On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
supermajority requirement, and quorum is met).
That's a relatively weak criterion, all
Raul Miller wrote:
I would like to know if anyone have a specific problem with the following
concept of cumulative preference:
An individual ballot prefers option A to option B, if:
(*) Option A is mentioned at some preference, and option B is not
mentioned at all, or
(*) Option A is
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 05:43:43PM -0600, Norman Petry wrote:
One point though -- I recommend that you avoid reference to numerical
rankings in the constitutional wording. So long as ballots are
submitted by e-mail, it may make sense for voters to number the
options. In the future, however,
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:20:15PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
My point of view is that these two are essentially equivalent: in the
N+1 style of voting, a person who thinks that the option isn't the best
would vote for further discussion.
Well, they might do that, yes. Or else they might
On Mon, Dec 04, 2000 at 11:41:48AM -0800, Karl M. Hegbloom wrote:
You don't have to put my key in the ring if you don't want to. Wait
Karl, Karl, Karl. Your new key would have been accepted if you simply
got it signed the proper way. Instead, you proposed lots of insecure
haphazard schemes to
My point of view is that these two are essentially equivalent: in the
N+1 style of voting, a person who thinks that the option isn't the best
would vote for further discussion.
Well, they might do that, yes. Or else they might think to themselves,
well, I'm never going to get my
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 12:32:12AM +1000, Anthony Towns wrote:
The Condorcet criterion says that if there's a single option that
pairwise beats every other option, it should win (assuming there's no
supermajority requirement, and quorum is met).
That's a relatively weak criterion, all
I would like to know if anyone have a specific problem with the following
concept of cumulative preference:
An individual ballot prefers option A to option B, if:
(*) Option A is mentioned at some preference, and option B is not
mentioned at all, or
(*) Option A is mentioned at a lower
Raul Miller wrote:
I would like to know if anyone have a specific problem with the following
concept of cumulative preference:
An individual ballot prefers option A to option B, if:
(*) Option A is mentioned at some preference, and option B is not
mentioned at all, or
(*) Option A is
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 03:24:34PM -0500, Raul Miller wrote:
An individual ballot prefers option A to option B, if:
(*) Option A is mentioned at some preference, and option B is not
mentioned at all, or
(*) Option A is mentioned at a lower cannonical preference number than
option B.
(This
On Tue, Dec 05, 2000 at 05:43:43PM -0600, Norman Petry wrote:
One point though -- I recommend that you avoid reference to numerical
rankings in the constitutional wording. So long as ballots are
submitted by e-mail, it may make sense for voters to number the
options. In the future, however,
11 matches
Mail list logo
