Of course, those like Lucky who believe that trusted computing technology
is evil incarnate are presumably rejoicing at this news. Microsoft's
patent will limit the application of this technology.
In what way is in the desktop of almost every naive user a usefully
limited application?
--
On 19 Sep 2002 at 11:13, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
Of course, those like Lucky who believe that trusted
computing technology is evil incarnate are presumably
rejoicing at this news. Microsoft's patent will limit the
application of this technology. And the really crazy people
are the
AARG! Anonymous wrote:
Lucky Green wrote:
In the interest of clarity, it probably should be mentioned that any
claims Microsoft may make stating that Microsoft will not encrypt their
software or software components when used with Palladium of course only
applies to Microsoft [...]
First, it
Of course, those like Lucky who believe that trusted computing technology
is evil incarnate are presumably rejoicing at this news. Microsoft's
patent will limit the application of this technology.
In what way is in the desktop of almost every naive user a usefully
limited application?
Lucky Green wrote:
AARG! Wrote:
In addition, I have argued that trusted computing in general
will work very well with open source software. It may even
be possible to allow the user to build the executable himself
using a standard compilation environment.
What AARG! is failing to
Lucky Green wrote:
AARG! Wrote:
In addition, I have argued that trusted computing in general
will work very well with open source software. It may even
be possible to allow the user to build the executable himself
using a standard compilation environment.
What AARG! is failing to
- Original Message -
From: Nathaniel Daw [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Cypherpunks [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 3:01 PM
Subject: Re: but _is_ the pentium securely virtualizable? (Re: Cryptogram:
Palladium Only for DRM)
The fact that VMWare works just
Peter Biddle writes:
Pd is designed to fail well - failures in SW design shouldn't result in
compromised secrets, and compromised secrets shouldn't result in a BORE
attack.
Could you say something about the sense in which Palladium achieves
BORE (break once run everywhere) resistance? It
- Original Message -
From: Nathaniel Daw [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: Cypherpunks [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 3:01 PM
Subject: Re: but _is_ the pentium securely virtualizable? (Re: Cryptogram:
Palladium Only for DRM)
The fact that VMWare works just
Peter Biddle writes:
Pd is designed to fail well - failures in SW design shouldn't result in
compromised secrets, and compromised secrets shouldn't result in a BORE
attack.
Could you say something about the sense in which Palladium achieves
BORE (break once run everywhere) resistance? It
On Mon, Sep 16, 2002 at 11:01:06PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
[...] in a correctly operating OS, MMUs+file permissions do more or
less stop processes from seeing each others data if the OS functions
correctly.
The OS can stop user processes inspecting each others address space.
Therefor a
Niels Ferguson wrote:
At 16:04 16/09/02 -0700, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
Nothing done purely in software will be as effective as what can be done
when you have secure hardware as the foundation. I discuss this in more
detail below.
But I am not suggesting to do it purely in software. Read
On Tue, 17 Sep 2002, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
Niels Ferguson wrote:
At 16:04 16/09/02 -0700, AARG! Anonymous wrote:
Nothing done purely in software will be as effective as what can be done
when you have secure hardware as the foundation. I discuss this in more
detail below.
But I
On Mon, Sep 16, 2002 at 11:01:06PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote:
[...] in a correctly operating OS, MMUs+file permissions do more or
less stop processes from seeing each others data if the OS functions
correctly.
The OS can stop user processes inspecting each others address space.
Therefor a
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