-Caveat Lector-
an excerpt from:
Treason's Peace
Howard Watson Armbruster©1947
A Crossroads Press Book
Beechurst Press
New York
438 pps. -- First/Only Edition -- Out-of Print
-----
--On July 5, 1945, under instructions contained in J. C. S. 1067, the U.S.
Military Government in Germany (O.M.G.U.S.) promulgated General Order No. 2,
which directed seizure of Farben for the purpose of making its plants
available for reparations, and for destruction of all Farben arms or
munitions of war or of any ingredients for same, which are not generally used
in industries permitted in Germany.
Special Order No. 1, of the same date, appointed a control office for Farben
to prevent the production by and rehabilitation of these plants except as
might be specifically determined in accordance with objectives of United
States.
However, within a few weeks of the promulgation of this order Brigadier
General William H. Draper, formerly of the New York banking house of Dillon,
Read & Co. (which floated the thirty million dollar bond issue of Vereinigte
Stahlwerke, Fritz Thyssen's Steel Trust, in the United States) was reported
in a published dispatch from Berlin to have declared that a considerable
portion of Germany"s pre-war industry must remain if Germany was to survive.
General Draper was chief adviser to General Eisenhower on German industry.
This apparent defiance of official military orders appeared strange, but no
more so than the address delivered by the Honorable John J. McCloy before the
Academy of Political Science in New York City on November 8th. Mr. McCloy,
who bad just resigned as Assistant Secretary of War, argued that Germany
could never be made into an exclusively agricultural or pastoral society. He
belittled the capacity of the enemy's remaining industrial plants and
indicated that their plants should be put to work as soon as possible to pay
for food that was to be imported. Concluded Mr. McCloy, "For a long time to
come there is no justifiable fear that Germany's war potential is being
rebuilt."
The Assistant Secretary of War, until 1940, was a member of the law firm of
Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine & Wood, which firm as mentioned in earlier
Chapters had been representing I.G. Farben or its affiliates in the United
States. It may appear to be a coincidence that Mr. McCloy should have turned
up in the War Department in 1941, in a position in which he could speak with
authority on such matters as handling the destruction of that mainstay of
Germany's war potential—I.G. Farben. The coincidence may also be recorded
here that other members of the Cravath law firm also held responsible places
in the War Department, including Alfred McCormack, and Howard C. Peterson, as
assistants to the Secretary. Another former member of this firm, Col. Richard
A. Wilmer, was commissioned after the war began and had to do with such
problems.---
Om
K
--[20]--
CHAPTER XX
Plans for Peace-In Time of War
I. G. FARBEN, unlike the governments and the armies of Germany, never
surrenders and never dies. Win, lose, or draw, the pattern of Farben goes on.
When the first World War ended, Farben turned abruptly from the production of
munitions no longer needed by a defeated army to rebuilding its international
framework in preparation for the next attempt at world conquest. Again, this
tenacity of purpose and flexibility of pattern are clearly discernible in the
events which developed so speedily in those hectic weeks following the
surrender of Germany on May 6, 1945.
An important phase of this pattern of eternal life and perpetual war is found
in numerous carry-over agreements or understandings already referred to
between Farben and certain of its affiliates in the United States, all of
which provided for, or promised, resumption of pre-war arrangements when the
war should end.
Aside from written agreements are the verbal understandings such as that
described in Chapter II in the 1914 letter from the German Hoechst to Herman
Metz:
Our entire relationship is really a confidential relationship and it will be
and must, without agreements, so continue in the future as in the past.
A similar relationship may be observed in a report of the duPont Foreign
Relations Department, dated February 9, 1940, in which reference was made to
various current agreements with Farben relating to nylon and plastics, and to
an arrangement made to return to Farben certain funds advanced to purchase
shares in Duperial, the duPont-I. C. I. dye subsidiary in South America. The
British I. C. I. had objected to Farben's purchase of the shares, so duPont
was arranging to repay the money. The report went on to say:
The duPont Company Wormed I.G.. that they intended to use their good offices
after the war to have the I.G. participation (in Duperial) restored.
