On Thu, 23 Jun 2005, Tyler Durden wrote:
How do you take out a bulldozer?
Anti-tank mine?
On Thu, 23 Jun 2005, Tyler Durden wrote:
How do you take out a bulldozer?
Anti-tank mine?
On Mon, 2 May 2005, Tyler Durden wrote:
yes, this reminded me of another brilliant idea.
Why don't some cars have a little tiny furnace for stash destruction?
If you've got an on-board stash and some Alabama hillbilly with a badge pulls
you over, you just hit the button and have you're
On Thu, 31 Mar 2005, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
At 10:08 PM 3/31/05 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
government plan to insert remotely readable chips in American
passports, calling the chips [2]homing devices for high-tech
muggers,
So the market for faraday-cages for your passport will
On Thu, 31 Mar 2005, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
At 10:08 PM 3/31/05 +0200, Eugen Leitl wrote:
government plan to insert remotely readable chips in American
passports, calling the chips [2]homing devices for high-tech
muggers,
So the market for faraday-cages for your passport will
FPGAs will have very hard time to be as fast as dedicated CPUs,
frequency-wise. The FPGA structures have to be too generic, and are much
bigger than specialized structures of the CPUs, so they have higher
capacity, which limits the maximum achievable switching frequency. The
length of the
On Thu, 10 Feb 2005, Tyler Durden wrote:
Well, I didn't say it would be easy. We'd definitely need to split up into
teams...one to handle the alarm systems,
Teamwork is essential here.
Maybe attract a lightning with a rocket on a wire[1], the induced current
will do the job with the sensors
On Thu, 10 Feb 2005, Tyler Durden wrote:
Well, I didn't say it would be easy. We'd definitely need to split up into
teams...one to handle the alarm systems,
Teamwork is essential here.
Maybe attract a lightning with a rocket on a wire[1], the induced current
will do the job with the sensors
On Thu, 4 Nov 2004 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I recently violated the network user agreement (they packet-sniffed and
got the username/password for my FTP server and didn't like what I was
sharing with myself) and was informed by the admin that I am now 'under
observation' and that they hope
On Thu, 4 Nov 2004 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I recently violated the network user agreement (they packet-sniffed and
got the username/password for my FTP server and didn't like what I was
sharing with myself) and was informed by the admin that I am now 'under
observation' and that they hope
On Tue, 19 Oct 2004, James A. Donald wrote:
The US government should expose and condemn these objectionable
practices, subvert moderately objectionable regimes, and
annihilate more objectionable regimes. The pentagon should
deprive moderately objectionable regimes of economic resources,
On Tue, 19 Oct 2004, James A. Donald wrote:
The US government should expose and condemn these objectionable
practices, subvert moderately objectionable regimes, and
annihilate more objectionable regimes. The pentagon should
deprive moderately objectionable regimes of economic resources,
On Mon, 18 Oct 2004, James A. Donald wrote:
a. The probability ratios don't work out so that the
overwhelming majority of people you throw off planes are
innocent.
Provided the number of people you throw off planes is rather
small, I don't see the problem.
It isn't a problem for
On Mon, 18 Oct 2004, James A. Donald wrote:
Thomas Shaddack wrote:
It isn't a problem for you until it happens to you. Who knows
when being interested in anon e-cash will become a ground to
blacklist *you*.
I know when it will happen. It will happen when people
interested in anon
On Mon, 18 Oct 2004, James A. Donald wrote:
Sadre protected himself with Iraqi women and young children as
human shields, showing that he expected the Pentagon to show
more concern for Iraqi lives than he did.
Pentagon protects their people by distance - being it by bombing from high
On Mon, 18 Oct 2004, James A. Donald wrote:
a. The probability ratios don't work out so that the
overwhelming majority of people you throw off planes are
innocent.
Provided the number of people you throw off planes is rather
small, I don't see the problem.
It isn't a problem for
On Mon, 18 Oct 2004, James A. Donald wrote:
Thomas Shaddack wrote:
It isn't a problem for you until it happens to you. Who knows
when being interested in anon e-cash will become a ground to
blacklist *you*.
I know when it will happen. It will happen when people
interested in anon
On Mon, 18 Oct 2004, James A. Donald wrote:
Sadre protected himself with Iraqi women and young children as
human shields, showing that he expected the Pentagon to show
more concern for Iraqi lives than he did.
