Hello cypherpunks@minder.net,
We have received your request to join the hersey-serbest
group hosted by Yahoo! Groups, a free, easy-to-use community service.
This request will expire in 7 days.
TO BECOME A MEMBER OF THE GROUP:
1) Go to the Yahoo! Groups site by clicking on this link:
--- begin forwarded text
Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2005 07:24:09 -0500
To: Philodox Clips List [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [Clips] The myth of suitcase nukes.
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
--- begin forwarded text
Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2005 07:29:37 -0500
To: Philodox Clips List [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [Clips] Security 2.0: FBI Tries Again To Upgrade Technology
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sender: [EMAIL
--- begin forwarded text
Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2005 07:35:05 -0500
To: Philodox Clips List [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [Clips] How Tools of War On Terror Ensnare Wanted Citizens
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sender: [EMAIL
In the context of:
If your plaintext consists primarily of small packets, you should set the MTU
of the transporter to be small. This will cause fragmentation of the
large packets, which is the price you have to pay. Conversely, if your
plaintext consists primarily of large packets, you
A similar approach enabled Bleichenbacher's SSL attack on
RSA with PKCS#1 padding. This sounds very dangerous to me.
William
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of cyphrpunk
Sent: Friday, October 28, 2005 5:07 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED];
--- begin forwarded text
Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Mon, 31 Oct 2005 09:55:05 -0500
To: Philodox Clips List [EMAIL PROTECTED]
From: R.A. Hettinga [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [Clips] Re: [duodenalswitch] Re: Konstantin
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
Thanks for Enquiring about our recent (H.)uman-(G.)rowth-(H.)ormone Study.
Dr. Wright and Hormone Specialist Elizabeth Hall have finally
completed their 2 year study on the (H.)-(G.)-(H.) product at the Life
Tran-sitions Institution.
These are summary results (20 male, 20 female patients)
-Ursprüngliche Nachricht-
Von: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Im Auftrag von cyphrpunk
Gesendet: Freitag, 28. Oktober 2005 06:07
An: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; cryptography@metzdowd.com
Betreff: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Skype security evaluation]
Wasn't there a rumor last year
hi
( 05.10.26 09:17 -0700 ) James A. Donald:
While many people are rightly concerned that DRM will
ultimately mean that the big corporation, and thus the
state, has root access to their computers and the owner
does not, it also means that trojans, viruses, and
malware does not.
do you
At 10:22 AM -0500 10/31/05, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
and doesn't history show that big corporations are only interested in
revenue
One should hope so.
;-)
Cheers,
RAH
--
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1
Peter Gutmann wrote:
Gregory Hicks [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
As for applying for one now, I think the deadline for the non-RFID passwords
is about 3 days away (31 Oct 2005), but I could be wrong. (In other words, if
your application is not in
James A. Donald writes:
Further, genuinely secure systems are now becoming available, notably
Symbian.
What does it mean for Symbian to be genuinely secure? How was this
determined and achieved?
--
http://www.eff.org/about/staff/#chris_palmer
signature.asc
Description: Digital signature
James A. Donald writes:
Further, genuinely secure systems are now becoming available, notably
Symbian.
Chris Palmer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
What does it mean for Symbian to be genuinely secure? How was this
determined and achieved?
There is no official definition of genuinely secure, and it is
I very much doubt it. Where did that factor of half come frome.
During lulls, you are constantly sending chaff packets. On average,
you're halfway through transmitting a chaff packet when you want to
send a real one. The system has to wait for it to finish before
sending another. QED.
Ah,
Modes that are based on a small window of previous plaintext, such as
OFB, would be vulnerable too.
My mistake, OFB does not have this property. I thought there was a
common mode with this property, but it appears that I am mistaken.
If it makes you feel any better, you can consider the PRNG
On 10/28/05, Daniel A. Nagy [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Irreversibility of transactions hinges on two features of the proposed
systetm: the fundamentally irreversible nature of publishing information in
the public records and the fact that in order to invalidate a secret, one
needs to know it;
On Sat, Oct 29, 2005 at 08:42:35PM -0400, Tyler Durden wrote:
One thing to think about with respect to the RFID passports...
Um, uh...surely once in a while the RFID tag is going to get corrupted or
something...right? I'd bet it ends up happening all the time. In those
cases they probably
From: James A. Donald [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Oct 28, 2005 12:09 PM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Return of the death of cypherpunks.
From: Eugen Leitl [EMAIL PROTECTED]
..
The list needs not to stay dead, with some finite
effort on our part (all of us) we can well resurrect
it. If there's
At 01:31 AM 10/30/05 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote:
They've said they'll fall back on the traditional
If we can't read the passport it's invalid and you'll need to
replace it before we'll let you leave the country technique,
just as they often do with expired passports and sometimes
What is the
Tyler Durden wrote:
One thing to think about with respect to the RFID passports...
Um, uh...surely once in a while the RFID tag is going to get corrupted
or something...right? I'd bet it ends up happening all the time. In
those cases they probably have to fall back upon the traditional
One thing to think about with respect to the RFID passports...
Um, uh...surely once in a while the RFID tag is going to get corrupted or
something...right? I'd bet it ends up happening all the time. In those cases
they probably have to fall back upon the traditional passport usage and
On Sun, Oct 30, 2005 at 03:05:25AM +, Justin wrote:
If I apply for a new one now, and then apply for a another one once the
gov starts RFID-enabling them, will the first one be invalidated? Or
can I have two passports, the one without RFID to use, and the one with
RFID to play with?
