabia, the world's largest oil
reserve, and Iraq, arguably the world's second largest oil reserve.
Now we are fighting a war against what sometimes seems like a
virtual Saudi Arabia, and we may use Iraq to achieve victory. But
this will not be a victory over Osama bin Laden, or over terrorism.
It will be a victory over our dependence on Saudi oil, and Russia
is going to help us win it. Maybe.

It is often said that hunting down and killing Osama will solve
nothing. That after this Osama, there will be many Osamas. This is
true, but not just because of abstractions like "poverty" or
"ignorance." Osama is neither poor nor ignorant. The reason there
may be more Osamas is that there is a network that grows them, and
that network is, for the moment, indistinguishable from the Saudi
elite.

Committed to the conservative Wahhabite strain of the Muslim faith,
much of the Saudi power structure has been deeply compromised by
its support for the networks of militant Islam—how deeply is the
great mystery of this war. But when President Bush made "You're
either with us or against us" the war's mantra, he must surely have
been talking to people who never had to make the choice before.

How deeply compromised are the Saudis? We don't know, because our
government is keeping very quiet about this. But according to the
book Ben Laden: La Verité Interdite, which grew out of French
intelligence reports (and was the subject of James Ridgeway's
November 27 column), the answer is pretty much . . . totally.

In a chapter called "Terrorism's Banker," for example, we learn
that Osama's brother-in-law was once the biggest private banker in
the world. Until relieved of his duties in 1999, he was also
personal banker to the Saudi royal family. His name is Khalid bin
Mahfouz, and he was last seen in a Saudi military hospital, being
interrogated by U.S. officials about $2 billion gone missing, very
probably to terrorist causes.

These are not the type of people lending institutions are
comfortable doing business with. And many leading banks have
responded predictably: They have taken Bush at his word, and
declined to invest in the region. In an end-of-year prognosis
published in London's Financial Times, Arthur Andersen partner Carl
Hughes said: "The focus of the great geopolitical game will no
longer be east versus west, but north versus south. The 'war on
terrorism' will hasten this trend, slowing the reopening of the
Middle Eastern companies to western oil capital."

The power of the Saudi state, of course, rests on 262 billion
barrels of oil, the largest concentration of wealth on the planet.
To do battle with that, one must do battle with OPEC, the 13-nation
cartel dominated by Saudi Arabia. And nobody can do that better
than what the oil industry calls "non-OPEC," led by Russia, the
world's second-largest oil-exporter.

The latest skirmish was occasioned by OPEC's November 14
announcement that, in response to the continuing global recession
and the resultant fall in the price of oil, OPEC was scheduling a
cut in production for the third time last year. But whereas
non-OPEC—and especially Russia—had taken advantage of the previous
cuts to increase their global market share, this time they were
told to contribute a quarter of the planned drop of 2 million
barrels a day, scheduled for the first two quarters of 2002.

Mexico and Norway made cooperative noises. Moscow most definitely
did not. Having been asked to pony up a cut of 150,000 barrels a
day, Russia offered 30,000—just enough to be insulting. Andrei
Illarionov, one of Putin's top economic advisors, came flat out
against cutting production, calling OPEC "an unreliable partner"
and "a historically doomed organization." Eventually, a compromise
was reached: Russia promised to cut production the full 150,000,
but for the first quarter only—when the Siberian winter forces down
output naturally.

The last thing the U.S. economy needs now is higher oil prices. But
the delicacy of current relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia
led to administration murmurs of support for "price stability,"
instead of the all-out price war the Russians said they were
prepared to wage. But soon after there was a slightly different
message from America's inconspicuous but powerful secretary of
energy, Spencer Abraham. "Obviously we want stability. At the same
time, we don't want a recession that's artificially extended
because of decisions that are made with only a short-term focus."

In fact, Abraham, previously best known for his opinion that many
Department of Energy functions would be best served by
privatization, could not be more supportive of U.S.-Russian oil
initiatives. In October, for example, Exxon exercised a previously
unused option to develop Siberian oil. It's a $12 billion
investment, and will reap $35 billion in revenues over the next
three decades—and that's just the Russian share.

In this sense, Abraham's pro-Russian position is no different from
that of the rest of the administration. Despite the abrogation of
the ABM Treaty—a political embarrassment that Putin waved away as
being "of no major concern to us"—the administration has supported
Tony Blair's initiatives for the fast-track entry of Russia into
both the World Trade Organization and even, despite Donald
Rumsfeld's objections, NATO itself.

And why not? It's Statecraft 101: After World War II, we used
defeated Nazis to help us fight our former Soviet ally. And after
the Cold War, we are using the Russians in more or less the same
way against our close friends the Saudis: by rebuilding their
economy, starting with the oil business. As Secretary Abraham put
it: "Greater energy security through a more diverse supply of oil
for global markets—these are key elements of President Bush's
National Energy Policy."

The quote comes from a visit Abraham paid to Moscow at the end of
November. The ostensible and very p.c. purpose of the visit was
"strengthening standards for the protection and accounting of
nuclear materials," but the main event turned out to be the
pronouncement, from all parties concerned, that the days of
U.S.-Russian rivalry over Caspian Sea oil have finally ended.

The occasion for the lovefest was provided by the Caspian Pipeline
Consortium (CPC), whose members include Chevron-Texaco, Arco,
Mobil, Shell, and the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan. The
event they were celebrating was the inauguration of a pipeline
running from Kazakhstan's Tenghiz oil field (the world's sixth
largest) to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossisk.

