On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 02:38:23AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 12:36:21PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
That depends what you consider "plausible". I'm willing to believe the
constitution has bugs, and that in some circumstances it may very well
come up with nonsensical
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 06:39:16PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Huh? Look, all I'm trying to say is that the straightforward and
obvious reading of the constitution leads to a result that doesn't
make any sense.
I should expand on my concern about your interpretation of the
constitution. If
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 02:53:15AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
A.6(3) A supermajority requirement of n:m for an option A means that
when votes are considered which indicate option A as a better
choice than some other option B, the number of votes in favor
of A are multiplied by
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 07:28:44AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
Whether one criteria is better than another is of course a matter of
opinion.
Agreed. Still, consensus is possible.
Above, you prefer Single Transferable Vote (which also appears to be
called "Instant Runoff Voting" or "IRV"
At 10:07 AM 11-29-2000 -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
That's one question. Another question is: what problem are we trying
to solve?
Last things first... This is a -very- important question that I don't know
the full answer to.
The main problem: The current "Standard Resolution Procedure" as
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 09:05:09AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Please reread: [...] for the explanation.
Eh? All I see is that my proposal is less ambiguous than the current
constitution for this kind of case.
[Those specific messages are where we were talking at cross purposes --
*sigh*
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:34:58AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
With your rule, you instead just have an initial vote, with the initial
pairwise preferences:
A dominates B, 60 to 40
A dominates F, 100 to 10
B dominates F, 100 to 10
What part of my proposed A.6 leads you
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 06:25:17PM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
Twice now, when composing a reply to Raul in the "Condorcet Voting" thread,
I've hit C-E to move to the end of the line, and Eudora has interpreted
that as "Send Immediately", and sent incomplete replies Sorry about that.
What part of my proposed A.6 leads you to believe this? [It's other
parts of the constitution which specify how the ballots are constructed.]
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:16:14AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
If you still require N initial votes and 1 final vote, it has no benefit
over the
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 10:30:05PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:16:14AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
If you still require N initial votes and 1 final vote, it has no benefit
over the current wording, at all, since supermajorities only apply to
final votes, which are
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:41:26AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
One problem if you don't have further discussion win more often than it
perhaps should is as follows:
Suppose you have three options on your ballot, A, B and F. A requires a
3:1 supermajority. Sincere preferences are:
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 11:52:53PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
* A single vote, where the pairwise preferences for A against
"Further Discussion" (only) are scaled according to A's
supermajority requirements.
F:A in A.6(7) stands for For:Against. Not Further Discussion :
Here are the voting methods I mentioned in the various aborted replies
to Raul:
Definitions from http://www.barnsdle.demon.co.uk/vote/vote.html
Defn: An "unbeaten set" is a set of options none of which is beaten [in a
pairwise contest] by anyone outside that set.
Defn: A "small unbeaten set"
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 12:36:21PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
That depends what you consider plausible. I'm willing to believe the
constitution has bugs, and that in some circumstances it may very well
come up with nonsensical results for a vote. So I'm not willing to rule
such an answer
Argh, Anthony is correct, I misread the implementation of quorum.
Let's try this again:
A.6(1) An individual ballot is said to rank an option A above some
other option B if it votes for option A but not option B, or if
it votes for both options but assigns a lower canonical
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 02:38:23AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 12:36:21PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
That depends what you consider plausible. I'm willing to believe the
constitution has bugs, and that in some circumstances it may very well
come up with nonsensical
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 02:53:15AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
A.6(3) A supermajority requirement of n:m for an option A means that
when votes are considered which indicate option A as a better
choice than some other option B, the number of votes in favor
of A are multiplied
Single Transferable Vote biases the selection in favor of first
preferences at the expense of other preferences. Can you think of a
better kind of criteria for making the selection?
Other methods can be found at the URLs I cited at the start of the
thread. Reversing the fewest and
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 06:39:16PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
Huh? Look, all I'm trying to say is that the straightforward and
obvious reading of the constitution leads to a result that doesn't
make any sense.
I should expand on my concern about your interpretation of the
constitution. If
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 02:53:15AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
A.6(3) A supermajority requirement of n:m for an option A means that
when votes are considered which indicate option A as a better
choice than some other option B, the number of votes in favor
of A are multiplied by
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 07:28:44AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
Whether one criteria is better than another is of course a matter of
opinion.
Agreed. Still, consensus is possible.
Above, you prefer Single Transferable Vote (which also appears to be
called Instant Runoff Voting or IRV on
At 10:07 AM 11-29-2000 -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
That's one question. Another question is: what problem are we trying
to solve?
Last things first... This is a -very- important question that I don't know
the full answer to.
The main problem: The current Standard Resolution Procedure as
Er, I hit send by accident, please wait for my complete reply before
replying
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 09:05:09AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Please reread: [...] for the explanation.
Eh? All I see is that my proposal is less ambiguous than the current
constitution for this kind of case.
[Those specific messages are where we were talking at cross purposes --
*sigh*
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:34:58AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
With your rule, you instead just have an initial vote, with the initial
pairwise preferences:
A dominates B, 60 to 40
A dominates F, 100 to 10
B dominates F, 100 to 10
What part of my proposed A.6 leads you to
At 10:07 AM 11-29-2000 -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
That's one question. Another question is: what problem are we trying
to solve?
Last things first... This is a -very- important question that I don't know
the full answer to.
The main problem: The current Standard Resolution Procedure as
Twice now, when composing a reply to Raul in the Condorcet Voting thread,
I've hit C-E to move to the end of the line, and Eudora has interpreted
that as Send Immediately, and sent incomplete replies Sorry about that.
The last reply actually has most of the meat of what I was going to
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 12:01:09PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:34:58AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
With your rule, you instead just have an initial vote, with the initial
pairwise preferences:
A dominates B, 60 to 40
A dominates F, 100 to 10
B
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 02:34:58AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The other, independent, question is what to do when the Condorcet winner
doesn't meet it's supermajority requirement. That is, a simple majority
of people prefer some particular option to all others, but there isn't a
supermajority
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 06:25:17PM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
Twice now, when composing a reply to Raul in the Condorcet Voting thread,
I've hit C-E to move to the end of the line, and Eudora has interpreted
that as Send Immediately, and sent incomplete replies Sorry about that.
The
What part of my proposed A.6 leads you to believe this? [It's other
parts of the constitution which specify how the ballots are constructed.]
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:16:14AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
If you still require N initial votes and 1 final vote, it has no benefit
over the
On Wed, Nov 29, 2000 at 10:30:05PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:16:14AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
If you still require N initial votes and 1 final vote, it has no benefit
over the current wording, at all, since supermajorities only apply to
final votes, which are
On Thu, Nov 30, 2000 at 11:41:26AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
One problem if you don't have further discussion win more often than it
perhaps should is as follows:
Suppose you have three options on your ballot, A, B and F. A requires a
3:1 supermajority. Sincere preferences are:
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