Argh, Anthony is correct, I misread the implementation of quorum.
Let's try this again:
A.6(1) An individual ballot is said to rank an option A above some
other option B if it votes for option A but not option B, or if
it votes for both options but assigns a lower canonical
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 02:38:23AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 12:36:21PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
That depends what you consider plausible. I'm willing to believe the
constitution has bugs, and that in some circumstances it may very well
come up with nonsensical
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 02:53:15AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
A.6(3) A supermajority requirement of n:m for an option A means that
when votes are considered which indicate option A as a better
choice than some other option B, the number of votes in favor
of A are multiplied
Single Transferable Vote biases the selection in favor of first
preferences at the expense of other preferences. Can you think of a
better kind of criteria for making the selection?
Other methods can be found at the URLs I cited at the start of the
thread. Reversing the fewest and
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 06:39:16PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Huh? Look, all I'm trying to say is that the straightforward and
obvious reading of the constitution leads to a result that doesn't
make any sense.
I should expand on my concern about your interpretation of the
constitution. If
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 02:53:15AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
A.6(3) A supermajority requirement of n:m for an option A means that
when votes are considered which indicate option A as a better
choice than some other option B, the number of votes in favor
of A are multiplied by
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 07:28:44AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
Whether one criteria is better than another is of course a matter of
opinion.
Agreed. Still, consensus is possible.
Above, you prefer Single Transferable Vote (which also appears to be
called Instant Runoff Voting or IRV on
At 10:07 AM 11-29-2000 -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
That's one question. Another question is: what problem are we trying
to solve?
Last things first... This is a -very- important question that I don't know
the full answer to.
The main problem: The current Standard Resolution Procedure as
Er, I hit send by accident, please wait for my complete reply before
replying
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 09:05:09AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Please reread: [...] for the explanation.
Eh? All I see is that my proposal is less ambiguous than the current
constitution for this kind of case.
[Those specific messages are where we were talking at cross purposes --
*sigh*
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:34:58AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
With your rule, you instead just have an initial vote, with the initial
pairwise preferences:
A dominates B, 60 to 40
A dominates F, 100 to 10
B dominates F, 100 to 10
What part of my proposed A.6 leads you to
At 10:07 AM 11-29-2000 -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
That's one question. Another question is: what problem are we trying
to solve?
Last things first... This is a -very- important question that I don't know
the full answer to.
The main problem: The current Standard Resolution Procedure as
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 12:01:09PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:34:58AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
With your rule, you instead just have an initial vote, with the initial
pairwise preferences:
A dominates B, 60 to 40
A dominates F, 100 to 10
B
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:34:58AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The other, independent, question is what to do when the Condorcet winner
doesn't meet it's supermajority requirement. That is, a simple majority
of people prefer some particular option to all others, but there isn't a
supermajority
What part of my proposed A.6 leads you to believe this? [It's other
parts of the constitution which specify how the ballots are constructed.]
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:16:14AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
If you still require N initial votes and 1 final vote, it has no benefit
over the
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 10:30:05PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:16:14AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
If you still require N initial votes and 1 final vote, it has no benefit
over the current wording, at all, since supermajorities only apply to
final votes, which are
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:41:26AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
One problem if you don't have further discussion win more often than it
perhaps should is as follows:
Suppose you have three options on your ballot, A, B and F. A requires a
3:1 supermajority. Sincere preferences are:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2000 at 05:53:39PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
But, under any reasonable interpretation I can see, A.6(2) only uses
individual preferences to determine whether one option dominates another.
(This matches, say, the definition of "pairwise-victory" given in
It seems, listening to this discussion, that there are some problems
with ambiguity and lack of clarity with regards to Appendix A and the
"Concorde" voting method and how it works.
I wouldn't mind seeing a omnibus amendment that replaces Appendix A
with a clearer version, based on our
At 01:44 AM 11-29-2000 +1000, you wrote:
Why not simply define the terms as they are used by the people who care
about these things, and then clearly express the procedure by which ties
should be dealt with, rather than defining them out of existance?
A.6(2) An option A is said to
Buddha Buck [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
It seems, listening to this discussion, that there are some problems
with ambiguity and lack of clarity with regards to Appendix A and the
"Concorde" voting method and how it works.