Dave O'Reilly, Chevron's CEO, used the moment to proclaim to "the
global business community that one can confidently invest in Russia
and Kazakhstan." And Secretary Abraham, with the OPEC-Russia fracas
no doubt in mind, said that "Russia is emerging as a separate
nucleus of the energy equation. We have great respect for the
energy role that Russia is playing, and we believe it will be an
expanded role in the future." The Russian press even reported that
Abraham had endorsed the idea of a "third nucleus," a channel for
ongoing consultations among non-OPEC nations (which in theory could
include the U.S.).

The CPC represents a complete reversal of the traditional status
quo on Caspian Sea oil, whose paradigm until recently was the
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline, a U.S.-backed effort to transport oil (how
much is uncertain, although the estimate has been diminishing) an
enormous distance (1100 miles) at a cost (up to $4 billion) almost
double its original projection. The Baku-Ceyhan pipeline would go
from Azerbaijan (recently at war with Armenia) through Georgia
(occasionally bombed by Russia) and Armenia to Turkey (across the
Kurdish war zone)—all in the name of greater "security." This meant
the pipeline didn't pass through Russia or Iran. And though it's
been promoted for years by its main backer, British Petroleum (BP),
it has never been built.

The Russians, of course, always resented the rude and exclusionary
attitude to Caspian Sea oil represented by Baku-Ceyhan, and
boycotted it accordingly. So imagine the pleasure felt this
December in BP offices when representatives were invited to make a
presentation—to the Kremlin. If, as expected, Moscow extends its
blessing, then giant Russian oil companies like Lukoil and Yukos
will be free to invest in the pipeline, locking it into their own
extensive networks and using it to transport their own oil to the
Mediterranean—a win-win situation for everybody.

More and more in recent years, those networks have extended to
Iraq, which has long shipped its oil from Ceyhan. Friendly
relations between the two countries go back decades, and Russia is
by far Iraq's largest trading partner. It also holds $8 billion in
Iraqi debt, giving it a long-term stake in Iraqi stability. Lukoil,
for example, holds rights to Iraq's West Qurna oil field. One of
the world's largest, West Qurna could eventually pump up to a
million barrels a day. So for historical and commercial reasons,
Russia has opposed the levying of further UN sanctions against
Iraq, and would like to see those in place lifted.

The sanctions have, of course, been a political and humanitarian
disaster (which Osama bin Laden has not hesitated to exploit).
Depending on whose abacus one uses, the number of innocent children
said to have died runs into the hundreds of thousands (according to
the UN) or even the millions (according to the Iraqis).

The American and British response has been to lobby intensively for
a change in the nature of sanctions. This past summer, they
proposed to the UN Security Council the idea of "smart sanctions,"
which would allow the Iraqi citizenry access to a far greater range
of goods, while clamping down more firmly on "dual use" items with
potential military applications. France, traditionally a staunch
ally of Iraq, went along with the U.S.-U.K. proposal. Russia did
not, and the long shadow of a Russian veto kept the Security
Council from voting smart sanctions into effect.

Iraq, which claims to have no more weapons of mass destruction, is
of course opposed to any sanctions, as well as to the return of UN
weapons inspectors. So in August of 2001, in clear appreciation of
Russia's backing at the UN, Iraq reassigned rights to its oil
fields at Nahr Umar and Majnoon, previously held by the French, to
Russia. Their potential is well over double that of the West Qurna
fields, which means that in a post-sanctions world, Russia has
access, from these fields alone, to more than 3 million barrels a
day of Iraqi oil. And there are others.

Russia is, by Western standards, an underdeveloped country, with a
GNP about the same size as Holland's. And it is very unlikely that
the West will ever stop buying Persian Gulf oil—there are no known
sources as cheap or as plentiful. But factoring in ever rising
output from both Russian and Caspian fields, the amount of oil
Russia can bring to market exceeds Saudi numbers (although the
quality of Russian oil is inferior to Saudi, and it costs three or
four times as much to extract). Add in Iraqi potential, and it's
roughly double Saudi Arabia's current production level of 8 million
barrels a day.

The Petroleum Finance Company, an influential consulting and
analysis firm, has devoted much study to this, and some of it
recently found an echo in The Washington Post. In a December 23
column called "Russia Wins the War," David Ignatius cited a PFC
report and found it "obvious that Moscow is on its way to becoming
the next Houston—the global capital of energy."

On November 26—the same day Secretary Abraham took off for
Moscow—President Bush issued his famous "he'll find out" threat to
Saddam Hussein. Although the topic at the time was the admission of
weapons inspectors, it was not widely noted that four days later,
the UN Security Council was again to put the issue of "smart
sanctions" to a vote.

It never happened. The decision was tabled for six months, because
a deal had been worked out, it was reported, between the U.S. and
Russia. Both countries would come to agreement on a list of
prohibited dual-use items, to be presented to the Security Council
on June 1, 2002, at which time the whole issue of sanctions against
Iraq would be reviewed. In the meantime, Putin has been calling on
Iraq to readmit UN weapons inspectors, in the hope that sanctions
be lifted.

But whatever happens—air strikes, a new spirit of cooperation from
Iraq, nothing at all—one thing is certain. For the foreseeable
future, a resurgent Russia, America's new best friend, will be
Iraq's main partner in the oil business—Saddam or no Saddam.



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