Pentagon protects their people by distance - being it by bombing from high
On Sun, 17 Oct 2004, James A. Donald wrote:
--
James A. Donald:
If you really look like the shoe bomber, then you
should have to drive, or use public transport.
Thomas Shaddack
Ever tried to drive to Europe? Or to Hawaii?
Hard biscuit
Do I interpret this statement
On Sun, 17 Oct 2004, James A. Donald wrote:
--
James A. Donald:
If you really look like the shoe bomber, then you
should have to drive, or use public transport.
Thomas Shaddack
Ever tried to drive to Europe? Or to Hawaii?
Hard biscuit
Do I interpret this statement
On Sat, 16 Oct 2004, James A. Donald wrote:
If you really look like the shoe bomber, then you should have to
drive, or use public transport.
Ever tried to drive to Europe? Or to Hawaii?
Why airplanes don't count as a form of public transport?
So by that rationale, every Arab should
On Sat, 16 Oct 2004, James A. Donald wrote:
If you really look like the shoe bomber, then you should have to
drive, or use public transport.
Ever tried to drive to Europe? Or to Hawaii?
Why airplanes don't count as a form of public transport?
So by that rationale, every Arab should
On Thu, 7 Oct 2004, Sunder wrote:
So the cops and RFID h4x0rZ can know your true name from a distance. and
since RFID tags, are what, $0.05 each, the terrorists and ID
counterfitters will be able to make fake ones too... Whee!
Given the power requirements for doing anything more than dumb
On Thu, 7 Oct 2004, Sunder wrote:
So the cops and RFID h4x0rZ can know your true name from a distance. and
since RFID tags, are what, $0.05 each, the terrorists and ID
counterfitters will be able to make fake ones too... Whee!
Given the power requirements for doing anything more than dumb
On Sun, 3 Oct 2004, J.A. Terranson wrote:
(1) There are also a number of non-rebar+concrete walls in place to keep
US citizens from leaving;
Please elaborate?
On Sun, 3 Oct 2004, J.A. Terranson wrote:
(1) There are also a number of non-rebar+concrete walls in place to keep
US citizens from leaving;
Please elaborate?
On Sun, 19 Sep 2004, James A. Donald wrote:
I don't recall the American revolutionaries herding children
before them to clear minefields, nor surrounding themselves
with children as human shields.
Using children to clear minefields has its logic. They are often not heavy
enough to trigger
On Thu, 16 Sep 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
At 02:17 PM 9/16/04 -0700, Joe Touch wrote:
Except that certs need to be signed by authorities that are trusted.
Name one.
You don't have to sign the certs. Use self-signed ones, then publish a GPG
signature of your certificate in a known
On Thu, 16 Sep 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
At 02:17 PM 9/16/04 -0700, Joe Touch wrote:
Except that certs need to be signed by authorities that are trusted.
Name one.
You don't have to sign the certs. Use self-signed ones, then publish a GPG
signature of your certificate in a known
On Tue, 14 Sep 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
How about Iran stating that they're messing with UF6, when Israel[1] is
a known pre-emptive bomber of Facilities to the East? That's pretty
much tickling the dragon.
Maybe they are playing a different game. They couldn't use the eventually
On Wed, 15 Sep 2004, Ian Grigg wrote:
The whole point of the CA model is that there is no prior
relationship and that the network is a wild wild west sort
of place - both of these assumptions seem to be reversed
in the backbone world, no? So one would think that using
opportunistic
On Tue, 14 Sep 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
How about Iran stating that they're messing with UF6, when Israel[1] is
a known pre-emptive bomber of Facilities to the East? That's pretty
much tickling the dragon.
Maybe they are playing a different game. They couldn't use the eventually
On Sun, 12 Sep 2004, J.A. Terranson wrote:
No big deal? Who are they kidding?
A 2-mile wide cloud is WAY too big to be caused by a single explosion,
unless REALLY big. The forest fire claim sounds more plausible in this
regard. An existing cloud could be used for masking, though.