Senator Bone was indignant at this and other evidence of an intended
resumption of "business as usual" with Farben after the war. Said the Senator:
Everything that has been revealed so far on the relationship between these
big private outfits indicates clear-ly that as soon as this bloody war is
over the gentlemen are going to get their feet under the table and restore
their ante-bellum status as soon as that can be accomplished . . . I am
wondering if the high officials of this government are aware of the fact that
these gentlemen, who have parcelled out this world, have intended to make
such adjustments of this prop-erty after the war. That is a picture which
should be very clearly presented to Congress, and Congress should have
something to say about it. I am disposed to think that it will.
Senator Bone was mistaken. Congress had nothing to say about it
On one other occasion before his Committee closed up shop, Senator Bone
warned of the future, saying:
You recall how we were caught up after the last war? We took over a lot of
German patents in the pharmaceutical and chemical fields and our business
entrepreneurs proceeded to fix things so that they were given back to the
Germans . . . through finagling devices
After this war, unless we are wiser or smarter than I think we may be, we
will probably find that the block of patents that the Alien Property
Custo-dian has will ultimately find their way back into the hands of smooth
German operators, and we will go through this same wretched process again, in
spite of the fact that there may be a million of our boys who have paid the
price with their blood and broken bodies.
As the events of the war progressed favorably, confusion increased at home
and a new voice was raised in opposition to a future renewal of international
cartels in general and that of Standard Oil-Farben in particular.
On July 26, 1943, Vice-President Henry A. Wallace, smarting at having been
removed as head of the Board of Economic Warfare, delivered a political
comeback speech in Detroit in which he took a slap at cartels; a few weeks
later, in Chicago, on September 11, he became more specific, referring to the
"creators of secret supergovernments."
Prior to the Chicago address the Vice-President had received a mass of data
on the subject from William Floyd II, Chairman Of the Standard Oil Minority
Stockholders Committee. His attack was so specific that the following day
Standard's president, R. W. Gallagher, replied defending his company's tie-up
with Farben and bitterly criticizing the Vice-President for the attack. In
passing Mr. Gallagher mentioned his own opposition to cartels and a few days
later, Standard's pugnacious public relations pacifier, Robert T. Haslam.
permitted Sylvia Porter to quote him in the New York Post that the dispute
between Mr. Wallace and Mr. Gallagher was all an unfortunate mistake because
Standard was already in agreement with the Vice-President.
Next, Assistant Attorney General Wendell Berge, now returned to anti-trust as
its chief, called Messrs. Gallagher and Wallace into conference and it
appeared that a semblance of harmony was restored; both parties seemed to
oppose international cartel agreements (with Farben) unless such agreements
were to be registered with the State or justice Department. This quaint
reservation hardly indicated much hope of action which would do away with
cartels as such in the future, or to eradicate I.G. Farben and its pattern
for all time as the primary essential for an enduring peace in the post-war
era. A week later Mr. Berge published an article in the New York Times
Magazine entitled "Can We End Monopoly," in which he first admitted that for
the last forty years, "emotional promises to enforce the Sherman Act" by both
political parties resulted in elected officials who "with equal consistency
did nothing about it."
Despite this painful admission, Mr. Berge also naively asserted that during
the present war "the spirit of the anti-trust laws has not only been
preserved, but much of the effect as well." Perhaps the new anti-trust
enforcement official was thinking of the adage, "the spirit is willing but
the flesh is weak."
Mr. Berge also paid unconscious tribute to the official Farben policies of
hush-hush and immunity by saying that:
The full story of our unintentional industrial contribution to the German war
effort has not been told
He finally concluded that. . .enforcement of the anti-trust laws . . .is
being pressed as vigorously now as available manpower permits.
It was hardly an optimistic forecast.
It may appear that the outspoken opposition of Henry Wallace to cartels in
general and to Farben in particular was not the least important of the
reasons which cost him the re-nomination as Vice-President. The truth
regarding President Roosevelt's health was even then known, or at least
suspected, by the inner councils of his party leaders. They chose his
successor.
The foregoing brings this story, for a brief space, to France and North
Africa, through which, when the Nazi doom became visible, the leaders of I.G.
