Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-09-07 Thread Javier Fernández-Sanguino Peña
On Tue, Aug 12, 2008 at 03:52:14PM -0700, John H. Robinson, IV wrote: As mktemp and tempfile are both essential[2], they can be relied upon. Essential in Debian, not in other systems. Is there any scenario where using mktemp or tempfile fails, and sing $TMPDIR succeeds? Scripts that are

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-28 Thread Michelle Konzack
Hi *, a little bit late, but since I am currently working in germany... Am 2008-08-11 17:31:51, schrieb Sam Morris: A while ago, the use of libpam-tmpdir was suggested in order to mitigate some of these attacks. It would be nice to see it in use by default, some day. Obviously there

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-19 Thread Dmitry E. Oboukhov
Package: lintian Tags: patch, security Severity: wishlist Hello, lintan maintainers! please, see full discussion in -devel: http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2008/08/msg00271.html for example, see the bug http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=494648 (if attacker

Re: Bug#495705: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-19 Thread Russ Allbery
Dmitry E. Oboukhov [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Package: lintian Tags: patch, security Severity: wishlist Hello, lintan maintainers! please, see full discussion in -devel: http://lists.debian.org/debian-devel/2008/08/msg00271.html for example, see the bug

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-16 Thread Vincent Danjean
Brian May wrote: Ivan Jager wrote: qemu-make-debian-root will continue running even if mkdir failed. Dmitry said the script has -e set - if so the script will not continue running if mkdir failed (unless it somehow overrides the -e check, e.g. mkdir /tmp/file || true). You must take care to

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-15 Thread Brian May
Ivan Jager wrote: qemu-make-debian-root will continue running even if mkdir failed. Dmitry said the script has -e set - if so the script will not continue running if mkdir failed (unless it somehow overrides the -e check, e.g. mkdir /tmp/file || true). Also, assuming qemu-make-debian-root is

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-13 Thread Brian May
Dmitry E. Oboukhov wrote: qemu makes mount the directory /tmp/mount.$$. Attacker creates many symlinks /tmp/dir.\d+ - /etc and if qemu (/usr/sbin/qemu-make-debian-root) starts then /etc goes out from root directory tree. The result: system is unusable. I might be dense, but I don't get this.

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-13 Thread Dmitry E. Oboukhov
On 18:42 Wed 13 Aug , Brian May wrote: Dmitry E. Oboukhov wrote: qemu makes mount the directory /tmp/mount.$$. Attacker creates many symlinks /tmp/dir.\d+ - /etc and if qemu (/usr/sbin/qemu-make-debian-root) starts then /etc goes out from root directory tree. The result: system is

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-13 Thread Ivan Jager
On Wed, 13 Aug 2008, Brian May wrote: Dmitry E. Oboukhov wrote: qemu makes mount the directory /tmp/mount.$$. Attacker creates many symlinks /tmp/dir.\d+ - /etc and if qemu (/usr/sbin/qemu-make-debian-root) starts then /etc goes out from root directory tree. The result: system is unusable. I

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-13 Thread Dmitry E. Oboukhov
Report of sid: http://uvw.ru/report.sid.txt -- ... mpd is off . ''`. Dmitry E. Oboukhov : :’ : [EMAIL PROTECTED] `. `~’ GPGKey: 1024D / F8E26537 2006-11-21 `- 1B23 D4F8 8EC0 D902 0555 E438 AB8C 00CF F8E2 6537 signature.asc Description: Digital signature

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-12 Thread Dmitry E. Oboukhov
On 13:45 Mon 11 Aug , Joey Hess wrote: JH Dmitry E. Oboukhov wrote: JH os-prober_1.17 os-prober /tmp/mounted-map (pipe) JH /tmp/raided-map (pipe) JH os-prober writer to

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-12 Thread Dmitry E. Oboukhov
A while ago, the use of libpam-tmpdir was suggested in order to mitigate some of these attacks. It would be nice to see it in use by default, some day. Obviously there will always be some programs that don't look at the TMPDIR environment variable and directly use /tmp. write file to

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-12 Thread Dmitry E. Oboukhov
The script in attach looks through a mirror of a specified distributive and makes a search of '\s*/tmp/' and 'tee [^|]*/tmp/' constructions. It finds less errors then I've found earlier however the results of its work are more accurate. The script looks through all the files of packages marked

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-12 Thread Eugene V. Lyubimkin
Dmitry E. Oboukhov wrote: A while ago, the use of libpam-tmpdir was suggested in order to mitigate some of these attacks. It would be nice to see it in use by default, some day. Obviously there will always be some programs that don't look at the TMPDIR environment variable and directly use

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-12 Thread Dmitry E. Oboukhov
EVL The idea behind libpam-tmpdir is that it creates a subdirectory of /tmp EVL that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other EVL variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you EVL create a non-random filename, because nobody but you can access it. EVL

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-12 Thread Dmitry E. Oboukhov
report for etch: http://uvw.ru/report.etch.txt 107 packages :( On 18:23 Tue 12 Aug , Dmitry E. Oboukhov wrote: TDEO The script in attach looks through a mirror of a specified distributive TDEO and makes a search of '\s*/tmp/' and 'tee [^|]*/tmp/' constructions. TDEO It finds less errors