So, then, the procedure will be:
1) Amend the Constitution to fix up
At 10:52 AM 11-28-2000 -0800, you wrote:
Buddha Buck [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
So, then, the procedure will be:
1) Amend the Constitution to fix up the voting procedure, especially when
supermajorities are needed.
2) Vote to decide what the threshhold will be for amendments to the
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 01:44:33AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The reason I'm not accepting your interpretation, or considering it
at all reasonable, is that I'm still not seeing any basis for your
interpretation than that it comes up with the right answer.
I'd say "plausible answer" instead
On Tue, Nov 28, 2000 at 03:12:51PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 01:44:33AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The reason I'm not accepting your interpretation, or considering it
at all reasonable, is that I'm still not seeing any basis for your
interpretation than that it
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 12:36:21PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
That depends what you consider "plausible". I'm willing to believe the
constitution has bugs, and that in some circumstances it may very well
come up with nonsensical results for a vote. So I'm not willing to rule
such an answer
On Mon, Nov 27, 2000 at 01:16:30AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Mon, Nov 27, 2000 at 11:48:05AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
But I still don't see how you can read that into the constitution, which
simply talks about `strictly more ballots [preferring] A to B'. It seems
completely
On Tue, Nov 28, 2000 at 05:53:39PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
But, under any reasonable interpretation I can see, A.6(2) only uses
individual preferences to determine whether one option dominates another.
(This matches, say, the definition of pairwise-victory given in
It seems, listening to this discussion, that there are some problems
with ambiguity and lack of clarity with regards to Appendix A and the
Concorde voting method and how it works.
I wouldn't mind seeing a omnibus amendment that replaces Appendix A
with a clearer version, based on our
On Tue, Nov 28, 2000 at 07:52:00AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Tue, Nov 28, 2000 at 05:53:39PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
But, under any reasonable interpretation I can see, A.6(2) only uses
individual preferences to determine whether one option dominates another.
(This matches, say, the
At 01:44 AM 11-29-2000 +1000, you wrote:
Why not simply define the terms as they are used by the people who care
about these things, and then clearly express the procedure by which ties
should be dealt with, rather than defining them out of existance?
A.6(2) An option A is said to
Buddha Buck [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
It seems, listening to this discussion, that there are some problems
with ambiguity and lack of clarity with regards to Appendix A and the
Concorde voting method and how it works.
So, then, the procedure will be:
1) Amend the Constitution to fix up the
At 10:52 AM 11-28-2000 -0800, you wrote:
Buddha Buck [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
So, then, the procedure will be:
1) Amend the Constitution to fix up the voting procedure, especially when
supermajorities are needed.
2) Vote to decide what the threshhold will be for amendments to the
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 01:44:33AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The reason I'm not accepting your interpretation, or considering it
at all reasonable, is that I'm still not seeing any basis for your
interpretation than that it comes up with the right answer.
I'd say plausible answer instead of
At 01:44 AM 11-29-2000 +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Why not simply define the terms as they are used by the people who care
about these things, and then clearly express the procedure by which ties
should be dealt with, rather than defining them out of existance?
A.6(2) An option A is
On Tue, Nov 28, 2000 at 03:12:51PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 01:44:33AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The reason I'm not accepting your interpretation, or considering it
at all reasonable, is that I'm still not seeing any basis for your
interpretation than that it
On Tue, Nov 28, 2000 at 04:01:14PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Let's try it this way:
A.6(1) If the vote has a quorum, this number of ballots are
cast for the default option (these ballots are in addition to
those votes cast by people).
This isn't meaningful. You don't cast
On Mon, Nov 27, 2000 at 11:48:05AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
But I still don't see how you can read that into the constitution, which
simply talks about `strictly more ballots [preferring] A to B'. It seems
completely straightforward to read that as meaning `count the number of
individual
I wrote:
I'm using the dictionary definition of the word "strict".
However, I'm happy with formal definitions of the concept "strict
preference" ...
Thinking about this further, I'm not sure I'm completely happy with the
formal definition of "strict preference".
As I understood the
On Sun, Nov 26, 2000 at 11:44:40AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Mon, Nov 27, 2000 at 02:20:04AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Not helped by me making up my own terminology now and then, by the looks.
