Just presented at ICETE2005 by Daniel Nagy:
http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
Abstract. In present paper a novel approach to on-line payment is
presented that tackles some issues of digital cash that have, in the
author s opinion, contributed to the fact that despite
On 10/19/05, Daniel A. Nagy [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
Note that nowhere in my paper did I imply that the issuer is a bank (the
only mentioning of a bank in the paper is in an analogy). This is because I
am strongly convinced that banks
On 10/18/05, Major Variola (ret.) [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
So this dupe/spy/wannabe journalist thinks that journalists
should be *special*.. how nice. Where in the 1st amendment is the class
journalists mentioned? She needs a WMD enema.
We put up with this needs killing crap from Tim May
Let's take a look at Daniel Nagy's list of desirable features for an
ecash system and see how simple, on-line Chaum ecash fares.
http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
One of the reasons, in the author s opinion, is that payment systems
based on similar schemes lack some key
As far as the issue of receipts in Chaumian ecash, there have been a
couple of approaches discussed.
The simplest goes like this. If Alice will pay Bob, Bob supplies Alice
with a blinded proto-coin, along with a signed statement, I will
perform service X if Alice supplies me with a mint signature
On 10/20/05, Daniel A. Nagy [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Thu, Oct 20, 2005 at 03:36:54PM -0700, cyphrpunk wrote:
As far as the issue of receipts in Chaumian ecash, there have been a
couple of approaches discussed.
The simplest goes like this. If Alice will pay Bob, Bob supplies Alice
On 10/20/05, R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
At 12:32 AM +0200 10/21/05, Daniel A. Nagy wrote:
Could you give us a reference to this one, please?
Google is your friend, dude.
Before making unitary global claims like you just did, you might consider
consulting the literature. It's out
On 10/13/05, Brian Minder [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The minder.net CDR node will be shutting down on November 1, 2005. This
includes the cypherpunks-moderated list. Please adjust your subscriptions
accordingly.
Gmail would facilitate automating a new cypherpunks-moderated list.
Gmail's spam
On 10/23/05, Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
My understanding of the peer-to-peer key agreement protocol (hereafter
p2pka) is based on section 3.3 and 3.4.2 and is something like this:
A - B: N_ab
B - A: N_ba
B - A: Sign{f(N_ab)}_a
A - B: Sign{f(N_ba)}_b
A - B: Sign{A, K_a}_SKYPE
B -
On 10/22/05, Ian G [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
R. Hirschfeld wrote:
This is not strictly correct. The payer can reveal the blinding
factor, making the payment traceable. I believe Chaum deliberately
chose for one-way untraceability (untraceable by the payee but not by
the payer) in order
On 10/24/05, Steve Schear [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I don't think E-gold ever held out its system as non-reversible with proper
court order. All reverses I am aware happened either due to some technical
problem with their system or an order from a court of competence in the
matter at hand.
http://www.hbarel.com/Blog/entry0006.html
I believe that for anonymity and pseudonymity technologies to survive
they have to be applied to applications that require them by design,
rather than to mass-market applications that can also do (cheaper)
without. If anonymity mechanisms are
On 10/26/05, Shawn K. Quinn [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, 2005-10-25 at 23:40 -0500, Travis H. wrote:
Many of the anonymity protocols require multiple participants, and
thus are subject to what economists call network externalities. The
best example I can think of is Microsoft Office
From: Kerry Bonin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2005 06:52:57 -0700
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], Peer-to-peer development. [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [p2p-hackers] P2P Authentication
User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.6 (Windows/20050716)
Reply-To: Peer-to-peer development. [EMAIL
The cypherpunks list is about anything we want it to be. At this stage in
the lifecycle (post-nuclear-armageddon-weeds-in-the-rubble), it's more
about the crazy bastards who are still here than it is about just about
anything else.
Fine, I want it to be about crypto and anonymity. You can
On 10/25/05, Travis H. [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
More on topic, I recently heard about a scam involving differential
reversibility between two remote payment systems. The fraudster sends
you an email asking you to make a Western Union payment to a third
party, and deposits the requested amount
Wasn't there a rumor last year that Skype didn't do any encryption
padding, it just did a straight exponentiation of the plaintext?
Would that be safe, if as the report suggests, the data being
encrypted is 128 random bits (and assuming the encryption exponent is
considerably bigger than 3)?
On 10/26/05, James A. Donald [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
How does one inflate a key?
Just make it bigger by adding redundancy and padding, before you
encrypt it and store it on your disk. That way the attacker who wants
to steal your keyring sees a 4 GB encrypted file which actually holds
about a
On 10/28/05, Daniel A. Nagy [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Irreversibility of transactions hinges on two features of the proposed
systetm: the fundamentally irreversible nature of publishing information in
the public records and the fact that in order to invalidate a secret, one
needs to know it;
One other point with regard to Daniel Nagy's paper at
http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
A good way to organize papers like this is to first present the
desired properties of systems like yours (and optionally show that
other systems fail to meet one or more of these properties);
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