But a
On Sun, 12 Sep 2004, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
From: Adam Back [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: anonymous IP terminology (Re: [anonsec] Re: potential new IETF
At ZKS we had software to remail
MIME mail to provide a pseudonymous email. But one gotcha is that
mail clients include MIME boundary
On Fri, 3 Sep 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Just heard Clinton's going in the hospital to get a heart.
Clinton was a victim of an assassination attempt by junk food.
McQaeda, the cardiovascular terrorist organization endangering the
Developed World and deemed responsible for millions
On Fri, 3 Sep 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Just heard Clinton's going in the hospital to get a heart.
Clinton was a victim of an assassination attempt by junk food.
McQaeda, the cardiovascular terrorist organization endangering the
Developed World and deemed responsible for millions
On Sun, 29 Aug 2004, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
Question for the crowd: How difficult it would be to write a suitable
crypto engine as a plug-in module for FUSE itself? Then we could have
support for encrypted files on any filesystem accessible through FUSE.
---
http
On Fri, 3 Sep 2004, Adam Back wrote:
Don't know anything about EncFS, but you could also use loopback
encryption on top of gmailfs. Just make a large file in gmail fs, and
make a filesystem in it via loopback virtual block device-in-a-file.
According to the shards of knowledge about GmailFS
On Sun, 29 Aug 2004, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
Question for the crowd: How difficult it would be to write a suitable
crypto engine as a plug-in module for FUSE itself? Then we could have
support for encrypted files on any filesystem accessible through FUSE.
---
http
I hereby suggest to postpone the flamewars for the winter, when the
weather brings the need of some spare waste heat.
I thought we're above name-calling here. But perhaps it was just a quiet
period and the current situation will rectify on its own in couple days,
as it usually does.
Besides,
I hereby suggest to postpone the flamewars for the winter, when the
weather brings the need of some spare waste heat.
I thought we're above name-calling here. But perhaps it was just a quiet
period and the current situation will rectify on its own in couple days,
as it usually does.
Besides,
On Sat, 14 Aug 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Argh. You misunderstood me. I don't want to find hash collisions, to
create a false known hash - that is just too difficult. I want to make
every file in the machine recognized as unidentifiable.
No, I understood this. In a later post it was
On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Even if you map a particular hash into one of a million known-benign
values, which takes work, there are multiple orthagonal hash algorithms
included on the NIST CD. (Eg good luck finding values that collide in
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-256
On Sat, 14 Aug 2004, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
polymorphic or encrypted, but then they would be in the unknown
category, along with user-created files. And programs :-) To be
manually inspected by a forensic dude.
Run a tool for signature changing preemptively, on *all* the files
On Thu, 12 Aug 2004, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
The NIST CDROM also doesn't seem to include source code amongst its
sigs, so if you compile yourself, you may avoid their easy glance.
A cool thing for this purpose could be a patch for gcc to produce unique
code every time, perhaps using
On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Morlock Elloi wrote:
A cool thing for this purpose could be a patch for gcc to produce unique
code every time, perhaps using some of the polymorphic methods used by
viruses.
The purpose would be that they do not figure out that you are using some
security program,
On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Sunder wrote:
If you're suspected of something really big, or you're middle eastern,
then you need to worry about PDA forensics. Otherwise, you're just
another geek with a case of megalomania thinking you're important enough
for the FedZ to give a shit about you.
In
On Sat, 14 Aug 2004, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
polymorphic or encrypted, but then they would be in the unknown
category, along with user-created files. And programs :-) To be
manually inspected by a forensic dude.
Run a tool for signature changing preemptively, on *all* the files
On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Even if you map a particular hash into one of a million known-benign
values, which takes work, there are multiple orthagonal hash algorithms
included on the NIST CD. (Eg good luck finding values that collide in
MD5 SHA-1 SHA-256
Can somebody record it in MPEG or DivX, please? :) It's difficult to get
ABC News across the Atlantic without a dish.
On Thu, 12 Aug 2004, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
There's a teaser for tonight's 6:30 news about a wesite that publishes
pipeline maps and the names and addresses of government
On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Sunder wrote:
If you're suspected of something really big, or you're middle eastern,
then you need to worry about PDA forensics. Otherwise, you're just
another geek with a case of megalomania thinking you're important enough
for the FedZ to give a shit about you.
