Raul Miller wrote:
Once that definition is made to my satisfaction, I like this option, or
one of these two variants:
[2a] Discard the result if the CpSSD winner doesn't meet supermajority.
Default option (Further Discussion) wins by default. New election to
be held after appropriate
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 10:16:27AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
Unlike Branden, I would like some issues to be hard to change -- things
like the Social Contract and the DFSG. I think it's one of Debian's
strenghts that we take a principled stand, and have not waivered on
those principles (at
Branden == Branden Robinson [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Branden It does? Having a General Resolution on hold for over two
Branden years works?
You are blaming the process not working because gecko was in
charge to a fault in the process?
manoj
--
Chicago Transit
Branden == Branden Robinson [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Branden On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 12:06:01PM -0600, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
I think this is not really a matter of screwing up, this is a
matter of, in some cases, avoiding the tyranny of the majority;
Branden ...a platitude directly
Branden Robinson wrote:
Supermajority requirements don't retard mistakes, just change.
On Wed, Nov 20, 2002 at 11:04:10PM -0800, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
i tend to agree with the philosophy that you need to convince at least
half of the voting populous.
[1] Who is the voting populous?
Branden Robinson wrote:
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 12:39:27PM -0600, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
Interesting. However, that paper makes a number of assumptions
May (1952) shows that majority rule is the only positively
responsive voting rule that satisfies anonymity (all voters are
treated
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 09:53:55PM +0100, Jochen Voss wrote:
Making random additions (with only half-understood consequences)
to the original Condorcet voting scheme seems messy to me.
Er.. are you suggesting we squelch debate on supermajority?
None of the additions were random. They were
Hello,
For those of us that haven't followed the discussions about new voting
methods closely throughout their long history, and aren't fluent in the
philosophies and merits of the different options, I'd find it very helpful
if someone could post some simple answers to these questions by the time
On Wed, Nov 20, 2002 at 11:04:10PM -0800, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
i tend to agree with the philosophy that you need to convince at least
half of the voting populous.
[1] Who is the voting populous?
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 01:11:12PM -0800, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
depends upon
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 01:24:59PM -0800, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
if the Default Option is something other that Further Discussion or
Forget We Ever Had This Vote, then i cannot agree.
The Constitution defines the default option as either 'Further Discussion'
[decision votes] or 'None of
Hello,
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 10:16:27AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
As to why I prefer (2) over the rest... CpSSD is well-defined and
reasonably well studied when all votes are counted equally. I find the
idea of scaling votes involving particular options to change it enough
that its
Raul Miller wrote:
I'm assuming that we can describe an implementation of supermajority
with CpSSD where supermajority does not encourage insincere voting.
WRT changes to the Constitution, a Tyrrany of the Status Quo may not be
a bad thing. my sole purpose in bringing up the study was to make
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 03:30:16PM -0600, John Goerzen wrote:
1. Why are we doing this? What are the problems that we hope to solve?
What are some examples of this?
The description of the voting system in the current constitution
is kind of broken. For one there is the spelling mistake
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 12:04:34AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Also, what do you think of imposing some kind of quorum requirement
(like maybe 1% of the voters need to vote in an election which changes
the constitution, or some other such thing quite a bit more severe for
our current set of
Hello,
On Tue, Nov 19, 2002 at 05:54:30PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Here's some thoughts about how we might implement supermajority:
[1] ... [5]
I did not think much about this until now.
But what do you think about
[6] We could introduce a second kind of vote, which is exclusively used
to
Hi,
Jochen Voss:
* If we really would want to cover the case of several
competing proposals we could use a two step mechanism: we
could first determine a candidate via Condorect voting with
CpSCC (without any supermajority stuff) and then use [6] the
decide whether we want the
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 11:53:48PM +0100, Jochen Voss wrote:
[6] We could introduce a second kind of vote, which is exclusively used
to change the constitution or social contract. We could use
something like: every voter may just say yes or no to the
proposed change (i.e. there is
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 03:42:12PM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
Obviously -- The paper defines neutrality as all options are treated
the same. If we are asserting a supermajority requirement on certain
actions, like constitutional amendments, then we are not treating all
options the same, and
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 03:49:46PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
[3] Is competence an issue? Why or why not?
I'd say this is addressed by our NM system.
Are you claiming that NM is our only criteria for determining relevant
competence on all issues?
What do you propose? Isn't the scope
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 05:59:37PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
In fact, there are a number of insincere strategies around quorum,
Can you elaborate on this, please?
--
G. Branden Robinson|I'm sorry if the following sounds
Debian GNU/Linux |combative and
Branden == Branden Robinson [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Branden We've already seen what is probably insincere voting in the
Branden DPL elections (a lot of people ranked the default option
Branden second, which means my guy or nobody -- I doubt any *two*
Branden of the candidates provoked that
Obviously -- The paper defines neutrality as all options are treated
the same. If we are asserting a supermajority requirement on certain
actions, like constitutional amendments, then we are not treating all
options the same, and therefore lose neutrality.
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 03:49:46PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
[3] Is competence an issue? Why or why not?
I'd say this is addressed by our NM system.
