- Forwarded message from Roger Dingledine [EMAIL PROTECTED] -
From: Roger Dingledine [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sun, 23 Oct 2005 23:41:20 -0400
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Publicizing Hidden Services
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.9i
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Sun, Oct 23, 2005 at
- Forwarded message from Geoffrey Goodell [EMAIL PROTECTED] -
From: Geoffrey Goodell [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sun, 23 Oct 2005 21:54:04 -0400
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Access for the uncomputed
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.6+20040907i
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
I see the problem as
Title: - CUNA Update Report -
In attention of all Credit Union customers,
As the Internet and information technology enable us to expand our services, we are committed to maintaining the trust customers have placed in us for protecting the privacy and security of information we have
- Forwarded message from Damien Miller [EMAIL PROTECTED] -
From: Damien Miller [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2005 12:39:42 +1000 (EST)
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Skype security evaluation]
On Sun, 23 Oct 2005, Joseph Ashwood
Title: domeus
Messaggio di sistema
Ciao cypherpunks@minder.net,
sei stato invitato ad unirti al gruppo
Title: You are invited to participate
You are invited to participateThe Elimination of User Fees - eLearning Made Available To EveryoneDear list member,We cordially invite you to participate in the first of a four part online seminar series titled “Elearning – making the MOST of your
On 10/23/05, Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
My understanding of the peer-to-peer key agreement protocol (hereafter
p2pka) is based on section 3.3 and 3.4.2 and is something like this:
A - B: N_ab
B - A: N_ba
B - A: Sign{f(N_ab)}_a
A - B: Sign{f(N_ba)}_b
A - B: Sign{A, K_a}_SKYPE
B -
On 10/22/05, Ian G [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
R. Hirschfeld wrote:
This is not strictly correct. The payer can reveal the blinding
factor, making the payment traceable. I believe Chaum deliberately
chose for one-way untraceability (untraceable by the payee but not by
the payer) in order
At 11:14 AM 10/24/2005, cyphrpunk wrote:
Note that e-gold, which originally sold non-reversibility as a key
benefit of the system, found that this feature attracted Ponzi schemes
and fraudsters of all stripes, and eventually it was forced to reverse
transactions and freeze accounts. It's not
From: cyphrpunk [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Oct 24, 2005 2:14 PM
Subject: Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like
Payment Systems
On 10/22/05, Ian G [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Note that e-gold, which originally sold non-reversibility as a key
benefit of the system, found
On 10/24/05, Steve Schear [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I don't think E-gold ever held out its system as non-reversible with proper
court order. All reverses I am aware happened either due to some technical
problem with their system or an order from a court of competence in the
matter at hand.
On 10/24/05, John Kelsey [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
More to the point, an irreversible payment system raises big practical
problems in a world full of very hard-to-secure PCs running the
relevant software. One exploitable software bug, properly used, can
steal an enormous amount of money in an
On Mon, Oct 24, 2005 at 02:58:32PM -0700, cyphrpunk wrote:
Digital wallets will require real security in user PCs. Still I don't
see why we don't already have this problem with online banking and
similar financial services. Couldn't a virus today steal people's
passwords and command their
One intresting security measure protecting valuable digital assets (WM
protects private keys this way) is inflating them before encryption.
While it does not protect agains trojan applications, it does a surprisingly
good job at reducing attacks following the key logging + file theft pattern.
IMPEACH BUSH AND ENTER THE GUESS HOW MANY INDICTMENTS POOL
As always we feature the action link first, this one to call for the
impeachment of George Bush
http://www.actspeak.com/impeach.htm
There is a storm of historic proportions headed for the United States, one that
will make Hurricane
--- begin forwarded text
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2005 23:31:34 +0200
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: Hagai Bar-El [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [PracticalSecurity] Anonymity - great technology but hardly used
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Hello,
I wrote a short essay about anonymity and pseudonymity
http://www.hbarel.com/Blog/entry0006.html
I believe that for anonymity and pseudonymity technologies to survive
they have to be applied to applications that require them by design,
rather than to mass-market applications that can also do (cheaper)
without. If anonymity mechanisms are
At 11:17 AM -0700 10/21/05, someone who can't afford a vowel, Alex, ;-)
expressed his anal glands thusly in my general direction:
You're such an asshole.
My, my. Tetchy, this morning, oh vowelless one...
At 11:17 AM -0700 10/21/05, cyphrpunk wrote:
This is what you characterized as a unitary
The question is, can
she defy a subpoena based on membership in the privileged Reporter class
that an ordinary person could not defy?
It seems like the real question is how membership in the class is determined.
If anyone who's acting like a reporter in a certain context (say, Adam Shostack
- Forwarded message from Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED] -
From: Steven M. Bellovin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sun, 23 Oct 2005 09:48:37 -0400
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Subject: Skype security evaluation
X-Mailer: exmh version 2.6.3 04/04/2003 with nmh-1.0.4
Skype has released an
That's a fairly interesting review, and Skype should be commended for
hiring someone to do it. I hope to see more evaluations from vendors
in the future.
However, I have a couple of suggestions.
My understanding of the peer-to-peer key agreement protocol (hereafter
p2pka) is based on section
On 10/13/05, Brian Minder [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The minder.net CDR node will be shutting down on November 1, 2005. This
includes the cypherpunks-moderated list. Please adjust your subscriptions
accordingly.
Gmail would facilitate automating a new cypherpunks-moderated list.
Gmail's spam
- Original Message -
Subject: [Tom Berson Skype Security Evaluation]
Tom Berson's conclusion is incorrect. One needs only to take a look at the
publicly available information. I couldn't find an immediate reference
directly from the Skype website, but it uses 1024-bit RSA keys, the
--- begin forwarded text
Date: Sat, 22 Oct 2005 01:50:38 -0400
To: Philodox Clips List [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Blood, Bullets, Bombs and Bandwidth
The long version of the Wired Story on Ryan Lackey, including lots more
about Tyler Wagner, who I've
On 10/23/05, Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
My understanding of the peer-to-peer key agreement protocol (hereafter
p2pka) is based on section 3.3 and 3.4.2 and is something like this:
A - B: N_ab
B - A: N_ba
B - A: Sign{f(N_ab)}_a
A - B: Sign{f(N_ba)}_b
A - B: Sign{A, K_a}_SKYPE
B -
On 10/22/05, Ian G [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
R. Hirschfeld wrote:
This is not strictly correct. The payer can reveal the blinding
factor, making the payment traceable. I believe Chaum deliberately
chose for one-way untraceability (untraceable by the payee but not by
the payer) in order
From: cyphrpunk [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Oct 24, 2005 2:14 PM
Subject: Re: [fc-discuss] Financial Cryptography Update: On Digital Cash-like
Payment Systems
On 10/22/05, Ian G [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Note that e-gold, which originally sold non-reversibility as a key
benefit of the system, found
At 11:14 AM 10/24/2005, cyphrpunk wrote:
Note that e-gold, which originally sold non-reversibility as a key
benefit of the system, found that this feature attracted Ponzi schemes
and fraudsters of all stripes, and eventually it was forced to reverse
transactions and freeze accounts. It's not
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