In
On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Tyler Durden wrote:
And it seems to me to be a difficult task getting ahold of enough photos
that would be believably worth encrypting.
Homemade porn?
On Fri, 13 Aug 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Any jpg which looks like noise will be of interest. And any stego
program will make them look at your images (etc) more closely :-)
Most of the programs they've hashed is so the forensic pigs can discount
them. But they would find
On Wed, 11 Aug 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Obvious lesson: Steganography tool authors, your programs
should use the worm/HIV trick of changing their signatures
with every invocation. Much harder for the forensic
fedz to recognize your tools. (As suspicious, of course).
It should be
On Wed, 11 Aug 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Obvious lesson: Steganography tool authors, your programs
should use the worm/HIV trick of changing their signatures
with every invocation. Much harder for the forensic
fedz to recognize your tools. (As suspicious, of course).
It should be
On Mon, 9 Aug 2004, John Young wrote:
Excerpt below from a Baltimore Sun article of August 8, 2004.
Some of it could be true, but.
http://cryptome.org/dirnsa-shift.htm
I think the correct title would be sidesteps instead of overcomes.
It's a fundamentally different way (though the result is
On Tue, 10 Aug 2004, Pete Capelli wrote:
Being still currently undecided myself (although living in one of the
32 or so 'pre-ordained' states) I found this speech to be most
cynical, opportunistic, divisive, and un-American ones I've listend
to in awhile.
Define un-American, please?
On Wed, 4 Aug 2004, Hal Finney wrote:
As you can see, breaking 128 bit keys is certainly not a task which is
so impossible that it would fail even if every atom were a computer.
If we really needed to do it, it's not outside the realm of possibility
that it could be accomplished within 50
On Wed, 4 Aug 2004, Hal Finney wrote:
As you can see, breaking 128 bit keys is certainly not a task which is
so impossible that it would fail even if every atom were a computer.
If we really needed to do it, it's not outside the realm of possibility
that it could be accomplished within 50
I don't worry about car bombs nor hijacked airplanes. I have better chance
of being killed in a standardized ISO-compliant CE-marked car crash than
getting into mere visual contact with a bomb blast.
On the other side, the streams of bureaucrap the Hellhole also known as
Brussels spews every
On Wed, 28 Jul 2004, Dave Howe wrote:
Particularly disgusted by the last paragraph
| With encryption comes the problem of either managing public/private
| keys, which must be kept secret, or the annoyance of transmitting a
| secure key to a remote party over other secure methods.
On Wed, 28 Jul 2004, Dave Howe wrote:
Particularly disgusted by the last paragraph
| With encryption comes the problem of either managing public/private
| keys, which must be kept secret, or the annoyance of transmitting a
| secure key to a remote party over other secure methods.
On Mon, 19 Jul 2004, James A. Donald wrote:
As I predicted, transactions are increasingly going on line.
And as Hettinga predicted, the more anonymous and irreversible the
transaction service, the cheaper and more convenient its services.
All happening as predicted.
So why don't we
On Thu, 22 Jul 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
My point is only that they will be killed should they leak their
actual capabilities.
Well... I am reading a book about intelligence now. Specifically, Ernst
Volkman: Spies - the secret agents who changed the course of history.
Amusing book;
Thermal imaging is a very powerful and very cool technology with many many
applications in both security and engineering. However, the main obstacle
for its wider usage in civilian sector is very high cost of the
microbolometer array sensors.
However, there are affordably cheap remote
On Tue, 20 Jul 2004, Justin wrote:
HOUSTON (Reuters) - Law enforcement officials said on Monday they are
looking for a man seen taking pictures of two refineries in Texas City,
Texas.
How difficult it is to wait for a sunny day, wire a digital camera to take
two pictures per second with
Thermal imaging is a very powerful and very cool technology with many many
applications in both security and engineering. However, the main obstacle
for its wider usage in civilian sector is very high cost of the
microbolometer array sensors.
However, there are affordably cheap remote
The laser diodes used in eg. CD players have a feedback photodiode,
sensing the laser's optical output.
If the lasers used for optical fibers have similar mechanism too, and if
the diode is sensitive to the light coming to it not only from the chip
but also from the fiber itself, and can
On Sun, 18 Jul 2004, Bill Stewart wrote:
If you're trying to build a usable cellphone,
you've got much more stringent design criteria than a deskphone.
