Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-06-02 Thread Matt Zimmerman
On Tue, Jun 01, 2004 at 11:21:23PM -0400, James Damour wrote: My understanding of the position of Bob and Mike can be summed up as, in general, shell script's can't be made to use setuid/setgid securely. Basically, the problem comes down that a user can manipulate their PATH to redefining

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-06-02 Thread Jay Berkenbilt
My understanding of the position of Bob and Mike can be summed up as, in general, shell script's can't be made to use setuid/setgid securely. Basically, the problem comes down that a user can manipulate their PATH to redefining basic commands that are used by the shell scripts

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-06-02 Thread Jay Berkenbilt
My understanding of the position of Bob and Mike can be summed up as, in general, shell script's can't be made to use setuid/setgid securely. Basically, the problem comes down that a user can manipulate their PATH to redefining basic commands that are used by the shell scripts

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-06-01 Thread James Damour
Somehow I managed to miss Bob's and Mike's emails on this subject. I rather wish that I *had* seen it before I spent 16 hours coding up the wrapper ;) Still, I don't think my time was wasted; I learned quite a lot and I think that I have something that can still be salvaged. Still salvage seems

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-06-01 Thread James Damour
Somehow I managed to miss Bob's and Mike's emails on this subject. I rather wish that I *had* seen it before I spent 16 hours coding up the wrapper ;) Still, I don't think my time was wasted; I learned quite a lot and I think that I have something that can still be salvaged. Still salvage seems

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-06-01 Thread Matt Zimmerman
On Tue, Jun 01, 2004 at 11:21:23PM -0400, James Damour wrote: My understanding of the position of Bob and Mike can be summed up as, in general, shell script's can't be made to use setuid/setgid securely. Basically, the problem comes down that a user can manipulate their PATH to redefining

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-05-20 Thread Bob Proulx
Steven Augart wrote: First, a retraction: James Damour wrote: On Tue, 2004-05-18 at 09:03, Steven Augart wrote: As you probably know, when a shell sees that it is running a setuid or setgid shell script, it detects this because the euid and ruid or egid and rgid are different. It fixes

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-05-19 Thread Jeroen van Wolffelaar
On Wed, May 19, 2004 at 07:53:46AM -0400, James Damour wrote: On Tue, 2004-05-18 at 09:03, Steven Augart wrote: As you probably know, when a shell sees that it is running a setuid or setgid shell script, it detects this because the euid and ruid or egid and rgid are different. It fixes

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-05-19 Thread Goswin von Brederlow
Jeroen van Wolffelaar [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On Wed, May 19, 2004 at 07:53:46AM -0400, James Damour wrote: On Tue, 2004-05-18 at 09:03, Steven Augart wrote: As you probably know, when a shell sees that it is running a setuid or setgid shell script, it detects this because the euid and

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-05-19 Thread Grzegorz B. Prokopski
On (19/05/04 15:54), Goswin von Brederlow wrote: Jeroen van Wolffelaar [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On Wed, May 19, 2004 at 07:53:46AM -0400, James Damour wrote: On Tue, 2004-05-18 at 09:03, Steven Augart wrote: As you probably know, when a shell sees that it is running a setuid or

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-05-19 Thread Steven Augart
might misinterpret the docs and do something dangerous. I had suggested restricting the program to just being a setgid wrapper at first, because it seemed harder to exploit security bugs that way. I know that that once one gains setgid access to the disk group, one can then go ahead and directly

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-05-19 Thread Goswin von Brederlow
Grzegorz B. Prokopski [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On (19/05/04 15:54), Goswin von Brederlow wrote: Jeroen van Wolffelaar [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On Wed, May 19, 2004 at 07:53:46AM -0400, James Damour wrote: On Tue, 2004-05-18 at 09:03, Steven Augart wrote: As you probably know, when a

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-05-19 Thread Grzegorz B. Prokopski
Now I know why I had such trouble getting setuid programs to work on Linux. My understanding of Greg and Jeroen's explanations is that the kernel ignores whether an interpreted program has the setuid bit set -- it just executes the interpreter given after the #!, passing the full pathname

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-05-19 Thread Goswin von Brederlow
Jeroen van Wolffelaar [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On Wed, May 19, 2004 at 07:53:46AM -0400, James Damour wrote: On Tue, 2004-05-18 at 09:03, Steven Augart wrote: As you probably know, when a shell sees that it is running a setuid or setgid shell script, it detects this because the euid and

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-05-19 Thread Matt Zimmerman
On Wed, May 19, 2004 at 07:53:46AM -0400, James Damour wrote: In this case, this setgid-wrapper concept would work for *all* Java applications. I'm still not sure if it will work for shell driven apps in general, but it sounds reasonable. Security may be a concern, but I believe

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-05-19 Thread Grzegorz B. Prokopski
On (19/05/04 15:54), Goswin von Brederlow wrote: Jeroen van Wolffelaar [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: On Wed, May 19, 2004 at 07:53:46AM -0400, James Damour wrote: On Tue, 2004-05-18 at 09:03, Steven Augart wrote: As you probably know, when a shell sees that it is running a setuid or

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-05-19 Thread Grzegorz B. Prokopski
On (19/05/04 13:14), Grzegorz B. Prokopski wrote: On (19/05/04 15:54), Goswin von Brederlow wrote: Could it be you mean bash droping the setuid/setgid bits when it is set setuid/setgid? Thats a bash speciality preventing hackers to setuid/gid bash as so many rootkits have done in the past.

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-05-19 Thread Steven Augart
and do something dangerous. I had suggested restricting the program to just being a setgid wrapper at first, because it seemed harder to exploit security bugs that way. I know that that once one gains setgid access to the disk group, one can then go ahead and directly modify the raw filesystem

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-05-19 Thread Grzegorz B. Prokopski
Now I know why I had such trouble getting setuid programs to work on Linux. My understanding of Greg and Jeroen's explanations is that the kernel ignores whether an interpreted program has the setuid bit set -- it just executes the interpreter given after the #!, passing the full pathname

Re: setgid-wrapper

2004-05-19 Thread Bob Proulx
Steven Augart wrote: First, a retraction: James Damour wrote: On Tue, 2004-05-18 at 09:03, Steven Augart wrote: As you probably know, when a shell sees that it is running a setuid or setgid shell script, it detects this because the euid and ruid or egid and rgid are different. It fixes

setgid-wrapper (was: Re: ITA: filler - Simple game in Java)

2004-05-17 Thread Steven Augart
problem with setuid and setgid bits not working on shell scripts. I was thinking it might make sense to create a program (and package) named setgid-wrapper? Using filler as an example, the basic idea is this: You'd have a directory, /etc/setgid-wrapper.d , which contains a bunch of config files

setgid-wrapper (was: Re: ITA: filler - Simple game in Java)

2004-05-17 Thread Steven Augart
with setuid and setgid bits not working on shell scripts. I was thinking it might make sense to create a program (and package) named setgid-wrapper? Using filler as an example, the basic idea is this: You'd have a directory, /etc/setgid-wrapper.d , which contains a bunch of config files. The package