Are you claiming that NM is our only criteria for determining relevant
competence on all issues?
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 03:30:16PM -0600, John Goerzen wrote:
For those of us that haven't followed the discussions about new voting
methods closely throughout their long history, and aren't fluent in the
philosophies and merits of the different options, I'd find it very helpful
if someone
On Nov 19, Raul Miller wrote:
Here's some thoughts about how we might implement supermajority:
[1] The simplest: discard supermajority entirely. Nothing special is
required to override important decisions. This has some elegantly
simple mathematical properties but I don't know of any other
On Thursday, November 21, 2002, at 12:03 PM, Branden Robinson wrote:
Arguably, if the system you have mostly works (which it apparently
does),
It does? Having a General Resolution on hold for over two years
works?
It mostly works, in the sense that we have one of the best --- if not
the
On Thu, Nov 21, 2002 at 11:55:54PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Wed, Nov 20, 2002 at 05:24:02PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
3. If a majority of N:1 is required for an option A, and V(A,D)
is less than or equal to N * V(D,A), then A is dropped from
consideration. If a simple
Raul Miller wrote:
Once that definition is made to my satisfaction, I like this option, or
one of these two variants:
[2a] Discard the result if the CpSSD winner doesn't meet supermajority.
Default option (Further Discussion) wins by default. New election to
be held after appropriate
On Thu, Nov 21, 2002 at 11:57:33PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Wed, Nov 20, 2002 at 11:48:47AM -0500, Branden Robinson wrote:
I don't understand, then. When have we ever had a non-election vote
where the winning option *did* defeat the first runner-up by a 2:1
margin, let alone 3:1. I
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 10:16:27AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
Unlike Branden, I would like some issues to be hard to change -- things
like the Social Contract and the DFSG. I think it's one of Debian's
strenghts that we take a principled stand, and have not waivered on
those principles (at
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 12:04:34AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Tue, Nov 19, 2002 at 05:54:30PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
[1] The simplest: discard supermajority entirely. Nothing special is
required to override important decisions. This has some elegantly
simple mathematical
Branden == Branden Robinson [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Branden It does? Having a General Resolution on hold for over two
Branden years works?
You are blaming the process not working because gecko was in
charge to a fault in the process?
manoj
--
Chicago Transit
Branden == Branden Robinson [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Branden On Tue, Nov 19, 2002 at 05:54:30PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
[1] The simplest: discard supermajority entirely. Nothing special is
required to override important decisions. This has some elegantly
simple mathematical properties
Branden Robinson wrote:
Also, what do you think of imposing some kind of quorum requirement
(like maybe 1% of the voters need to vote in an election which
changes the constitution, or some other such thing quite a bit more
severe for our current set of developers than that of any draft
Anthony == Anthony DeRobertis [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Anthony On Thursday, November 21, 2002, at 12:03 PM, Branden Robinson wrote:
I suggest you ask the Project Secretary's opinion before pursuing this
line of reasoning too far (7.1.3).
Anthony If the secretary doesn't chime in to this
John == John H Robinson, IV [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
John
http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:4wJT-1c0FykC:www.democ.uci.edu/democ/papers/McGann02.pdf+condorcet+supermajorityhl=enie=UTF-8
Interesting. However, that paper makes a number of assumptions
May (1952) shows that
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 12:06:01PM -0600, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
I think this is not really a matter of screwing up, this is a
matter of, in some cases, avoiding the tyranny of the majority;
...a platitude directly rebutted by the paper to which John Robinson
linked.
My
Branden == Branden Robinson [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Branden On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 12:06:01PM -0600, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
I think this is not really a matter of screwing up, this is a
matter of, in some cases, avoiding the tyranny of the majority;
Branden ...a platitude directly
Branden Robinson wrote:
Supermajority requirements don't retard mistakes, just change.
On Wed, Nov 20, 2002 at 11:04:10PM -0800, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
i tend to agree with the philosophy that you need to convince at least
half of the voting populous.
[1] Who is the voting populous?
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 12:39:27PM -0600, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
Interesting. However, that paper makes a number of assumptions
May (1952) shows that majority rule is the only positively
responsive voting rule that satisfies anonymity (all voters are
treated equally) and
Branden Robinson wrote:
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 12:39:27PM -0600, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
Interesting. However, that paper makes a number of assumptions
May (1952) shows that majority rule is the only positively
responsive voting rule that satisfies anonymity (all voters are
Branden == Branden Robinson [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Branden On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 01:15:45PM -0600, Manoj Srivastava wrote:
Except I have not found the paper to be convincing; I think
that the underlying assumptions are about mechanisms that are far
different from ours, and that this
Hello,
On Tue, Nov 19, 2002 at 12:08:28PM -0800, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
the whole supermajority thing i feel would make people vote insincerely.
the ony way to avoid it, as i see it, is to _remove entirely_ the Quorum
and Supermajority requirements.
Just to repeat myself: I would support
Raul Miller wrote:
Branden Robinson wrote:
Supermajority requirements don't retard mistakes, just change.