I am painfully aware of it.
You've got packaging requirements that force you into
serious industrial design if you want something
On Sat, 17 Jul 2004, Steve Schear wrote:
How about building a secure cell phone using GnuRadio as a core? That way you
have maximum control afforded by the protocols.
Several reasons valid at this moment (though I suppose (and hope) the
situation will improve in next couple years).
There is
The laser diodes used in eg. CD players have a feedback photodiode,
sensing the laser's optical output.
If the lasers used for optical fibers have similar mechanism too, and if
the diode is sensitive to the light coming to it not only from the chip
but also from the fiber itself, and can
On Fri, 16 Jul 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Um, even the small form factor PC on a board the size of your palm may
still rely on caps in the power supply that don't handle 760 to 0 mm
Hg/min so readily.
However, if you use a low-power board, you have less current to filter the
ripples
On Sat, 17 Jul 2004, Tyler Durden wrote:
Sorry to need educating once again, but I had assumed can-shaped capacitors
were gone from laptops in lieu of surface mount. Anyone know? (I don't own a
laptop.)
The can caps can be surface-mounted as well. The leads then look
different, but the
On Sat, 17 Jul 2004, Steve Schear wrote:
How about building a secure cell phone using GnuRadio as a core? That way you
have maximum control afforded by the protocols.
Several reasons valid at this moment (though I suppose (and hope) the
situation will improve in next couple years).
There is
On Sun, 18 Jul 2004, Bill Stewart wrote:
If you're trying to build a usable cellphone,
you've got much more stringent design criteria than a deskphone.
I am painfully aware of it.
You've got packaging requirements that force you into
serious industrial design if you want something
On Sat, 17 Jul 2004, Eric Murray wrote:
For a seperate project, does anyone know of a small linux-ready/able
box with ethernet?
Gumstix looks cool but I need hardwire networking.
Soekris, http://www.soekris.com/.
PXA255, http://www.hw-server.com/hw_products/sld_hws.html
Are there more,
Pondering construction of a secure telephone. (Or at least a cellphone in
general. The user interfaces and features available on virtually all the
mass-market phones suck, to put it very very mildly, not even mentioning
that there's no access to their firmware (so no chance of audit), poor or
On Fri, 16 Jul 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Does anyone *know* (first or second hand, I can speculate myself) which
laptops, if any, can safely go to zero air pressure (dropping from 1 atm
to 0 in, say, 1 minute.)
Sorry so late ---but your can-shaped capacitors might not handle the
On Sat, 17 Jul 2004, Eric Murray wrote:
For a seperate project, does anyone know of a small linux-ready/able
box with ethernet?
Gumstix looks cool but I need hardwire networking.
Soekris, http://www.soekris.com/.
PXA255, http://www.hw-server.com/hw_products/sld_hws.html
Are there more,
On Fri, 16 Jul 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
Does anyone *know* (first or second hand, I can speculate myself) which
laptops, if any, can safely go to zero air pressure (dropping from 1 atm
to 0 in, say, 1 minute.)
Sorry so late ---but your can-shaped capacitors might not handle the
On Tue, 13 Jul 2004, J.A. Terranson wrote:
Forwarded for amusement
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/07/13/mexico.chip.reut/index.html
Mexico attorney general gets microchip implant
Politicians getting RFIDs.
Will it spur a new generation of smart roadside bombs, landmines, and
On Tue, 13 Jul 2004, Harmon Seaver wrote:
Bumazhkas? I thought I was pretty familiar with most weapons of the world,
but not Bumazhkas. What calibre are they? I've always liked those CZ Model 52
pistols and Model 32 subguns in .30Mauser. Loaded hot with a teflon coated
bullet they
On Tue, 13 Jul 2004, J.A. Terranson wrote:
Forwarded for amusement
http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/americas/07/13/mexico.chip.reut/index.html
Mexico attorney general gets microchip implant
Politicians getting RFIDs.
