RE: Cryptogram: Palladium Only for DRM

2002-09-20 Thread James A. Donald
-- On 19 Sep 2002 at 11:13, AARG! Anonymous wrote: Of course, those like Lucky who believe that trusted computing technology is evil incarnate are presumably rejoicing at this news. Microsoft's patent will limit the application of this technology. And the really crazy people are the

Re: Cryptogram: Palladium Only for DRM

2002-09-20 Thread David Wagner
AARG! Anonymous wrote: Lucky Green wrote: In the interest of clarity, it probably should be mentioned that any claims Microsoft may make stating that Microsoft will not encrypt their software or software components when used with Palladium of course only applies to Microsoft [...] First, it

Re: Cryptogram: Palladium Only for DRM

2002-09-20 Thread Alan Braggins
Of course, those like Lucky who believe that trusted computing technology is evil incarnate are presumably rejoicing at this news. Microsoft's patent will limit the application of this technology. In what way is in the desktop of almost every naive user a usefully limited application?

RE: Cryptogram: Palladium Only for DRM

2002-09-19 Thread AARG! Anonymous
Lucky Green wrote: AARG! Wrote: In addition, I have argued that trusted computing in general will work very well with open source software. It may even be possible to allow the user to build the executable himself using a standard compilation environment. What AARG! is failing to

Re: but _is_ the pentium securely virtualizable? (Re: Cryptogram: Palladium Only for DRM)

2002-09-18 Thread Peter
- Original Message - From: Nathaniel Daw [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Cc: Cypherpunks [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tuesday, September 17, 2002 3:01 PM Subject: Re: but _is_ the pentium securely virtualizable? (Re: Cryptogram: Palladium Only for DRM) The fact that VMWare works just

Re: Cryptogram: Palladium Only for DRM

2002-09-18 Thread Nomen Nescio
Peter Biddle writes: Pd is designed to fail well - failures in SW design shouldn't result in compromised secrets, and compromised secrets shouldn't result in a BORE attack. Could you say something about the sense in which Palladium achieves BORE (break once run everywhere) resistance? It

Re: Cryptogram: Palladium Only for DRM

2002-09-17 Thread AARG! Anonymous
Niels Ferguson wrote: At 16:04 16/09/02 -0700, AARG! Anonymous wrote: Nothing done purely in software will be as effective as what can be done when you have secure hardware as the foundation. I discuss this in more detail below. But I am not suggesting to do it purely in software. Read

Re: CDR: Cryptogram: Palladium Only for DRM

2002-09-17 Thread Jim Choate
On Tue, 17 Sep 2002, AARG! Anonymous wrote: Niels Ferguson wrote: At 16:04 16/09/02 -0700, AARG! Anonymous wrote: Nothing done purely in software will be as effective as what can be done when you have secure hardware as the foundation. I discuss this in more detail below. But I

but _is_ the pentium securely virtualizable? (Re: Cryptogram: Palladium Only for DRM)

2002-09-17 Thread Adam Back
On Mon, Sep 16, 2002 at 11:01:06PM -0400, Perry E. Metzger wrote: [...] in a correctly operating OS, MMUs+file permissions do more or less stop processes from seeing each others data if the OS functions correctly. The OS can stop user processes inspecting each others address space. Therefor a