What I've been randomly calling the "schwartz" set, is actually meant
to be called the Smith
On Sat, Nov 25, 2000 at 06:07:30AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
A.6(3) is applied to remove all dominated options
But remember that an option is only dominated if strictly more ballots
prefer the dominating option.
Yes, sure.
So, really, you're abusing the terminology
to say that
So, really, you're abusing the terminology
to say that A dominates B, B dominates C and C dominates A. A more
accurate way of describing that situation would be to say that more
ballots prefer A to B, more prefer B to C and more prefer C to A, but
that, strictly speaking, there is no
On Sun, Nov 26, 2000 at 09:02:51AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
So, really, you're abusing the terminology
to say that A dominates B, B dominates C and C dominates A. A more
accurate way of describing that situation would be to say that more
ballots prefer A to B, more prefer B to C and
I wrote:
I'm using the dictionary definition of the word strict.
However, I'm happy with formal definitions of the concept strict
preference ...
Thinking about this further, I'm not sure I'm completely happy with the
formal definition of strict preference.
As I understood the formalisms
On Sun, Nov 26, 2000 at 11:44:40AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Mon, Nov 27, 2000 at 02:20:04AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Not helped by me making up my own terminology now and then, by the looks.
What I've been randomly calling the schwartz set, is actually meant
to be called the Smith
Which would mean that A.6(7) doesn't really apply to anything at
all (since A.6(5) and A.6(6) both would apply before A.6(7)). Personally,
I'm uncomfortable with the idea that A.6(7) is a part of the constitution
that should never be applied.
With a 3:1 supermajority over B, and 60
On Thu, Nov 23, 2000 at 10:58:28PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Fri, Nov 24, 2000 at 10:07:24AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Consider another possible vote outcome:
60 votes A
21 votes BAF
in which case:
Yep -- A didn't win by 3 to 1.
3:1 supermajority requires a near
On Fri, Nov 24, 2000 at 12:22:31PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
If you consider how:
60 votes, ABF
30 votes, BFA
might turn out under the current constitution (again where A requires
3:1 supermajority, B requires simple majority to pass), you'd have:
A dominates B, 60 to 30
On Tue, 21 Nov 2000, Norman Petry wrote:
I agree with you that supermajority requirements don't make much sense when
using the 'Concorde' (Condorcet's) method. Usually, a supermajority
requirement is used to prevent drastic flip-flops in the basic policies of
an organisation. [...]
On Tue, 14 Nov 2000, Buddha Buck wrote:
Here's how it would work. Voters rank all candidates or options, but also
put in a cut line above which all candidates/options are approved, and
below which, no candidates/options are approved. One could create a dummy
candidate to achieve this if
On Thu, Nov 23, 2000 at 08:04:21AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Tue, Nov 21, 2000 at 07:42:44PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
In really rare cases this might lead to paradoxical situations where the
winning option doesn't have the required approval rating, but a lesser
option does.
Some
On Thu, Nov 23, 2000 at 11:31:44PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Suppose you have the following ballot, and the following votes:
A: Remove non-free
B: Support non-free
F: Further discussion
60 votes ABF (Would prefer to remove non-free, but either is okay)
50
On Thu, Nov 23, 2000 at 09:33:58AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Thu, Nov 23, 2000 at 11:31:44PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Suppose you have the following ballot, and the following votes:
A: Remove non-free
B: Support non-free
F: Further discussion
60 votes ABF (Would
With a 3:1 supermajority, the 60 raw votes for A are equivalent to 20
real votes, so A does not dominate B.
On Fri, Nov 24, 2000 at 10:07:24AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
I'm no longer at all sure what you're talking about then. Note that I'm
not referring to the system described in the
On Thu, Nov 23, 2000 at 10:58:28PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Fri, Nov 24, 2000 at 10:07:24AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Consider another possible vote outcome:
60 votes A
21 votes BAF
in which case:
Yep -- A didn't win by 3 to 1.