Here
At 11:10 AM -0700 10/28/05, James A. Donald wrote:
I am a reluctant convert to DRM. At least with DRM, we
face a smaller number of threats.
I have had it explained to me, many times more than I want to remember,
:-), that strong crypto is strong crypto.
It's not that I'm unconvinceable, but I'm
Gregory Hicks [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
As for applying for one now, I think the deadline for the non-RFID passwords
is about 3 days away (31 Oct 2005), but I could be wrong. (In other words, if
your application is not in processing by 31 Oct, then you get the new,
improved, RFID passport.)
Ahh,
On 2005-10-22T01:51:50-0400, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
--- begin forwarded text
Tyler and Jayme left Iraq in May 2005. The Arbil office failed; there
wasn't enough business in Kurdistan. They moved to London, where Tyler
still works for SSI. His time in Iraq has transformed him to the extent
I don't agree.
One thing we do know is that, although Crypto is available and, in special
contexts, used, it's use in other contexts is almost counterproduct, sending
up a red flag so that those that Protect Our Freedoms will come sniffing
around and bring to bear their full arsenal of
--
James A. Donald:
Since cryptography these days is routine and
uncontroversial, there is no longer any strong
reason for the cypherpunks list to continue to
exist.
John Kelsey
The ratio of political wanking to technical posts and
of talkers to thinkers to coders needs to be
If I apply for a new one now, and then apply for a another one once the
gov starts RFID-enabling them, will the first one be invalidated? Or
can I have two passports, the one without RFID to use, and the one with
RFID to play with?
--
The six phases of a project:
I. Enthusiasm. IV.
At 7:51 PM -0400 10/28/05, R.A. Hettinga wrote:
OTOH, if markets overtake the DRM issue,
^ moot, was what I meant to say...
Anyway, you get the idea.
Cheers,
RAH
--
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer
Date: Sun, 30 Oct 2005 03:05:25 +
From: Justin [EMAIL PROTECTED]
If I apply for a new one now, and then apply for a another one once
the gov starts RFID-enabling them, will the first one be
invalidated? Or can I have two passports, the one without RFID to
use, and the one with RFID
At 01:42 AM 10/30/2005, Roy M. Silvernail wrote:
Tyler Durden wrote:
One thing to think about with respect to the RFID passports...
Um, uh...surely once in a while the RFID tag is going to get corrupted
or something...right? I'd bet it ends up happening all the time. In
those cases they
On 10/30/05, Gregory Hicks [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The only people that I knew that had two passports were those with an
Official (red) passport or a Diplomatic (black) passport. If they
wanted to go play tourist, they had to also have a tourist (Blue)
passport.
I wasn't able to find a
When I saw the title of this thread,
I was assuming it would be about getting Mozambique
or Sealand or other passports of convenience or coolness-factor
like the Old-School Cypherpunks used to do :-)
On 10/30/05, Gregory Hicks [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
The only people that I knew that had two
A similar approach enabled Bleichenbacher's SSL attack on
RSA with PKCS#1 padding. This sounds very dangerous to me.
William
-Original Message-
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of cyphrpunk
Sent: Friday, October 28, 2005 5:07 AM
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED];
I assume that the length is
explicitly encoded in the legitimate packet. Then the peer for the
link ignores everything until the next escape sequence introducing a
legitimate packet.
I should point out that encrypting PRNG output may be pointless, and
perhaps one optimization is to stop
-Ursprüngliche Nachricht-
Von: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Im Auftrag von cyphrpunk
Gesendet: Freitag, 28. Oktober 2005 06:07
An: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; cryptography@metzdowd.com
Betreff: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Skype security evaluation]
Wasn't there a rumor last year
One other point with regard to Daniel Nagy's paper at
http://www.epointsystem.org/~nagydani/ICETE2005.pdf
A good way to organize papers like this is to first present the
desired properties of systems like yours (and optionally show that
other systems fail to meet one or more of these properties);
On Fri, Oct 28, 2005 at 02:18:43PM -0700, cyphrpunk wrote:
In particular I have concerns about the finality and irreversibility
of payments, given that the issuer keeps track of each token as it
progresses through the system. Whenever one token is exchanged for a
new one, the issuer records
From: cyphrpunk [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Sent: Oct 27, 2005 9:15 PM
To: James A. Donald [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: On Digital Cash-like Payment Systems
On 10/26/05, James A. Donald [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
How does one inflate a key?
Just make it
In the context of:
If your plaintext consists primarily of small packets, you should set the MTU
of the transporter to be small. This will cause fragmentation of the
large packets, which is the price you have to pay. Conversely, if your
plaintext consists primarily of large packets, you
hi
( 05.10.26 09:17 -0700 ) James A. Donald:
While many people are rightly concerned that DRM will
ultimately mean that the big corporation, and thus the
state, has root access to their computers and the owner
does not, it also means that trojans, viruses, and
malware does not.
do you
Good catch on the encryption. I feel silly for not thinking of it.
If your plaintext consists primarily of small packets, you should set the MTU
of the transporter to be small. This will cause fragmentation of the
large packets, which is the price you have to pay. Conversely, if your
At 10:22 AM -0500 10/31/05, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
and doesn't history show that big corporations are only interested in
revenue
One should hope so.
;-)
Cheers,
RAH
--
-
R. A. Hettinga mailto: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The Internet Bearer Underwriting Corporation
44 matches
Mail list logo
