Re: debcheckroot v1.0 released

2014-04-05 Thread Elmar Stellnberger
The tool is now ready to be downloaded at http://www.elstel.org/debcheckroot. Feedback will be highly appreciated! Am 28.01.2014 11:40, schrieb Elmar Stellnberger: Dear Debian-Security Having just released debcheckroot I wanna shortly present you my new tool: It was originally designed as

Re: debcheckroot v1.0 released

2014-04-05 Thread Elmar Stellnberger
Great! I do really believe that Debian and other distros are currently lacking such a tool. Have you also thought about retrieving checksums from package headers? That is at least my approach because storing checksums spearately is a tedious task which the casual user is not likely up to take.

Re: debcheckroot v1.0 released

2014-04-05 Thread Patrick Schleizer
Hi Elmar! This is a most interesting tool! The opensuse logo on http://www.elstel.org/debcheckroot/ is confusing, since this is a Debian tool. This might scare of interested people. As Debian package headers do not use to be signed I think you are mistaken here or maybe I misunderstand. When

Re: debcheckroot v1.0 released

2014-04-05 Thread Elmar Stellnberger
Am 05.04.2014 15:23, schrieb Patrick Schleizer: Hi Elmar! This is a most interesting tool! The opensuse logo on http://www.elstel.org/debcheckroot/ is confusing, since this is a Debian tool. This might scare of interested people. Oh, what an embarrassing mishap! Many Thanks for your evidence

Re: debcheckroot v1.0 released

2014-04-05 Thread Adam D. Barratt
On Sat, 2014-04-05 at 16:52 +, Elmar Stellnberger wrote: Am 05.04.2014 15:23, schrieb Patrick Schleizer: As Debian package headers do not use to be signed I think you are mistaken here or maybe I misunderstand. When you have a Debian medium you trust (such as a Live DVD from a trusted

Re: debcheckroot v1.0 released

2014-04-05 Thread Elmar Stellnberger
Ah; sometimes you oversee what is not hard to see; I am just updating the web page for debcheckroot; thx kind regards, Elmar. Am 05.04.2014 17:00, schrieb Adam D. Barratt: On Sat, 2014-04-05 at 16:52 +, Elmar Stellnberger wrote: Am 05.04.2014 15:23, schrieb Patrick Schleizer: As Debian

Re: debcheckroot v1.0 released

2014-04-05 Thread Elmar Stellnberger
Hi Patrick! Hi Adam! Am 05.04.2014 15:23, schrieb Patrick Schleizer: This approach seemed futile to me. At least for now. There are too many files, that are automatically generated created by postinst scripts. For example /usr/lib/pymodules/python2.7/**/__init__.pyc gets automatically

Re: debcheckroot v1.0 released

2014-04-05 Thread Patrick Schleizer
Elmar Stellnberger: As Debian package headers do not use to be signed I think you are mistaken here or maybe I misunderstand. When you have a Debian medium you trust (such as a Live DVD from a trusted source), we can regard keys in /etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/ and /etc/apt/trusted.gpg as trusted.

Re: [SECURITY] [DSA 2895-1] prosody security update

2014-04-05 Thread Tom Fernandes
Hi, What about the prosody version in squeeze. Is it unaffected? If so, it may help to make it clear in the DSA. Warm regards and thanks for the good work, Tom On 06/04/14 01:10, Luciano Bello wrote: -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 -

Re: debcheckroot v1.0 released

2014-04-05 Thread Paul Wise
On Sat, Apr 5, 2014 at 11:23 PM, Patrick Schleizer wrote: This approach seemed futile to me. At least for now. There are too many files, that are automatically generated created by postinst scripts. For example /usr/lib/pymodules/python2.7/**/__init__.pyc gets automatically generated. Even