3:1 supermajority requires a near unanomous
On Tue, Nov 21, 2000 at 11:38:36AM -0600, Norman Petry wrote:
Therefore, provided a good compromise is proposed by someone, there should
never be any radical changes in policy, merely gradual evolution. In this
case, supermajority requirements simply undermine the democratic character
of an
Anthony Towns aj@azure.humbug.org.au writes:
I'm not sure this is an ideal way of looking at things from Debian's
perspective. The usual decision making process in Debian is (supposed
to be) one of reaching consensus on an issue, not one of democracy,
per se. I tend to look at consensus as
Hi all,
You guys caught me sleeping. This is the type of discussion I joined the
list to chime in on :)
On Tue, 14 Nov 2000, Buddha Buck wrote:
Could someone explain to me, in simple terms, how Condorcet-based
voting schemes work in the face of a supermajority requirement?
Well, I
On Tue, Nov 21, 2000 at 12:30:28AM -0800, Rob Lanphier wrote:
You guys caught me sleeping. This is the type of discussion I joined the
list to chime in on :)
Heh :)
On Tue, 14 Nov 2000, Buddha Buck wrote:
Here's how it would work. Voters rank all candidates or options, but also
put
On 21-Nov-00, 03:42 (CST), Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, Nov 21, 2000 at 12:30:28AM -0800, Rob Lanphier wrote:
On Tue, 14 Nov 2000, Buddha Buck wrote:
Here's how it would work. Voters rank all candidates or options, but also
put in a "cut line" above which all
Steve Greenland wrote:
I'm not sure it really makes any sense to have alternatives with
different majority requirements[1]. The recent case of an ammendment
that had an (arguably) different requirement than the original GR came
from two issues:
I agree with you that supermajority
Dear Buddha,
you wrote (14 Nov 2000):
Could someone explain to me, in simple terms, how
Condorcet-based voting schemes work in the face of
a supermajority requirement?
My understanding of Condorcet is that a ballot like
Anthony Towns used as an example ("Remove non-free
// We Love
On Tue, Nov 21, 2000 at 08:43:44AM -0600, Steve Greenland wrote:
On 21-Nov-00, 03:42 (CST), Anthony Towns [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Tue, Nov 21, 2000 at 12:30:28AM -0800, Rob Lanphier wrote:
On Tue, 14 Nov 2000, Buddha Buck wrote:
Here's how it would work. Voters rank all candidates
On Tue, Nov 14, 2000 at 12:00:05AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
Could someone explain to me, in simple terms, how Condorcet-based
voting schemes work in the face of a supermajority requirement?
Have you read A.6.7 (and A.6.8) of the debian constitution?
--
Raul
--
To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to
Hi all,
You guys caught me sleeping. This is the type of discussion I joined the
list to chime in on :)
On Tue, 14 Nov 2000, Buddha Buck wrote:
Could someone explain to me, in simple terms, how Condorcet-based
voting schemes work in the face of a supermajority requirement?
Well, I
Steve Greenland wrote:
I'm not sure it really makes any sense to have alternatives with
different majority requirements[1]. The recent case of an ammendment
that had an (arguably) different requirement than the original GR came
from two issues:
I agree with you that supermajority
On Tue, 21 Nov 2000, Norman Petry wrote:
status quo, it must do so against 3-1 odds (or whatever). Therefore, to
determine the winner, just multiply the votes for the status quo by 3
against every alternative before comparing. For example, suppose we have
the following pair of vote totals:
Dear Buddha,
you wrote (14 Nov 2000):
Could someone explain to me, in simple terms, how
Condorcet-based voting schemes work in the face of
a supermajority requirement?
My understanding of Condorcet is that a ballot like
Anthony Towns used as an example (Remove non-free
// We Love non-free!
On Tue, Nov 21, 2000 at 08:43:44AM -0600, Steve Greenland wrote:
On 21-Nov-00, 03:42 (CST), Anthony Towns aj@azure.humbug.org.au wrote:
On Tue, Nov 21, 2000 at 12:30:28AM -0800, Rob Lanphier wrote:
On Tue, 14 Nov 2000, Buddha Buck wrote:
Here's how it would work. Voters rank all
On Tue, Nov 14, 2000 at 12:00:05AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
Could someone explain to me, in simple terms, how Condorcet-based
voting schemes work in the face of a supermajority requirement?
Have you read A.6.7 (and A.6.8) of the debian constitution?
--
Raul
On Tue, Nov 14, 2000 at 12:00:05AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
Could someone explain to me, in simple terms, how Condorcet-based
voting schemes work in the face of a supermajority requirement?
Hmmm.
The current way it's meant to work is that the supermajority only comes
into play on the final
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