So two illegals are going back because they were in a white van near a
pay phone.
They're fortunate, they only got the 12gauge in the face and the asphalt
facial;
in a month it'll be a cruise missile first, forensics later.
Mr. Godsniper, call us back. We couldn't trace^H^H^H^H^H hear you.
The
On Wed, 31 Dec 1969, Bill Frantz wrote:
I have been asked to audit some source code to see if the programmer
inserted a backdoor. (The code processes input from general users, and has
access to the bits that control the privilege levels of those users, so
backdoors are quite possible.) The
At 05:13 PM 10/21/02 -0400, Tyler Durden wrote:
So I guess the follow on question is: Even if you can look at the code
of a
RNG...how easy is it to determine if its output is usefully random,
or are
there certain Diffie-approved RNGs that should always be there, and
if not
something's up?
Start
If one has set up a new anonymous remailer, where is the best place to
get the word out? Here or somewhere else?
--
Shawn K. Quinn
Software-based attacks are redistributable. Once I write a program
that hacks a computer, I can give that program to anyone to use. I
can even give it to everyone, and then anyone could use it. The
expertise necessary can be abstracted away into a program even my
mother could use.
I've been trying to figure out whether the following attack will be
feasible in a Pd system, and what would have to be incorporated to prevent
against it.
Alice runs trusted application T on her computer. This is some sort of
media application, which acts on encoded data streamed over the
On Sun, Oct 20, 2002 at 10:38:35PM -0400, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
There may be a hole somewhere, but Microsoft is trying hard to get
it right and Brian seemed quite competent.
It doesn't sound breakable in pure software for the user, so this
forces the user to use some hardware hacking.
They
At 10:52 PM +0100 10/21/02, Adam Back wrote:
On Sun, Oct 20, 2002 at 10:38:35PM -0400, Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
There may be a hole somewhere, but Microsoft is trying hard to get
it right and Brian seemed quite competent.
It doesn't sound breakable in pure software for the user, so this
Remote attestation does indeed require Palladium to be secure against
the local user.
However my point is while they seem to have done a good job of
providing software security for the remote attestation function, it
seems at this point that hardware security is laughable.
So they disclaim in
On Tue, Oct 22, 2002 at 04:52:16PM +0100, Adam Back wrote:
So they disclaim in the talk announce that Palladium is not intended
to be secure against hardware attacks:
| Palladium is not designed to provide defenses against
| hardware-based attacks that originate from someone in control of
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