At 9:16 PM -0400 10/28/2000, John Kelsey wrote:
I'll comment more on this from another note of yours. I
think you're probably right, but that we need to figure out
how to really nail that argument down, which means
specifying exactly what's meant by ``close to an inverse,''
or whatever.
I have
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At 04:20 PM 10/27/00 -0400, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
At 1:00 PM -0500 10/27/2000, Carskadden, Rush wrote:
Are you guys still talking about the feasibility of a
cipher that implements each AES candidate in turn with the
same key? I don't really get this idea.
On Thu, 26 Oct 2000, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
simple way to combine the AES finalists and take advantage of all the
testing that each has already undergone. And, IMHO, it is an
interesting theoretical question as well. Even if the answer is
"yes," I am not advocating that it be used in
"Arnold G. Reinhold" wrote:
At 2:14 PM -0700 10/20/2000, Bram Cohen wrote:
This is just silly. There's nothing wrong with Rijndael.
...
Testing is the most expensive part of any new cipher effort. So I
think there is a practical basis for at least asking if there is a
simple way to
Title: RE: Paranoid Encryption Standard (was Re: Rijndael Hitachi)
Are you guys still talking about the feasibility of a cipher that implements each AES candidate in turn with the same key? I don't really get this idea. Provided you were actually using the same key with each stage
At 2:14 PM -0700 10/20/2000, Bram Cohen wrote:
This is just silly. There's nothing wrong with Rijndael.
Maybe so. I do agree that Rijndael is an excellent design and a good
choice for AES. But it hasn't been tested enough for complete
confidence, in my opinion. Supposedly NSA takes 7 years to
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At 02:26 PM 10/20/00 -0400, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
At 8:13 PM -0400 10/11/2000, John Kelsey wrote:
...
I read the Massey and Maurer paper (One can find it at
http://www.isi.ee.ethz.ch/publications/isipap/umaure-mass-inspec-1993
1.pdf ) and I have a couple
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