On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 10:02:40PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Actually, if you're talking about a properly formed A.3(3) vote, where
you're voting on option A and independent option B, there should be
on the ballot:
Yes on A and B
Yes on A, no on B
Yes on B no on A
no on A, no
* Karl M. Hegbloom [EMAIL PROTECTED] [001204 12:41]:
I've met almost none of you. You are dealing with a stranger who is
potentially "unstable"...
Err, Karl, statements such as these aren't great to put into mail list
archives, particularly when you are doing the whole job search thing. :)
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
supermajority requirement, and quorum is met).
That's a relatively weak criterion, all things
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:20:15PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
My point of view is that these two are essentially equivalent: in the
N+1 style of voting, a person who thinks that the option isn't the best
would vote for "further discussion".
Well, they might do that, yes. Or else they
Damn, I've got to stop postponing and forgetting these things.
On Fri, Dec 01, 2000 at 06:08:50AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
I suspect we've also agreed that the Condorcet winner (if there is
one) should always win. And we seem to have agreed that the winner
should be from the Smith set,
On Sun, Dec 03, 2000 at 10:02:40PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Actually, if you're talking about a properly formed A.3(3) vote, where
you're voting on option A and independent option B, there should be
on the ballot:
Yes on A and B
Yes on A, no on B
Yes on B no on A
no on A, no
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Karl M. Hegbloom) writes:
No, I have not resigned. I almost gave up and wrote an email
quitting and then thought better of it and unquit. My feelings
are very hurt over this.
I've seen at least two messages where you said you resigned.
Can you please make up your
Thomas == Thomas Bushnell, BSG [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Thomas [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Karl M. Hegbloom) writes:
No, I have not resigned. I almost gave up and wrote an email
quitting and then thought better of it and unquit. My feelings
are very hurt over this.
Thomas I've
* Karl M. Hegbloom [EMAIL PROTECTED] [001204 12:41]:
I've met almost none of you. You are dealing with a stranger who is
potentially unstable...
Err, Karl, statements such as these aren't great to put into mail list
archives, particularly when you are doing the whole job search thing. :)
--
Karl == Karl M Hegbloom [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Thomas == Thomas Bushnell, BSG [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Thomas [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Karl M. Hegbloom) writes:
No, I have not resigned. I almost gave up and wrote an email
quitting and then thought better of it and unquit. My feelings
are
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
supermajority requirement, and quorum is met).
That's a relatively weak criterion, all things
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 05:03:25PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
supermajority requirement, and
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
supermajority requirement, and quorum is met).
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 05:03:25PM -0500,
I'm back from vacation now...I've read the other posts, but I'm
probably not going to respond to them (too many to process all at
once...) So I'll just pick up here.
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option
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