-Caveat Lector-

WJPBR Email News List [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Peace at any cost is a Prelude to War!



ARTICLE 4

West Point and Women in the Military


Ed.: A realistic assessment of the realities of full integration from the
perspective of a former combat arms NCO.


By Robert C. Oberlender, First Sergeant, U.S. Army (Retired)

A little over a decade ago I was one of the few NCOs at West Point. My job
involved sending the cadets out during their 3rd and 4th summers to serve
with active units. This program has been variously know as Army Orientation
Program, Drill Cadet Leader Training, Cadet Troop Leader Training, and other
terms.

As an Assistant S3 in the United States Corps of Cadets, I was able to see
first hand the implementation of coeducational training for cadets. I often
remarked to fellow NCOs and officers -- that this isn't the Army!" The come
back often was, "Go read the West Point Charter,

I cannot, after these years recall the specific words of the charter, but I
do remember that it mentioned nothing about developing Army leaders. It read
something like: "To prepare leaders of character for the nation..."

I served two years in that capacity. I then spent another two years as the
first sergeant of the enlisted troops assigned to West Point. I left that
position to become the Chief Instructor of the US Army Jungle School in
Panama. I arrived just in time to command the troops of the Jungle School,
renamed Team Alpha, JOTB, TF Atlantic, during JUST CAUSE. A year later, I was
reassigned as the first sergeant of Delta Company (Anti-Tank), 2nd Battalion,
504th PIR, and 82d ABN Division. Our company team, served as the lead of the
Advance Guard, leading the 82d Airborne into Iraq.

During both actions, I had women soldiers assigned to my combat teams. I am
proud to say that they served well. However, in both actions, my units were
very lucky. We incurred minimal casualties. Had the situation been different,
I believe in my grunt heart that we would have had exceptional problems with
my 11 Bravos when they saw female soldiers killed. It was bad enough when we
had to stand back and watch through binoculars as the Republican Guard
slaughtered the Shi'ia in An Nazariah. The CO and I were almost unable to
hold them back.

We did, but I have nightmares when I think of what might have happened if the
troops' blood had been boiled by seeing our own female casualties. It would
have been bad even with friendly male casualties, with friendly female
casualties... I shudder to think. I say this because of the rumor that
circulated just prior to us crossing the LD.

Every one remembers the male and female truck drivers who got lost and were
captured a few days prior to the ground attack. The rumor that circulated
amongst us grunts was that their bodies had been found. The male has been
tied between 4 vehicles and drawn and quartered. The female had been
repeatedly raped, sodomized and then left dead for US soldiers to find.

Sir, I will never forget the fire in my soldiers' eyes. I saw a reflection in
my own. We crossed the LD that evening. Sir, when the first Iraqi's tried to
surrender, it took all the company leadership to prevent a massacre.

I guess my point is that I am not sure that the US Army is ready for a
knock-down, drag-out fight. With all the other problems we have, I don't
think our psyche is quite ready for women soldiers in mass body bags. The
public will revolt, the troops' confidence in themselves will crumble. And
this says nothing at all about the numbers of non-deployable female soldiers
tying up slots in deployable units. Sometimes I am glad I retired.


ARTICLE 5

Air Force: Tired of Politics and Undeserved Awards


Ed.: Steve Hamer highlights rampant careerism and the current policy of medal
self-aggrandizement.


Steve Hamer, TSgt, USAF Retired

Just finished reading the latest newsletter, including the comments by an Air
Force vet and his reasons for leaving. I'd like to share some of mine.

As I approached my nineteenth year of active-duty service in the Air Force
Security Forces (1999), I woke up one morning realizing that enough was
enough.

The smoke from the Yugoslavia air show had yet to clear when everyone (even
those remotely involved) began to jump on the hero bandwagon. My unit
witnessed more than a couple of these types putting themselves in for
decorations. While I have no doubt that there were many who deserved
recognition, I was thoroughly disgusted.

Thousands of Commendation Medals and Achievement Medals were approved (along
with more than a few Bronze Stars and other decorations normally associated
with direct combat involvement).

A colleague of mine asked if I would be receiving a medal and when I told him
that I didn't want one (other than maybe a campaign ribbon to show I
participated) he responded, "Everyone else is getting one. Think of the
promotion points." "That doesn't make it right," I said. "If you don't look
out for yourself, no one else will," he replied.

I always felt that my needs, including promotion points from chasing
decorations, were secondary to accomplishing the mission and taking care of
those troops under my direct supervision whose actions ensured mission
accomplishment. Word quickly got out that an individual who "oversaw" the
construction of a tent city to house the countless support personnel deployed
for the operation was receiving a Bronze Star. The Air Force later said it
could justify this and other Bronze Stars due to "the changing nature of
warfare" and the fact that imminent danger pay was authorized.

Sorry guys, but in my book the Bronze Star was traditionally reserved for
those engaged in combat---not combat support---and the fact that its prestige
was suddenly diminished due to the "changing nature of warfare" was a slap in
the face to those who had done far more and received far less in conflicts
past.