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-12 Thread John H. Robinson, IV
Dmitry E. Oboukhov wrote: EVL The idea behind libpam-tmpdir is that it creates a subdirectory of /tmp EVL that is only accessible by that user, and then sets TMPDIR and other EVL variables to that. Hence, it doesn't matter nearly as much if you EVL create a non-random filename, because nobody

Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-11 Thread Dmitry E. Oboukhov
Package: mplayer nws ppp twiki Severity: grave Tags: security This message about the error concerns a few packages at once. I've tested all the packages on my Debian mirror. (post|pre)(inst|rm) and config scripts were tested. In some packages I've discovered scripts with errors which may

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-11 Thread Steve Kemp
On Mon Aug 11, 2008 at 10:57:56 +0400, Dmitry E. Oboukhov wrote: I set Severity into grave for this bug. The tableof discovered problems is below. Great work. I don't think there should be any objection to a mass-filing for security sensitive bugs - and from the sounds of

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-11 Thread Dmitry E. Oboukhov
On 10:27 Mon 11 Aug , Steve Kemp wrote: SK On Mon Aug 11, 2008 at 10:57:56 +0400, Dmitry E. Oboukhov wrote: SK I set Severity into grave for this bug. The table of discovered SK problems is below. SK Great work. SK I don't think there should be any objection to a mass-filing for

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-11 Thread Dmitry E. Oboukhov
On 10:57 Mon 11 Aug , Dmitry E. Oboukhov wrote: DEO Package: mplayer nws ppp twiki DEO Severity: grave DEO Tags: security DEO This message about the error concerns a few packages at once. I've DEO tested all the packages on my Debian mirror. (post|pre)(inst|rm) and DEO config scripts

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-11 Thread Dmitry E. Oboukhov
On 10:57 Mon 11 Aug , Dmitry E. Oboukhov wrote: DEO Package: mplayer nws ppp twiki DEO Severity: grave DEO Tags: security DEO This message about the error concerns a few packages at once. I've DEO tested all the packages on my Debian mirror. (post|pre)(inst|rm) and DEO config scripts

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-11 Thread Steve Kemp
Great work. If you have the time to see if any of these are included in stable (etch) please could you do so? It might be that we'd need to release a security update, or at least a package for the next point release. (I guess severity grave and a tag of security will ensure the same

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-11 Thread Dmitry E. Oboukhov
DEO Package: mplayer nws ppp twiki DEO Severity: grave DEO Tags: security DEO This message about the error concerns a few packages at once. I've DEO tested all the packages on my Debian mirror. (post|pre)(inst|rm) and DEO config scripts were tested. DEO In some packages I've discovered

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-11 Thread Marco d'Itri
On Aug 11, Steve Kemp [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: I don't think there should be any objection to a mass-filing for security sensitive bugs - and from the sounds of it you'll only be filing a few bugs, not a mass of them. Except that one of the packages listed was obviously not vulnerable,

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-11 Thread Dmitry E. Oboukhov
On 14:05 Mon 11 Aug , Steve Kemp wrote: SK Great work. If you have the time to see if any of these are included SK in stable (etch) please could you do so? I checked only the packages of last version. I'll few new checks... SK It might be that we'd need to release a security update, or at

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-11 Thread Dmitry E. Oboukhov
MdI just by looking at the name. If program A writes file FILENAME and user1 and user2 can make (write) symlinks 'FILENAME' then name of program A is not important. user1 creates symlink FILENAME to ~user2/.gnupg/file, then user2 starts program A and destroy his .gnupg/file, etc this is

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-11 Thread Julien Cristau
On Mon, Aug 11, 2008 at 18:59:22 +0400, Dmitry E. Oboukhov wrote: MdI just by looking at the name. If program A writes file FILENAME and user1 and user2 can make (write) symlinks 'FILENAME' then name of program A is not important. If that program is in a udeb, then user1 and user2 don't

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-11 Thread Dmitry E. Oboukhov
JC just by looking at the name. JC JC If program A writes file FILENAME and user1 and user2 can make (write) JC symlinks 'FILENAME' then name of program A is not important. JC JC If that program is in a udeb, then user1 and user2 don't exist, so it's JC not a security problem. Yes, udeb is my

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-11 Thread Sam Morris
On Mon, 11 Aug 2008 10:57:56 +0400, Dmitry E. Oboukhov wrote: Package: mplayer nws ppp twiki Severity: grave Tags: security This message about the error concerns a few packages at once. I've tested all the packages on my Debian mirror. (post|pre)(inst|rm) and config scripts were

Re: Possible mass bug filing: The possibility of attack with the help of symlinks in some Debian packages

2008-08-11 Thread Joey Hess
Dmitry E. Oboukhov wrote: os-prober_1.17 os-prober /tmp/mounted-map (pipe) /tmp/raided-map (pipe) os-prober writer to $OS_PROBER_TMP/{mounted-map.raided-map,etc}, which is created by: