Adam Back writes:
So there are practical limits stemming from realities to do with code
complexity being inversely proportional to auditability and security,
but the extra ring -1, remote attestation, sealing and integrity
metrics really do offer some security advantages over the current
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On 12 Aug 2002 at 16:32, Tim Dierks wrote:
I'm sure that the whole system is secure in theory, but I
believe that it cannot be securely implemented in practice and
that the implied constraints on use usability will be
unpalatable to consumers and vendors.
Or to say the same thing
At 09:07 PM 8/12/2002 +0100, Adam Back wrote:
At some level there has to be a trade-off between what you put in
trusted agent space and what becomes application code. If you put the
whole application in trusted agent space, while then all it's
application logic is fully protected, the danger
I think you are making incorrect presumptions about how you would use
Palladium hardware to implement a secure DRM system. If used as you
suggest it would indeed suffer the vulnerabilities you describe.
The difference between an insecure DRM application such as you
describe and a secure DRM
At this point we largely agree, security is improved, but the limit
remains assuring security of over-complex software. To sum up:
The limit of what is securely buildable now becomes what is securely
auditable. Before, without the Palladium the limit was the security
of the OS, so this makes a