Farben established a bridgehead of escape to a financial bomb shelter in
Algiers. It was then reported that certain Vichy French financial
collaborators, hoping to salvage some of the Nazi loot by aiding in its
concealment, had joined hands with Farben in a scheme to transfer the huge
funds Farben had accumulated by absorbing four of the largest chemical and
dye industries in France, to North African banks, where they might remain
safe regardless of who won final victory in Europe.
The United States appeared in this picture with the landing of its troops in
North Africa in October 1942. Then, while thousands of American youths were
dying—to end what Farben had started—there came the disquieting rumor that
the on-the-spot representative of the State Department of the United States
was in accord with the obviously German-inspired proposal to freeze the
financial status quo in North Africa.
Here the same old pattern reappeared, hazily perhaps, but nonetheless the
outline of a modus operandi of survival—a bridgehead out of the war zone of
beaten Germany by which Farben could emerge as a going concern, financially
strong and ready to resume business.
Meanwhile there appeared on the stage the obscure figure of Fritz Thyssen,
whose steel trust had been tied in with Farben, since 1927. Thyssen, in a
true-confession story, "I Paid Hitler," whined, repented his error, and
proclaimed that the one way to insure the next peace would be for "Men of
good will" to reestablish the new Germany as a corporate state.
So Thyssen emerged at a propitious moment as a leader who might induce the
thoughtful citizens of the Fatherland to throw out the vile Hitler and join
hands with the Allies in a plan which would save Germany's industries and
industrialists, and create a reformed Reich and a peaceful world.
After the landing of the Allies in France and as the war speeded toward its
inevitable end, discussions of how best to handle a defeated Germany centered
around German industry in general and I.G. Farben in particular.
So the struggle beneath the surface of official Washington continued, between
those who favored Farben survival and those who did not.
While the late Commander-in-Chief was under stem compulsion to devote time
and energy to global war, the greatest of all time, be was forced to rely
upon subordinates and upon Congress to defeat and destroy the pattern of
Farben. And it may appear that already certain of those underlings and their
legislative colleagues fell in step one by one, and blindly took places
assigned to them in the nooks and crannies of a new Farben framework as it
was to be revised to fit the new peace.
Let it be said here, again, that there is no force which can restrain or turn
such men from folly save only the lash of public indignation aroused by
revelation of facts now hushed.
They are not stupid men who reach through all the barriers of war or peace to
seduce other men who are stupid to new betrayals -with specious arguments of
a better' normal world, or potent draughts of suggestion, of power to come.
The dispute raged—should professors, politicians or plutocratic leaders of
industry direct the war and build the peace. As to which of these Farben does
not care. Its pattern has always found places for all three and can do so
again.
For one more moment go back—go back-to Bayer's Schweitzer telling Ambassador
von Bernstorff in 1916 not to worry about the future as it would be easy to
choose a President with the "right politics" to respond favorably to a
post-war comeback of I.G. Dyes in the United States. So does history repeat.
Or go back again, not so far, to the aged Gerard still politically powerful,
in June 1943, defending Standard refusal to abolish all ties with Farben
because:
Some of those who are thinking what is to happen after the war, are
contemplating universal cartels.
Officially there could be no doubt that, President Roosevelt favored a hard
peace for Germany and the most vigorous handling of Farben. On September 8,
1944, Mr. Roosevelt made this clear in a letter to Secretary of State Hull,
which he made public and in which he said:
The history of the use of the I.G. Farben trust by the Nazi reads like a
detective story. Defeat of the Nazi armies will have to be followed by the
eradication of those weapons of economic warfare .....
Prior to this blast by the President it was reported that the softpeace
sentiments of certain members of the European Advisory Commission had
produced a proposed handbook of directions for officers of the Allied
Military Govermnent (A. M. G.) which so favored a survival of the I.G. Farben
set-up that Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, Jr. hit the ceiling,
He protested to the President and, as a result, was summoned to the second Qu
ebec conference which was held by the President and Prime Minister Churchill
in September 1944.
The so-called Morgenthau Plan was then revealed, calling for the elimination
of German chemical and metallurgical industries and the conversion of that
nation largely to an agricultural economy with no peacetime industries save
those which could not contribute to a future war.
Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill initialed and approved a memorandum which
outlined this plan and which concluded with:
The program for eliminating the war-making industries in the Ruhr and the
Saar is looking forward to converting Germany into a country primarily
agricultural and pastoral in character. The Prime Minister and The President
were in agreement upon this program.
