Re: Public Key Infrastructure: An Artifact...

2000-11-27 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 11:17 AM -0800 11/23/2000, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Basically cetificates are an implementation of R/O partial replicated distributed data that were intended to address availability of information in a predominately offline environment. In the SSL server certificates, distribution of CRLs

Re: Public Key Infrastructure: An Artifact...

2000-11-20 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 12:08 PM + 11/19/2000, Perry commented: [I see you've never paid attention to how easy it is to get a certificate, Ben. I suspect I could get one in the name of any company with about 20 minutes of unskilled forgery. The level of checking done is trivial. This wouldn't be a problem except

RE: Paranoid Encryption Standard (was Re: Rijndael Hitachi)

2000-11-02 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 9:16 PM -0400 10/28/2000, John Kelsey wrote: I'll comment more on this from another note of yours. I think you're probably right, but that we need to figure out how to really nail that argument down, which means specifying exactly what's meant by ``close to an inverse,'' or whatever. I have

Re: Paranoid Encryption Standard (was Re: Rijndael Hitachi)

2000-10-26 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 2:14 PM -0700 10/20/2000, Bram Cohen wrote: This is just silly. There's nothing wrong with Rijndael. Maybe so. I do agree that Rijndael is an excellent design and a good choice for AES. But it hasn't been tested enough for complete confidence, in my opinion. Supposedly NSA takes 7 years to

Paranoid Encryption Standard (was Re: Rijndael Hitachi)

2000-10-20 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 8:13 PM -0400 10/11/2000, John Kelsey wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- At 01:44 PM 10/10/00 -0400, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote: ... I was thinking it might be useful to define a "Paranoid Encryption Standard (PES)" that is a concatenation of all five AES finalist

Re: Non-Repudiation in the Digital Environment (was Re: First Monday August 2000)

2000-10-20 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 11:50 AM -0600 10/20/2000, Bob Jueneman wrote: Let's put this problem in perspective, and try to avoid the "chicken little, the sky is falling" syndrome. It's quite unlikely that someone would come up with "Eureka!" type of solution to factoring large numbers that would end up completely

Re: Non-Repudiation in the Digital Environment (was Re: First Monday August 2000)

2000-10-19 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 10:23 AM -0700 10/18/2000, Ed Gerck wrote: "Arnold G. Reinhold" wrote: At 11:21 AM -0700 10/17/2000, Ed Gerck wrote: As Tony Bartoletti wrote, apologies for what seems a rant, but the "solid mathematical foundations" underlying digital signatures, "Qualified Cer

Re: Non-Repudiation in the Digital Environment (was Re: First Monday August 2000)

2000-10-17 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 4:37 PM -0700 10/16/2000, Ed Gerck wrote: Borrowing from a private comment from Bob Jueneman, whatever the technical community decides that non-repudiation means, it probably isn't what the legal community means. So be it. Certainly the legal profession uses ordinary English words to mean

Re: Non-Repudiation in the Digital Environment (was Re: First Monday August 2000)

2000-10-16 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 10:20 PM -0700 10/15/2000, Ed Gerck wrote: Arnold, Internet RFCs are technical specifications that use common English words in a strictly defined manner. To suggest that the use of names in computer code or Internet RFCs might have legal implications ... imagine lawyers examining some code

Re: Rijndael Hitachi

2000-10-10 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
ideas in this posting are patentable, I would happily place them in the public domain. Arnold Reinhold At 2:17 AM -0400 10/10/2000, Vin McLellan wrote: Arnold G. Reinhold [EMAIL PROTECTED] asked: What is the licensing status of the other finalists? For example, I seem to recall reading

Re: Non-Repudiation in the Digital Environment (was Re: First Monday August 2000)

2000-08-11 Thread Arnold G. Reinhold
At 8:10 PM -0700 8/9/2000, David Honig wrote: At 08:29 AM 8/9/00 -0700, Eric Murray wrote: It's 1) saying that the passphrase can "usually be broken". I'm sure that some people manage to choose poor/short passphrases, but "usually" would be pushing it.  Has anyone ever published an entropy vs.