Furthermore, it appeared more and more as though my efforts were not being
truly appreciated. Never mind that I'd "been there, done that," on more than
one occasion and contributed significantly to any mission assigned.

In the eyes of many of those in senior leadership, I lacked a requisite
number of stripes to be taken seriously. Too many times, I heard statements
such as, "We know you can do the job Sarge, but you really need to look at
getting another promotion. You should really get some experience on the
staff."

Bottom Line: I enjoyed what I was doing in "the field" and the thought of
polishing a chair with my backside in an office didn't appeal to me.
Unfortunately, staff experience is necessary to fill the blocks/punch the
ticket in order to be competitive for senior ranks --- just look at the
officer career path.

Too many times, though, I saw those whose major concern (if not their only
concern) was knowing the right people, filling the right blocks and "butt
snorkeling" their way to the top. And on one too many occasion, I saw these
"up and coming wunderkinds" stumble and fall because they couldn't do the
most basic of tasks assigned. As I had seen in the field more often than not,
rank alone could never be a substitute for hard-wrought experience.

There were other reasons, of course, many beyond my power to change. Troops
on food stamps was one. "There are fewer now than ten years ago," was the
familiar refrain from Washington. Maybe in numbers, but I would venture to
say the percentage of the force as a whole was probably the same. I suspect
the Peace Dividend we were going to see at the end of the Cold War didn’t go
to pay but for newly created general officer positions.

In response, a suggestion to do away with the food stamps and replace them
with a type of debit card was made so the "stigma of being seen paying with
food stamps would be removed. Nice try, but bright new packaging doesn't make
the problem go away.

As I came closer to the day I was to test for promotion to E-7, I realized
that even if I made it, I would still be subject to the same fun and games,
albeit at somewhat higher pay. Enough was enough. I submitted my retirement
papers before testing.

When results came out (I missed it by 6 points) the senior leadership did
their best to "console" me and asked what kind of retirement ceremony I'd
like. "Keep it simple," I told 'em. And it was:

My retirement decoration was downgraded from an MSM to a Commendation (the
"generally accepted" rule is that if you're not a senior NCO, you don't
deserve an MSM); the retirement certificate was not ready for presentation
("same will be forwarded to you in the mail"); and the "generally accepted"
practice of having an 0-6 officiate the ceremony was "waived" (couldn't find
one).

Still, I shared the stage with two 0-3's I have the utmost respect and
admiration for. And the formation, which included some of the best and
brightest I've ever worked with, made me proud.

Looking back, I really have no regrets. I'm proud to have served my country
and been part of history on more than one occasion (witnessing the fall of
the Berlin Wall up close and personally was one). But, as I told my soon to
be former colleagues the day of my ceremony, "I can do more as a concerned
citizen than I can by staying in uniform."




ARTICLE 6

The Sergeant’s Corner: Why No Armor Combat Badge?


Ed.: This senior Armor NCO critically looks at the decision of Armor center
Commander B.B. Bell’s decision not to support an Armor Combat Badge. Old
Faught’s sentiments are justified. The Krauts used to issue Tank Assault
Badges and just look who did most of the killing during Desert Storm, besides
air power. Appropriate recognition for combat action is much more important
than any beret initiative.


By SFC Faught, Veteran Tanker

DitDitDitDit, News Flash," Armor Chief Says, We Don't Need No Stinking
Badges". "Crunchies breathe sigh of relief".

Well we don't have to worry about this controversy getting out of control,
now do we. I for one wouldn't really mind wearing an Armor Combat Badge (ACB)
on my BDUs or on my dress greens. But I can see the possible reason why the
Chief of Armor said no, he doesn't want another beret type mess, when we
should be worrying about, maybe like how to keep our tanks running!

And if the Chief had given his approval, then all hell would have broken
lose. The infantry, airborne, rangers, and SF’ers would have been squeaking
at the gates. Talk about squeaking, that’s what ground-pounders fear the
most, even though they won't admit it, especially at night when all they can
hear is the squeak of tank tracks.

Ask just about any infantry soldier and they'll tell you that they don't need
no stinking tanks, until the bad guy tankers show up on the scene, then
they'll be on the horn yelling for tank support.

I'm a firm believer in the combined arms team, but people have a tendency to
forget what it means. I remember the original meaning of the symbol of the
triangle, the way I was taught many years ago. It represents artillery "King
of Battle", infantry "Queen of Battle", armor "Arm of Decision".

Lets break this down, shall we. The artillery pounds the "badies" to mulch,
the infantry moves forward and takes the ground and opens a hole and holds
the shoulders of the breach, the armor hauls ass through and takes on the
reinforcements and destroys them, then wreaks havoc throughout the rear
areas.

The Germans, Russians, and Americans used these types of tactics throughout
WWII. We used them in Korea, to some extent, in Vietnam, and finally during
Desert Storm. Of course in DS, armor forces were given a small article on
page ten, while the air force, special ops, and infantry were given front
page news.