When the Morgenthau Plan was made public the storm broke over his head, and
the same barrage of epithets was aimed in his direction that had previously
been hurled at Englands leading advocate of a hard peace, Lord Vansittart.
President Roosevelt thereupon, in December 1944, through United States
Ambassador John G. Winant in London, outlined to the Allies his demand for a
complete and ruthless abolition of German war industries, but as this outline
allowed for some survival of chemical industries for civilian requirements,
it appeared less severe than the Morgenthau plan.
At Yalta, in February, 1945, Mr. Roosevelt, with Churchill and Stalin,
stepped back a bit more from a program of total elimination of Farben by
declaring merely an "inflexible purpose" to eliminate or control all German
industry that could be used for military production."
This was to be the last official pronouncement of policy on this subject by
President Roosevelt. Those who were closest to him believed that he never
wavered from his determination that
As for Germany, that tragic nation . . . we and our Allies are entirely
agreed that we shall not leave them a single element of military power or
potential military power.
However in April, after Harry S. Truman became President, there was issued
and then withheld from public knowledge, a joint Chiefs-of-Staff order (J. C.
S. 1067) instructing General Eisenhower for the governing of occupied
Germany. This order required basic objectives "to the full extent necessary
to achieve the industrial disarmament of Germany." It prohibited all research
laboratories save those necessary to the protection of the public health, and
stipulated abolition of all 'laboratories and related institutions whose work
has been connected with the building of the German War Machine." Also it
forbade all research that would in any way contribute to Germanys future war
potential.
These vigorous directives were softened however by a later reference to the
"pending final Allied agreement on reparation, and on control or elimination
of German industries that can be used for war production . . ."
The Potsdam Agreement, arrived at in July and August by Prime Minister Attlee
of England, Marshal Stalin of Russia, and President Truman, followed closely
the earlier directives "to eliminate Germanys war potential" by control and
restriction of industry "to Germany's approved postwar peacetime needs" and
ordered that:
In organizing the German economy primary emphasis shall be given to the
development of agriculture and peaceful domestic industries.
On July 5, 1945, under instructions contained in J. C. S. 1067, the U.S.
Military Government in Germany (O.M.G.U.S.) promulgated General Order No. 2,
which directed seizure of Farben for the purpose of making its plants
available for reparations, and for destruction of all Farben arms or
munitions of war or of any ingredients for same, which are not generally used
in industries permitted in Germany.
Special Order No. 1, of the same date, appointed a control office for Farben
to prevent the production by and rehabilitation of these plants except as
might be specifically determined in accordance with objectives of United
States.
However, within a few weeks of the promulgation of this order Brigadier
General William H. Draper, formerly of the New York banking house of Dillon,
Read & Co. (which floated the thirty million dollar bond issue of Vereinigte
Stahlwerke, Fritz Thyssen's Steel Trust, in the United States) was reported
in a published dispatch from Berlin to have declared that a considerable
portion of Germany"s pre-war industry must remain if Germany was to survive.
General Draper was chief adviser to General Eisenhower on German industry.
This apparent defiance of official military orders appeared strange, but no
more so than the address delivered by the Honorable John J. McCloy before the
Academy of Political Science in New York City on November 8th. Mr. McCloy,
who bad just resigned as Assistant Secretary of War, argued that Germany
could never be made into an exclusively agricultural or pastoral society. He
belittled the capacity of the enemy's remaining industrial plants and
indicated that their plants should be put to work as soon as possible to pay
for food that was to be imported. Concluded Mr. McCloy, "For a long time to
come there is no justifiable fear that Germany's war potential is being
rebuilt."
The Assistant Secretary of War, until 1940, was a member of the law firm of
Cravath, de Gersdorff, Swaine & Wood, which firm as mentioned in earlier
Chapters had been representing I.G. Farben or its affiliates in the United
States. It may appear to be a coincidence that Mr. McCloy should have turned
up in the War Department in 1941, in a position in which he could speak with
authority on such matters as handling the destruction of that mainstay of
Germany's war potential—I.G. Farben. The coincidence may also be recorded
here that other members of the Cravath law firm also held responsible places
in the War Department, including Alfred McCormack, and Howard C. Peterson, as
assistants to the Secretary. Another former member of this firm, Col. Richard
A. Wilmer, was commissioned after the war began and had to do with such
problems.
