On Mon, Nov 27, 2000 at 10:58:23AM -0800, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi Lynn!
problem is that consumer don't normally know that they want to check on a
particular merchant's CRL entry until they realize that they want to go to that
merchant site. in general, the consumer's aren't going to
d"
[EMAIL PROTECTED], Ben Laurie [EMAIL PROTECTED],
[EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED],
[EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Public Key Infrastructure: An Artifact...
I would like to get further information as to why you don't think revocation
does
n
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
The other solution is to go online and do real-time checks ... but
doing real-time checks invalidates basic design decision trade-offs
associated with choosing a R/O partial replicated distributed data
implementation in the first place.
Have you looked at the design
At 11:40 AM -0800 11/20/00, Ray Dillinger wrote:
On Mon, 20 Nov 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
as pure asside ... any SSL server certificate signed by any CA
in my browswer's CA list is acceptable.
my broswer makes no distinction on which CA signed what ...
and/or even what they signed. If I
On Sun, 19 Nov 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
When the user goes to www.amazon.com, they get a plaintext http redirect
to amazon.hackeddomain.com, which does check.
Still confused...
The original connection to www.amazon.com is an SSL connection, right?
We are following an https: URL?
On Thu, Nov 16, 2000 at 03:53:28PM -0800, Ed Gerck wrote:
http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/II/PKIMisFit.html
Public Key Infrastructure: An Artifact Ill-Fitted to the Needs of the
Information Society
Abstract
It has been conventional wisdom that, for e-commerce to fulfill
Greg Broiles wrote:
On Thu, Nov 16, 2000 at 03:53:28PM -0800, Ed Gerck wrote:
http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/II/PKIMisFit.html
Public Key Infrastructure: An Artifact Ill-Fitted to the Needs of the
Information Society
Abstract
It has been conventional wisdom
Of course not. Unilateral offers can be made to a defined class
of persons and accepted by action thereon. An old principle, but
valid still.
MacN
On Thu, 16 Nov 2000, Greg Broiles wrote:
It has been conventional wisdom that, for e-commerce to fulfill its
potential, each party to a
Mac Norton wrote:
Of course not. Unilateral offers can be made to a defined class
of persons and accepted by action thereon. An old principle, but
valid still.
Yes but the problem faced by e-commerce is what happens when it
fails. So, while I agree with you that it is not true that "for
On Thu, Nov 16, 2000 at 08:11:25PM -0600, Mac Norton wrote:
Of course not. Unilateral offers can be made to a defined class
of persons and accepted by action thereon. An old principle, but
valid still.
MacN
On Thu, 16 Nov 2000, Greg Broiles wrote:
It has been conventional wisdom
On Thu, 16 Nov 2000 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Bram Cohen writes:
In the vast majority of cases, preventing man in the middle attacks is a
waste of time.
In the sense that, in the vast majority of communications, there is no
man in the middle attack being mounted?
Yes.
Couldn't the
As an aside ... AADS (http://www.garlic.com/~lynn/ ) relies on existing business
processes that provide secure bindings in account records ... just adding public
key digital signature to existing authentication processes for
non-face-to-face and/or face-to-face transactions (i.e. the meaning
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