No we don't need badges, but when the chips are down and they don't have the
artillery to back them up, who do they call? It sure ain't the ghostbusters!
Can you imagine a conversation on the radio on some dark and lonely night
when some poor soldier out on op hears the rumble and squeak of tanks in the
dark, coming toward his position? He calls up to the CP and tells them, enemy
tanks are coming and there's a s t-load of’em -- what should he do?

The cp calls for armor support and gets this answer, "Hey, throw two grenades
and call us in the morning". How would you feel if you got such an answer?
Well that’s how a lot of us tankers feel most of the time. Nobody knows how
to use us and nobody seems to care, just when the chips are down and they got
no other recourse, then they call in the tankers and we end up pulling their
chestnuts out of the fire.

Do we need a badge to tell us what we can do and what we can accomplish? No,
not really, it would be nice if we got one, but we really don't need it
because we can sleep good at night in knowing that when somebody needs us,
we'll be there to help out, come hell or high water.

I like to think of us as combat fire fighters. We get the call and we're on
the move, and every once in a while we get a thank you from our comrades on
the ground, you now, the guys who are soaking wet and muddy standing there
looking up at you with gratitude in their eyes, and you feel good just being
there for them.

So remember my fellow tread-heads, a small piece of fabric or metal on a
uniform can mean something, but the great satisfaction you get for being at
the right moment and time to help save your comrades in arms can mean even
more.

Courage Conquers






ARTICLE 7

ARNG: The Guard Must Modernize


Ed.: Relevant thoughts as we are approaching a comprehensive review of the
total force by the new defense team. Carlton Meyer is editor of G2mil at
www.G2mil.com


By Carlton Meyer

The U.S. Army National Guard (ARNG) is in trouble. The problem is not a lack
of support in Congress, and not pressure to downsize by the regular Army. The
ARNG is in trouble because its Cold War equipment is aging, expensive to
operate, and inappropriate for likely missions. The ARNG must shed most of
its armored vehicles and convert units into urban infantry. This will allow
the eight ARNG divisions to change focus from the Soviet threat and
concentrate on these urban infantry missions: 1) urban combat 2)
peacekeeping/riot control 3) rear-area security 4) disaster relief/refugee
camps.

These are not glamorous missions, but they are ideal for the ARNG because
they are manpower intensive, which means cost-effective for a reserve force.
The overall cost for two ARNG tank battalions equal that of one active-duty
tank battalion. This is because of the high operating, maintenance, and
training costs of tanks. However, infantry units require much less equipment
that is inexpensive to maintain. As a result, five ARNG infantry battalions
cost the same as one active duty infantry battalion.

A second reason is that urban infantry missions are shunned. The regular Army
is still focused on defeating Soviet armor thrusts into Germany, although
battles with Iraqi tanks are substituted. If the Army becomes involved in a
major war, it will quickly discover that it lacks the manpower and skills for
urban infantry operations. Fortunately, most ARNG units are located in urban
areas where members can coordinate access to varied urban training areas.
Many guardsmen are employed in urban related security tasks, such as
policemen, prison guards, firemen, and civil engineers. If the ARNG focused
training on urban infantry missions, it could develop greater proficiency in
these tasks than active duty infantry.

For example, the regular army is reluctant to devote combat forces to guard
air bases. When a U.S. Air Force Wing deploys overseas, its base security
units must still guard its home base while providing more robust 24-hour
security overseas. Therefore, Air Force Wings should adopt a local ARNG
infantry battalion, which can train with the Wing and deploy when necessary.

If the Army becomes involved in a lengthy conflict, basic infantry
requirements will quickly sap manpower from regular fighting divisions. If
ARNG units are specifically trained for such missions, regular Army generals
will include them in war plans. Another reason is that the most important
role of the ARNG is guarding the USA, and the ARNG can increase readiness for
state miss

<A HREF="http://www.ctrl.org/">www.ctrl.org</A>
DECLARATION & DISCLAIMER
==========
CTRL is a discussion & informational exchange list. Proselytizing propagandic
screeds are unwelcomed. Substance—not soap-boxing—please!  These are
sordid matters and 'conspiracy theory'—with its many half-truths, mis-
directions and outright frauds—is used politically by different groups with
major and minor effects spread throughout the spectrum of time and thought.
That being said, CTRLgives no endorsement to the validity of posts, and
always suggests to readers; be wary of what you read. CTRL gives no
credence to Holocaust denial and nazi's need not apply.

Let us please be civil and as always, Caveat Lector.
========================================================================
Archives Available at:
http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html
 <A HREF="http://peach.ease.lsoft.com/archives/ctrl.html">Archives of
[EMAIL PROTECTED]</A>

http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/
 <A HREF="http:[EMAIL PROTECTED]/">ctrl</A>
========================================================================
To subscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email:
SUBSCRIBE CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED]

To UNsubscribe to Conspiracy Theory Research List[CTRL] send email:
SIGNOFF CTRL [to:] [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Om

Reply via email to