One fact is apparent-General Dwight D. Eisenhower was definitely not in a
ccord with those who favored softness. While on a visit to Washington on
October 20, 1945, the General publicly demanded the complete dissolution of
I.G. Farben in order to assure future world peace. That this was his
intention may not be doubted. But the General of the Armies in Europe, with
all his powers as a combat soldier, did not make policy and did not select
many of the men who were sent to Germany by the State and War Departments and
the F. E. A.
The retreat from the official policy of eliminating I.G. Farben continued
with a statement by Secretary of State James F. Byrnes, in December 1945, in
which he announced that German administrative agencies should be set up to
control foreign trade and industry, and that German industrial production
should be permitted to increase, and German exports permitted to finance
necessary imports.
In August of that same year President Truman had been persuaded to send the
well-meaning former war censor, Byron Price, to Germany to survey conditions.
Mr. Price's report, while highly informative, ignored completely the lessons
of Farben's quick emergency after the first World War by stating that . . . .
.
There certainly is not the slightest evidence that Germany can become, within
the forseeable future, sufficiently strong to permit diversions of production
for German war purposes.
In the Halls of Congress, Senators and Representatives were bombarded by the
forgive-and-forget brigade and the advocates of immmediate[sic] restoration
of German industry-so that the dear little baby Nazis would not starve.
Some of this special pleading was sincere idealism, and some of it arrant
hypocrisy all too similiar to the brazen demands for the restoration of the
German dye trust after the first World War. History repeats.
One very informative speech, which indicated the under cover struggle in
official circles on the future of I.G. Farben, was delivered in the Senate on
January 29, 1946 by Nebraska's distinguished funeral director, Republican
Senator Kenneth S. Wherry. This mortician-turned-statesman referred to the
bitter rivalry between Mr. Morgenthau's henchmen in the Treasury Department
and representatives in the War and State Department as far back as 1942; and
stated that:
Mr. Morgenthau finally won his battle and forced the incorporation of
his plan into the new infamous document J. C. S. 1067 despite the
repeated warnings of Mr. Stimson and of many high officials in the State
Department.
Unfortunately, the speech was received with acclaim by all too many members
of the Senate of the United States.
As illustrative of the non-partisan pattern of all such legislative
propaganda, Senator James Oliver Eastland, Democrat colleague Of Bilbo from
Mississippi, contributed a fine appeal to passion and illogic on December 4,
1945, in a lengthy diatribe against Secretary Morgenthau for wanting to
eliminate German war industry-and at Russian soldiers for, allegedly, raping
German maidens.
In associating these two varieties of injury to the German people as a single
great humanitarian issue, the Senator propounded this disingenious query:
Why blur the easily defined distinction between peacetime industry and
wartime industry? . . . . . to de-industrialize German is not necessary to
render Germans powerless again to wage war. We are concerned instead with the
great issue of humanitarianism.
However, it remained for that great Republican statesman from Indiana, the
Honorable Homer E. Capehart, to win the Senatorial humanitarianism
sweepstakes with an outburst on February 5, 1946, in which be denounced Mr.
Morgenthau and the advocates of his plan, rather than the Nazis, as
responsible for mass starvation of the German people and the deliberate
destruction of the German state. Accusing them of "burning with an
all-consuming determination to wreak their vengeance," the Senator stormed at
his colleagues that their "technique of hate" had earned for Mr. Morgenthau,
and Colonel Bernard Bernstein, the titles of "American Himmlers."
The thesis that the eradication of Farben's war potential was all wrong
because people were starving in Germany was also found in a November 1945
report of a House of Representatives Committee on post-war Planning, of which
another Mississippi statesman, William M. Colmer, was chairman. Ibis report
stressed the pre-war dependence of other European countries (Farben's
victims) on Germany's industry. Ignoring the obvious fact that chemical and
metallurgical industries could operate just as efficiently for peace if moved
out of Germany into adjoining countries where! the lust for world conquest
does not exist, Representative Colmer's report naively proclaimed that to
strip Germany of its ordinary industries would injure industrial production
in other, countries (those ravaged by Germany) and also would impose a heavy
burden on the United States or widespread starvation and dangerous conditions
all over Europe.