Will it spur a new generation of smart roadside bombs, landmines, and
On Tue, 13 Jul 2004, Harmon Seaver wrote:
Bumazhkas? I thought I was pretty familiar with most weapons of the world,
but not Bumazhkas. What calibre are they? I've always liked those CZ Model 52
pistols and Model 32 subguns in .30Mauser. Loaded hot with a teflon coated
bullet they
On Sat, 10 Jul 2004 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But we have a psychological mechanism here; many people tend to be
tough when not under direct threat. Then they implement the
mechanism. Then years flow by. Then the prosecutors come. But by then
it is too late to cooperate. They are doomed
On Sat, 10 Jul 2004 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
But we have a psychological mechanism here; many people tend to be
tough when not under direct threat. Then they implement the
mechanism. Then years flow by. Then the prosecutors come. But by then
it is too late to cooperate. They are doomed
On Fri, 9 Jul 2004, Steve Schear wrote:
This may best be accomplished by placing the data offshore and empowering the
db operators with some non-repudiatable right of disclosure (especially under
duress of a warrant).
This may be impractical in some cases.
Some months back I discussed a
On Fri, 9 Jul 2004, Steve Schear wrote:
Quite a few book stores (including the local Half-Priced Books) now keep no
records not required and some do not even automate and encourage their patron
to pay cash. In California book sellers to such used/remaindered stores must
identify themselves
On Fri, 9 Jul 2004, Steve Schear wrote:
This may best be accomplished by placing the data offshore and empowering the
db operators with some non-repudiatable right of disclosure (especially under
duress of a warrant).
This may be impractical in some cases.
Some months back I discussed a
On Thu, 8 Jul 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
5. One could call terahertz hard RF in same way that hard x-rays
bleed into soft gammas. But calling anything hard implies danger,
and we mustn't scare the proles. Perhaps soft IR is better.
Technically, it's closer to soft IR. If I remember
cases. In the rest, I have to resort to telnet.
Thanks a lot. Seems I have to learn perl. Looks powerful.
On Thu, 8 Jul 2004, Justin wrote:
On 2004-07-08T17:50:57+0200, Thomas Shaddack wrote:
I cobbled up together a small bash shell script that does this. It lists
the MX records for a domain
On Fri, 9 Jul 2004, Steve Schear wrote:
Quite a few book stores (including the local Half-Priced Books) now keep no
records not required and some do not even automate and encourage their patron
to pay cash. In California book sellers to such used/remaindered stores must
identify themselves
I cobbled up together a small bash shell script that does this. It lists
the MX records for a domain, and then tries to connect to each of them,
issue an EHLO command, disconnect, then list the output of the server,
alerting if the server supports STARTTLS. It should be easy to further
query
On Thu, 8 Jul 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
5. One could call terahertz hard RF in same way that hard x-rays
bleed into soft gammas. But calling anything hard implies danger,
and we mustn't scare the proles. Perhaps soft IR is better.
Technically, it's closer to soft IR. If I remember
I cobbled up together a small bash shell script that does this. It lists
the MX records for a domain, and then tries to connect to each of them,
issue an EHLO command, disconnect, then list the output of the server,
alerting if the server supports STARTTLS. It should be easy to further
query
A big database of images with metadata can be used to train a neural
network (or other suitable AI approach) to recognize unknown images.
On Thu, 8 Jul 2004, Tyler Durden wrote:
Yeah, but this is a metadata search, correct? Seems to me Our Protectors(TM)
are probably able to search a vast
On Tue, 6 Jul 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
So, which is better, Schneier's books or Mitnick's? I suspect
the former, but am curious what the community opinion is?
You may like one side of the coin more than the other one, but they still
belong to the same flat, dirty, formerly shiny
On Tue, 6 Jul 2004, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
So, which is better, Schneier's books or Mitnick's? I suspect
the former, but am curious what the community opinion is?
You may like one side of the coin more than the other one, but they still
belong to the same flat, dirty, formerly shiny
Reading some news about the email wiretapping by ISPs, and getting an
idea.
There are various email forwarding services, which are nothing more than a
SMTP server with pairs of [EMAIL PROTECTED] --
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Messages in storage have much lower judicial protection than messages in
On Tue, 6 Jul 2004, Hal Finney wrote:
There are various email forwarding services, which are nothing more than a
SMTP server with pairs of [EMAIL PROTECTED] --
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
Right, mostly for use as disposable email addresses. I've used
spamgourmet to good effect, myself.
I
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