On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 09:27:53PM +0200, Pavel Minev Penev wrote:
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 05:27:07PM +0300, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Of course plain md5 hashes are not very helpful. But we can keep MAC[1] for
binaries. Tampering with MAC database is useless.
...
[1] Message
On 00-12-26 Rainer Weikusat wrote:
Christian Kurz [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Debsums seems to help a little bit - you can expect to catch some less-clueful
intruders with it, but it doesn't help in general.
debsums just uses md5sums which can be manipulated on the one hand and
on the
Hi!
I started getting this first on SPARC Debian. And now I get it on
Intel.
On SPARC it was first with 2.2.17
Now on SPARC I get
{iommu_unlockarea} {___f_mmu_unlockarea}
Warning: /boot/System.map-2.2.18pre21 does not match kernel data.
On Intel I get
{module_list}
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 09:37:24AM +, Jim Breton wrote:
|On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 06:30:43PM +0900, Julian Stoev wrote:
| Warning: /boot/System.map-2.2.18 does not match kernel data.
|
| Can somebody explain this? Is this a security problem? I remember
| reading something about fake kernel
On Thu, Dec 21, 2000 at 01:39:19PM +0100, Christian Kurz wrote:
Debsums seems to help a little bit - you can expect to catch some
less-clueful
intruders with it, but it doesn't help in general.
debsums just uses md5sums which can be manipulated on the one hand and
on the other hand you
Christian Kurz [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Debsums seems to help a little bit - you can expect to catch some
less-clueful
intruders with it, but it doesn't help in general.
debsums just uses md5sums which can be manipulated on the one hand and
on the other hand you modify binaries so that
[ Stop sending me unnecessary Ccs.]
On 00-12-26 Rainer Weikusat wrote:
Christian Kurz [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Debsums seems to help a little bit - you can expect to catch some
less-clueful intruders with it, but it doesn't help in general.
debsums just uses md5sums which can be
Christian Kurz [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
[ Stop sending me unnecessary Ccs.]
Start thinking about getting a decent mail client.
and on the other hand you modify binaries so that the md5sum will
still be the same.
So you've effectively broken MD5 in a way that would yield useful
On 00-12-26 Rainer Weikusat wrote:
Christian Kurz [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
[ Stop sending me unnecessary Ccs.]
Start thinking about getting a decent mail client.
My client is so decent, that it support a pure list-reply-function.
Looks like your client is missing such a feature.
and
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 05:27:07PM +0300, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Of course plain md5 hashes are not very helpful. But we can keep MAC[1] for
binaries. Tampering with MAC database is useless.
...
[1] Message Authentication Code. One of possible ways to compute MAC is
H(K,H(K,M)) where H is
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 05:37:54PM +0100, Christian Kurz wrote:
On 00-12-26 Rainer Weikusat wrote:
Christian Kurz [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
... blah blah blah ...
Let's stop arguing about this. Instead of flaming anyone, I'll try to
state the relevant facts, since this argument is only
On 00-12-26 Peter Cordes wrote:
have produced collisions in MD5. This is a Bad Thing for MD5, but it isn't
a real break against MD5. It means that you can find two messages that hash
to the same value. To do so, you _have_ to choose both messages yourself.
If one of the messages is /bin/su,
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 09:27:53PM +0200, Pavel Minev Penev wrote:
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 05:27:07PM +0300, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Of course plain md5 hashes are not very helpful. But we can keep MAC[1] for
binaries. Tampering with MAC database is useless.
...
[1] Message
On Tue, Dec 26, 2000 at 10:52:47PM +0100, Christian Kurz wrote:
On 00-12-26 Peter Cordes wrote:
have produced collisions in MD5. This is a Bad Thing for MD5, but it isn't
a real break against MD5. It means that you can find two messages that hash
to the same value. To do so, you _have_
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