Over the air and in the press the pleas to save Farben were heard in a great
variety of argument. Among the gems of radio propaganda against the
Morgenthau plan was the conclusion expressed by Saul K. Padover, biographer
of emperors and former college professor, who is credited with effective work
in the Army's Psychological Warfare Division. Professor Padover in a World
Peaceways broadcast on December 16, 1945, ended his plea that we must re-make
the German mind (he admitted that this would take decades) with a caution
that there was an element of danger should we punish I.G. Farben or destroy
its plants. "Destroying factories will achieve nothing" concluded the
Professor.
Then be left in a hurry to return to his official duties in Germany. Months
later, after Professor Padover had re-examined the stealthy resuscitation of
the German industrial war potential in the guise of a peace-time economy, he
changed his views. On September 9, 1946 in the newspaper PM the Professor
expounded ably on the necessity to deprive the Reich of its industrial might
in order, as he said, to turn it into "a giant without weapons, and
consequently not to be feared."
However, as will appear later, the Professoes recognition of the menace of
the Farben war potential did not appear until after our Secretary of State
bad taken one more step away from the Roosevelt program of destruction for
all time of the real menace to future peace.
Meanwhile Raymond Moley, the kiss-and-tell hero of early New Deal days who
had openly advocated a new era of German industrial cartelization to be
directed by Americans, broadcast his conclusion that already the Morgenthau
plan was gone, and that Farben, "one of the most unusual and important
organizations in the world,' need not be destroyed as it could be properly
controlled, now that Americans had taken over.
Among the columnists, Dorothy Thompson, strangely changed from her earlier
attitude, was probably the most vociferous and certainly the most hysterical
opponent of Franklin Roosevelt's announced determination to eradicate the
industrial war potential of I.G. Farben.
As justifying her attacks on "de-industrialism," as she called it, Miss
Thompson made the point that "Only a limited number of industrialists helped
Hitler in any way to come to power," and stated that her criticisms were
based upon:
Unswerving allegiance to the principles of democracy, the rarely practiced
ethics of Christendom, the long range interests of America, and an unflagging
defense of humanism.
Sylvia Porter, brilliant rival of Miss Thompson, replied in her column in the
New York Post that the fundamental issue was to so direct Germany's post-war
economy that she would never again be able to threaten world peace. Summed up
Miss Porter on August 6, 1945:
The Nazi party didn't make Hitler. Germany's industrialists made him and made
his invasion possible.
And Farben's friends did not have it all their own way in the United States
Senate. In June 1945 a few weeks after the surrender, Democratic Senator
Harley M. Kilgore returned from an early postwar trip to occupied Germany
with the announcement that he had uncovered proof of the plot to revive I.G.
Farben and other German war industries, and that German industrial leaders
were already preparing for the next world war.
Senator Kilgore, made Chairman of the Sub-Committee on War Mobilization of
the Senate Military Affairs Committee in 1943, had done excellent work in
uncovering and recording evidence of Farben's prewar criminal conspiracies in
the country and had also explored some aspects of the cartel problem in
general.
In fact, Senator Kilgore became the first member of the Congress to express
written approval of my own earlier efforts to expose the influences which
were protecting the Farben prewar conspiracy when he wrote me in February
1944 that:
If Congress had only investigated this (Farben) lobby in 1931 as you
recommended, we should have had a more healthy realism about Germany and
cartels rather than the realism of war.
On June 22, 1945 Senator Kilgore called the Honorable Bernard M. Baruch as a
witness, and the latter, to his everlasting credit and to the dismay of many
of his Wall Street friends, delivered a most devastating blast at Germany's
industrial war potential which, he demanded, must be smashed for all time.
Bluntly he described Farben's industrialists:
War is their chief business and always has been . . . Her war-making
potential must be eliminated; many of her plants shifted east and west to
friendly countries; all other heavy industry destroyed
The elder statesman's testimony constituted a substantial approval of
Secretary Morgenthau's proposals and as such went further than the Yalta
agreement of the three heads of state. Over and over Mr. Baruch denounced the
German industrial leaders as equally guilty of murder as were the Nazis.