On Wed, Nov 20, 2002 at 11:04:10PM -0800, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
i tend to agree with the philosophy that you need to convince at least
half of the voting populous.
[1] Who
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 09:53:55PM +0100, Jochen Voss wrote:
Making random additions (with only half-understood consequences)
to the original Condorcet voting scheme seems messy to me.
Er.. are you suggesting we squelch debate on supermajority?
None of the additions were random. They were
Hello,
On Wed, Nov 20, 2002 at 05:24:02PM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
2. If fewer ballots are received than the required quorum for
the vote, the default option is declared the winner.
This is a version of quorum I could happily live with.
3. If a majority of N:1 is required
Hello,
For those of us that haven't followed the discussions about new voting
methods closely throughout their long history, and aren't fluent in the
philosophies and merits of the different options, I'd find it very helpful
if someone could post some simple answers to these questions by the time
Hello,
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 04:04:35PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 09:53:55PM +0100, Jochen Voss wrote:
Making random additions (with only half-understood consequences)
to the original Condorcet voting scheme seems messy to me.
Er.. are you suggesting we squelch
On Wed, Nov 20, 2002 at 11:04:10PM -0800, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
i tend to agree with the philosophy that you need to convince at least
half of the voting populous.
[1] Who is the voting populous?
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 01:11:12PM -0800, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
depends upon
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 01:24:59PM -0800, John H. Robinson, IV wrote:
if the Default Option is something other that Further Discussion or
Forget We Ever Had This Vote, then i cannot agree.
The Constitution defines the default option as either 'Further Discussion'
[decision votes] or 'None of
Hello,
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 10:16:27AM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
As to why I prefer (2) over the rest... CpSSD is well-defined and
reasonably well studied when all votes are counted equally. I find the
idea of scaling votes involving particular options to change it enough
that its
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 03:30:16PM -0600, John Goerzen wrote:
1. Why are we doing this? What are the problems that we hope to solve?
What are some examples of this?
We ran into conflicting interpretations of our current constitution when
discussing how to vote on some issues related to
Raul Miller wrote:
I'm assuming that we can describe an implementation of supermajority
with CpSSD where supermajority does not encourage insincere voting.
WRT changes to the Constitution, a Tyrrany of the Status Quo may not be
a bad thing. my sole purpose in bringing up the study was to make
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 03:30:16PM -0600, John Goerzen wrote:
1. Why are we doing this? What are the problems that we hope to solve?
What are some examples of this?
The description of the voting system in the current constitution
is kind of broken. For one there is the spelling mistake
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 12:04:34AM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Also, what do you think of imposing some kind of quorum requirement
(like maybe 1% of the voters need to vote in an election which changes
the constitution, or some other such thing quite a bit more severe for
our current set of
Hello,
On Tue, Nov 19, 2002 at 05:54:30PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
Here's some thoughts about how we might implement supermajority:
[1] ... [5]
I did not think much about this until now.
But what do you think about
[6] We could introduce a second kind of vote, which is exclusively used
to
If we would require a quorum (in the sense of Anthony Towns draft,
i.e. we would require some minimal total number of votes) INSTEAD
of a supermajority, I would like this:
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 11:36:27PM +0100, Jochen Voss wrote:
1) Implementing a quorum seems to have a lower risk of
Hi,
Branden Robinson:
Yes. Anything more than half is most, by definition.
Not in my book. Sorry.
consensus
n : agreement of the majority in sentiment or belief [syn: {general
agreement}]
The dictionary where you found that definition needs to be taken out and
Hi,
Jochen Voss:
* If we really would want to cover the case of several
competing proposals we could use a two step mechanism: we
could first determine a candidate via Condorect voting with
CpSCC (without any supermajority stuff) and then use [6] the
decide whether we want the
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 11:53:48PM +0100, Jochen Voss wrote:
[6] We could introduce a second kind of vote, which is exclusively used
to change the constitution or social contract. We could use
something like: every voter may just say yes or no to the
proposed change (i.e. there is
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 03:42:12PM -0500, Buddha Buck wrote:
Obviously -- The paper defines neutrality as all options are treated
the same. If we are asserting a supermajority requirement on certain
actions, like constitutional amendments, then we are not treating all
options the same, and
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 03:49:46PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
[3] Is competence an issue? Why or why not?
I'd say this is addressed by our NM system.
Are you claiming that NM is our only criteria for determining relevant
competence on all issues?
What do you propose? Isn't the scope
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 05:59:37PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
In fact, there are a number of insincere strategies around quorum,
Can you elaborate on this, please?
--
G. Branden Robinson|I'm sorry if the following sounds
Debian GNU/Linux |combative and
Branden == Branden Robinson [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
Branden We've already seen what is probably insincere voting in the
Branden DPL elections (a lot of people ranked the default option
Branden second, which means my guy or nobody -- I doubt any *two*
Branden of the candidates provoked that
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 05:59:37PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
In fact, there are a number of insincere strategies around quorum,
On Fri, Nov 22, 2002 at 09:14:48PM -0500, Branden Robinson wrote:
Can you elaborate on this, please?
Ok...
They're not voting strategies in the classic sense, since
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