At 9:16 PM -0400 10/28/2000, John Kelsey wrote:
I'll comment more on this from another note of yours. I
think you're probably right, but that we need to figure out
how to really nail that argument down, which means
specifying exactly what's meant by ``close to an inverse,''
or whatever.
I have
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At 04:20 PM 10/27/00 -0400, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
At 1:00 PM -0500 10/27/2000, Carskadden, Rush wrote:
Are you guys still talking about the feasibility of a
cipher that implements each AES candidate in turn with the
same key? I don't really get this idea.
On Thu, 26 Oct 2000, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
simple way to combine the AES finalists and take advantage of all the
testing that each has already undergone. And, IMHO, it is an
interesting theoretical question as well. Even if the answer is
"yes," I am not advocating that it be used in
"Arnold G. Reinhold" wrote:
At 2:14 PM -0700 10/20/2000, Bram Cohen wrote:
This is just silly. There's nothing wrong with Rijndael.
...
Testing is the most expensive part of any new cipher effort. So I
think there is a practical basis for at least asking if there is a
simple way to
Title: RE: Paranoid Encryption Standard (was Re: Rijndael Hitachi)
Are you guys still talking about the feasibility of a cipher that implements each AES candidate in turn with the same key? I don't really get this idea. Provided you were actually using the same key with each stage
At 2:14 PM -0700 10/20/2000, Bram Cohen wrote:
This is just silly. There's nothing wrong with Rijndael.
Maybe so. I do agree that Rijndael is an excellent design and a good
choice for AES. But it hasn't been tested enough for complete
confidence, in my opinion. Supposedly NSA takes 7 years to
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At 02:26 PM 10/20/00 -0400, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
At 8:13 PM -0400 10/11/2000, John Kelsey wrote:
...
I read the Massey and Maurer paper (One can find it at
http://www.isi.ee.ethz.ch/publications/isipap/umaure-mass-inspec-1993
1.pdf ) and I have a couple
At 8:13 PM -0400 10/11/2000, John Kelsey wrote:
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At 01:44 PM 10/10/00 -0400, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
...
I was thinking it might be useful to define a "Paranoid
Encryption Standard (PES)" that is a concatenation of all
five AES finalists, applied in
--
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED][SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]
I wouldn't recommend boobytrapping the glass in that manner.
I'd go with a ballistic laminate on the glass.
[...]
Ed
At 02:51 PM 10/14/00 -0700, jim bell wrote:
The solution is obvious, to a chemist. Make the glass
Wouldn't an errant BB, baseball, etc. blow your house to matchsticks with
this scenario? Or just all the glass, assuming you didn't do that yourself
"Tim Allen-ing" this thing into place? I guess if you used just enough
explosive to blow the glass into dust, you basically accomplish the bad guys
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At 04:57 PM 10/11/00 -0700, Meyer Wolfsheim wrote:
The only reasons I see for having a security system (be it
an encryption product, or a physical access device) with a
large discrepancy in the level of security that the
individual components provide is
At 06:11 PM 10/11/00 -0700, Tim May wrote:
A Medeco lock on a glass door may seem crazy, but a pickable lock on
a glass door means those who know how to pick locks--like cops who
have access to lock guns--can enter at will without any persistent
evidence of their intrusion.
Intrusion
Arnold G. Reinhold [EMAIL PROTECTED] asked:
What is the licensing status of the other finalists? For example, I seem
to recall reading that RC6 would be licensed to the public at no charge if
it won
the competition. What now?
Since April, RC6 has being commercially
Thanks for the summary. My only problem with Rijndael is that it is
still rather young. I recall reading that NSA takes seven years to
qualify a new cipher. It took at least that long for the open
cryptographic community to trust DES. If someone asked me what
cipher to use today in a new,
At 01:44 PM 10/10/00 -0400, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
Thanks for the summary. My only problem with Rijndael is that it is still rather
young. I recall reading that NSA takes seven years to qualify a new cipher. It took
at least that long for the open cryptographic community to trust DES. If
Listing the Fab Four who were AES finalists with Rijndael, I wrote:
Serpent is public domain, now under the GNU PUBLIC LICENSE (GPL),
although Serpent website warns that "some comments in the code still say
otherwise." http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rja14/serpent.html
I should
On Sun, 8 Oct 2000, Vin McLellan wrote:
Myself, I wouldn't blame NIST if they factored, as you suggest,
avoidance of endless legal hassles into their decision-making process.
With the current state of patents, it is literally impossible to do
anything with a computer without
On Wed, 04 Oct 2000, Vin McLellan me wrote:
Not to take anything from Rijndael, which is both popular and
widely respected among many critical professionals, but I suspect that one
of the more long-lasting (pseudo-conspiratorial) theories about the
selection of
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