"German industry is a war industry," he said. "You cannot industrialize
Germany and keep her from being a war agency."
Other witnesses who followed Mr. Baruch before the Kilgore Committee
included Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clay-ton, who testified
regarding evidence uncovered in Germany of the grandiose plot engaged in by
I.G. Farben and other war in-dustries in concealing their capital assets and
technicians in "safe havens," as be termed them, in foreign countries in
order to prepare for the next war.
Perhaps the most important testimony presented to the committee, in its
significance as regards the postwar administrative policy on I.G. Farben, was
a lengthy program outlined by Leo T. Crow'ley who, at the time, was still
wielding his great powers and influence behind the scenes as Foreign Economic
Administrator. In the outline of, his program of economic and industrial
disarmament Mi. Crowley indulged in a series of contradictory allegations and
proposals which, facing both ways, would appear to be merely aimless
double-talk if it were not for its more serious aspects. Mr. Crowley's thesis
at the start very ably pointed out that:
It was not the amount of military material which Germany was able to save
from destruction by the Allies nor the handful of military material which
Germany was able to manufacture during the years which immediately followed
the defeat of 1918. . . Rather it was the fact that Germany re-tained intact
a vast aggregate of economic and industrial war potential and was able to
continue to experiment, plan and prosecute its development in terms of future
war production that was important . . . and "that later enabled the German
nation to organize itself completely and entirely for war .....
The above- appears to be an extremely well expressed recognition by Mr.
Crowley of German's real war potential. However, in concluding, Mr. Crowley
openly advocated another era of control instead of eradication, saying that
"economic security from future German aggression must," among other things,
"recognize the differences between a powerful war economy and a healthy
peacetime economy" and "be achieved by . affirmative industrial and economic
controls as a first step."
Among the gems in this list of "musts" relating to the control but not the
elimination of Germany's war potential were requirements that the control be
possessed of a maximum of administra-tive feasibility and simplicity.
Complicated and detailed controls may be practical during the period of
occupation . . . Be simple and understandable for the common people of the
world . . ."
With gibberish of this sort emanating from one of the highest ranking
administrators in Washington, is it any wonder that minor 0. M. G. officials
who wanted to do a job were discouraged and ineffective.
It is appropriate to recite here statements of necessity for the disarmament
of Germany which are set forth in the summary of the final program prepared
under Mr. Crowley's direction and made public some months after his statement
before the Kilgore Committee.
One of these necessities is stated to be that "The achievement of security
from future German aggression should be the primary and controlling element
in our foreign policy toward Germany."
Another admits the inadequacy of any program which merely stops the direct
production of arms and munitions and states:
Military potential in a total war is a combination of modem industrial,
scientific, and institutional components of such a nature as to make them
equally useful for war or civilian productions.
Having thus ably stated the necessity to eliminate completely I.G. Farben and
its allied metallurgical industries, the Crowley program and its appendix in
some 660 closely printed pages of figures and discussion then recommends the
continued operations of these same industries with the trained management and
scientific research which must accompany them-all this to be "controlled" for
an indefinite period. In other words a substantial repetition, step by step,
of the control of German industry instituted by the Allies after the first
World War which fumbled and foozled until it was abandoned, while the men of
Farben went right along with their plans for the next war.
With respect to Mr. Crowley's contradictory recommendations on German
industry it is only fair to state that Henry H. Fowler, Director of the Enemy
Branch of the F. E. A., who did much of the work on the problems, also
presented numerous exhibits to the Kilgore Committee on June 26, 1945 which
were notable contributions to the unmasking of Farben's war potential.
Having contributed his final compendium of governmental policy which related
to the survival of I.G. Farben, Mr. Crowley retired from his numerous and
onerous government jobs to his duties as president and chairman of the
Standard Gas & Electric Company and other public utilities in which he held
office. However, criticism of Mr. Crowley did not cease with the end of his
governmental duties, as the Federal Power Commission on June 18, 1946, issued
an order forbidding him to continue as chairman of one electric light company
and director in two other utilities, giving neglect of his duties as the
reason for thus ousting him.
pps,378-394
-----
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